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Abstract 
This thesis consists of four independent chapters on urban economics and international trade.  
The first chapter analyses the effect of an improvement of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) on student performance. By exploiting a vast infrastructural program 
implemented in Italy, I study how the availability of high-internet speed affects student 
educational outcomes. On average, I find a positive effect on student performance in numeracy 
subjects. However, the policy outcome significantly depends on individual socio-economic 
backgrounds, with disadvantaged students mostly excluded from the benefits. As a result, the 
program increased the dispersion of student outcomes. 
The second chapter (co-authored) analyses a security policy aimed at tackling criminal 
organisations. The policy, consisting in the confiscation of mafia assets, is meant to eradicate the 
pervasive presence of the mafia organisations on the Italian territory and harm their business 
model and earnings. We investigate to what extent this policy is able to regenerate deprived areas 
by assessing its impact on the value of buildings located in the nearby of confiscated/re-allocated 
properties. Results show a positive effect of confiscation on housing prices, with the largest gains 
concentrated in the most deprived areas and where mafia organisations are more deeply rooted.  
Third and fourth chapter investigate between and within-industry differences in the spatial 
distribution of economic activities. The third chapter consists in a cross-country analysis of the 
economic geography of manufacturing and service plants. I compute continuous agglomeration 
and co-agglomeration indices using two comprehensive datasets, that cover the whole 
population of British and French establishments. The estimates are used to analyse in a common 
framework between- and with-industry variation in agglomeration patterns. The empirical 
strategy makes it possible to test some of the main predictions suggested by the literature. The 
fourth chapter, focussing on France only, investigates to what extent exogenous trade shocks are 
able to reshape the spatial distribution of manufacturing activities. Results unveil a positive effect 
of import penetration from emerging economies on firm spatial agglomeration. 
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Introduction 
This thesis consists of four independent chapters on urban economics and international trade.  
The first section of the thesis focuses on the evaluation of spatially targeted policies.   Place-based 
policies, such as placement of infrastructure and targeted economic development programmes, 
are intended to stimulate local economic growth and tackle spatial inequalities within countries. 
Other policies, although not explicitly targeting underperforming areas, focus on socio-economic 
phenomena characterised by significant spatial concentration. In both cases, the assessment of 
the pursued welfare effects and potential local externalities need to be performed within a 
common spatial framework. In particular, researchers are expected to isolate the causal effect 
from spatially correlated confounding factors, to carefully identify the spatial extension of the 
outcomes and to produce results that are robust to changes in shape and extension of the spatial 
aggregation. In this section, I analyse a large infrastructural program aimed at reducing the 
technological divide in Southern Italy as well as a security policy tackling the power exerted by 
organised crime on deprived territories. 
 
Chapter 1 investigates the impact of high-speed broadband on educational achievements, 
analysing a large infrastructural program implemented by the Italian Government. The causal 
effect of internet speed is identified exploiting three key features of the program implementation. 
First, I focus on designated ‘market failure areas’, where the Government is the only investor, 
bypassing potentially confounding effects that could stem from 
complementarity/substitutability between public and private intervention. Secondly, I exploit 
the exogeneity of the timing of roll-out of the broadband infrastructure, dictated by technical 
considerations and other quasi-random factors. Finally, I measure the potential treatment rather 
than the actual broadband connection to overcome biases related to the - possibly endogenous - 
decision to connect. To carry out my analysis, I combine a rich panel dataset covering the whole 
population of Italian students with broadband data measured at a very fine spatial scale. My 
results exhibit an average positive effect of high-speed internet broadband on educational 
achievements. However, this masks substantial heterogeneity: while students with better-off 
backgrounds gain from internet speed, the opposite is found for disadvantaged students.  
Chapter 2, co-authored with Marco Di Cataldo and Elisabetta Pietrostefani, focuses on a large-
scale policy consisting in the confiscation of properties belonging to individuals convicted for 
mafia-related crimes, and their re-allocation to a new use. We test the hypothesis that the policy 
contributes to the regeneration of urban spaces by assessing its impact on the value of buildings 
in the vicinity of confiscated/re-allocated properties. By exploiting detailed information on the 
exact location and timing of over 13,000 confiscated and re-allocated properties and over 80,000 
geo-localised house sale points, we perform difference-in-differences analyses, investigating the 
externalities of the policy in the 55 major Italian cities. The results unveil a positive and significant 
effect of re-allocations of confiscated real estate assets on house prices, that declines with distance 
from the re-allocation site. The impact is larger in cities with stronger mafia presence and in more 
deprived neighbourhoods. This suggests that the policy contributes to add value to the territory 
where it is applied, and favours processes of urban revitalisation. These findings have important 
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implications for the development of deprived urban areas characterised by a strong presence of 
criminal organisations.  
The second part of the thesis investigates the heterogeneity in between- and within-industry 
spatial agglomeration patterns. Over the past decades, new technologies and rapid decline of 
trade costs have fostered the globalisation of good and capital markets. Driven by the rising 
political divide between cities and the countryside, a large body of empirical and theoretical work 
has unveiled significant effects of trade liberalisations on economic inequality. These often take 
the form of dramatic increases in spatial disparities. Nevertheless, the use of discrete, non-
overlapping and often economically meaningless spatial units prevents researchers from 
correctly identifying the way exogenous shocks change the internal geography of jobs and 
economic activities. In this section I study the spatial distribution of economic activities and the 
way foreign shocks change the location of firms within a country. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the spatial distribution patterns of manufacturing and service firms in 
France and the United Kingdom. By exploiting a large micro-dataset covering the whole 
population of French and British establishments over the period 2008-2015, I analyse the specific 
co-agglomeration patterns that characterise various types of plant within each industry. Industry-
group location patterns are analysed interpreting agglomeration/coagglomeration estimates 
within a common framework. By comparing the main within-industry patterns identified in the 
two macro-sectors, I am able to test some of the most relevant dynamics predicted in the recent 
literature on agglomeration economies.  
Chapter 4, focussing on French manufacturing establishments only, analyses the impact of 
import competition on the location decisions of plants between and within industries. Results 
suggest that import penetration slows down the decline of spatial agglomeration that 
characterises the manufacturing sector in several developed countries. However, behind the 
aggregate effects, the analysis unveils a significant heterogeneity across different plant types. In 
general, import competition is found to affect manufacturing industries, reshaping both their 
aggregate economic geography and the nature of manufacturing activities performed in different 
regions. 
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Chapter 1: High-speed Broadband and Educational 
Achievements 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Nowadays, home computers have become an essential tool of modern education in the developed 
countries. According to the last OECD1 report on ICT and education, access to home computers 
is now nearly universal in most OECD countries. However, data still show significant disparities 
in the access to and quality of home computing. The digital divide is often related to various 
levels of access to high-speed internet connections and for this reason many countries have 
invested relevant amounts of public funding in order to upgrade information and 
communication technologies (ICT) with the aim of increasing the available internet connection 
speeds. In spite of this, the actual impact of ICT on student performance, as on several other social 
outcomes, is still debated (Machin, Sandra & Silva, 2007; Barrera-Osorio & Linden, 2009; Checchi, 
Rettore, & Girardi, 2015; Cristia, Ibarrarán, Cueto, & Santiago, 2017; Faber et al., 2015). Recently, 
Italy, one of the lowest performers in the Pisa tests among OECD countries, started to gradually 
reduce this historical gap with other European countries in the diffusion of ICT devices. In 2012, 
50% of Italian students browsed the internet for their schoolwork at least once a week at home, 
5% more than in 2009 but still below the OECD average of 54%. As such, Italian students are still 
characterised by a significant digital divide, especially in the poorer Southern regions. In 2012, 
almost 80% declared that they used the internet outside of school at least once a week in order to 
find practical information, but this number drops to only 66% for disadvantaged students. 
Despite efforts to provide schools with ICT devices and laboratories, actual usage is still 
constrained by the general inadequacy of broadband infrastructures.  
 
This paper sets out to estimate the causal effect of upgrades to the available internet speed on 
educational achievements. The identification strategy relies on the specific features of a policy 
implemented by the Italian Government in 2014; the ’National Ultra-Broadband Plan’ (NUBP) is a 
national plan aimed at ensuring 100% coverage at 30 Mbps and 85% coverage at 100 Mbps by 
2020. This study exploits two specific characteristics of the plan. First, the NUBP targets ‘market 
failure areas’, where no private operator is interested in investing. This ensures there are no 
concerns about possible overlaps with the interests of private actors. Second, in order to cover 
 
1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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the whole territory in a relatively short period, whilst minimising public spending, the NUBP 
was implemented progressively in adjacent territories (see Fig. 1.1). As a result, the timing of the 
implementation can hardly be related to variables associated with educational outcomes. In 
particular, the main estimation assumption is that, within each province (Nuts-3 level regions), 
the rollout can be considered exogenous. In addition, I focus on the broadband supply measure, 
rather than measuring its actual consumption. This allows me to bypass the endogeneity that 
may characterise the internet usage measures frequently used in the literature. Results suggest a 
small but significant positive effect of 30 Mbps broadband on educational achievement. When 
heterogeneity in social background is accounted for, this impact remains positive and significant 
for the best performers in the previous grade, while it becomes non-significant or negative for 
disadvantaged students. Overall, students’ backgrounds seem to play a relevant role in the 
heterogeneous policy outcome. 
 
This study contributes to the literature on social outcomes of the internet in two ways. First, it 
focusses on the impact of high-speed internet broadband on educational outcomes where 
previous studies have primarily focused on different outcomes, such as employment and 
productivity (Akerman et al., 2015), electoral outcomes (Falck et al., 2014; Campante et al., 2017), 
marriage rates (Bellou, 2015) and housing prices (Alhfeldt et al., 2017). A few studies have focused 
on the relationship between home computer technology and student achievement. For example, 
Beltran et al. (2006) use a large panel dataset of US students to explore the causal relationship 
between computer ownership and various educational attainment levels, with a specific focus on 
high school graduation. Fairlie and Robinson (2013) conducted a large field study involving 
almost 8,000 students enrolled in grades 6-10 in 15 different middle and high schools in the 
United States. Fiorini (2010) use data from the Longitudinal Study of Australian Children (LSAC) 
to analyse the causal relationship between computer usage and children’s cognitive and non-
cognitive skills. They are able to test individual skills at two moments in time, instrumenting 
computer usage with their parents’ previous computer ownership. Results generally exhibit 
computer usage to have a positive effect on cognitive skills, whereas the results are mixed for 
non-cognitive skills. Studies directly relating internet access to educational outcomes are 
generally descriptive. To my knowledge, the only exception is Faber et al. (2015). Exploiting 
randomly placed jumps in the available ICT across neighbouring residences, the authors 
investigate the causal effect of a sensible increase in available internet speeds on educational 
outcomes in the United Kingdom. The second relevant contribution of this work is that it exploits 
the features of a large infrastructure policy, bypassing the endogeneity issues that usually affect 
similar studies.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 provides a general background of the Italian 
School systems and describes the main features of the NUBP. Section 1.3 presents a simple 
theoretical framework. Section 1.4 describes the different data sources used and the procedure 
implemented to define school catchment areas. In Section 1.5 describes the empirical strategy. In 
section 1.6, 1.7 and 1.8, I present the results and discuss the main policy implications. 
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1.2 Institutional Background 
 
 
1.2.1 The National Ultra-Broadband Plan  
 
In 2014, the Italian Government set up the ‘National Ultra-Broadband Plan’ (Piano Nazionale Banda 
Ultra-Larga - NUBP), a massive program aiming to ensure 100% coverage at 30 Mbps and 85% 
coverage at 100 Mbps by 2020. The plan was developed in accordance with the ‘European 
Broadband Guidelines’, which set out how the EU State aid rules apply to public funding for the 
rollout of broadband networks. The national territory was classified into three different areas 
according to existing or expected future broadband infrastructure deployment:  
 
1. White areas: areas where no provider of broadband services is currently operating and 
where no such provider is expected to enter the market in the coming three years.  
2. Grey areas: areas where one (infrastructure-based) provider is already active, but 
another network is unlikely to be developed in the next three years.  
3. Black areas: areas where there are or there will be in the next three years at least two 
basic broadband networks of different operators.  
 
The NUBP is based on four main pillars. First, the State guarantees administrative simplification 
and a reduction in burdens for all of the target regions. Second, private investments are 
encouraged in black and grey areas through the creation of tax exemption tools for infrastructure 
operations. Grey areas also benefit from various measures to facilitate the access to financial 
resources, the establishment of a guarantee fund and access to credit at subsidised rates. Finally, 
in white areas (often incorrectly defined as “market failure areas2” ) the Public Sector intervenes 
directly to realise the infrastructures.  
 
After an initial delay, due to a number of legal disputes, in 2015 the program started to produce 
positive effects (see Fig. 1.3). The 30 Mbps broadband penetration rate increased between 2015 
and 2017, from 25% to almost 50%. Thus far, the implementation speed has widely varied across 
different regions. Basilicata, Puglia and Sicily, three poor Southern regions, experienced, 
respectively, a growth from 9% to 58%, from 15% to 80% and from 21% to 67%. The specific 
characteristics of the broadband infrastructures and the way the policy was implemented are 
such that these results are generally driven by an increase in high-speed broadband penetration 
in individual municipalities from 0% to 60%-95%. These significant results were made possible 
by the availability of EU structural funds (the European Regional Development Fund, European 
Agricultural Fund for rural development and the Development and Cohesion Fund), which 
complemented public funds, and the general inadequacy of existing infrastructures, offering an 
 
2 These areas are defined According to Article 107(3)(c)TFEU (Treaty of Functioning of the European Union). State aid 
is  allowed in order “facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not 
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest”. In the Communication from the Commission 
on EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM). Brussels, 8.5.2012. COM(2012), it is stated that “State aid policy should focus on 
facilitating well-designed aid targeted at market failures and objectives of common European interest. State aid measures can, under 
certain conditions, correct market failures, thereby improving the efficient functioning of markets and enhancing competitiveness. 
Further, where markets provide efficient outcomes but these are deemed unsatisfactory from a cohesion policy point of view, State aid 
may be used to obtain a more desirable, equitable market outcome. In particular, a well-targeted State intervention in the broadband 
field can contribute to reducing the ‘digital divide’  between areas or regions where affordable and competitive broadband services are 
on offer and areas where such services are not.” 
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average broadband speed below 2 Mbps. On the other hand, richer Northern regions, where 
many large cities and industrial clusters already had access to 100 Mbps broadband networks, 
did not experience any relevant changes in access to 30 Mbps broadband.  
The policy presents two peculiar features that makes it extremely interesting from a research 
point of view. First, the focus on white areas allows me to overcome the classical endogenous 
problems that characterise infrastructural policies. As a matter of fact, in the absence of private 
intervention, local demand is unlikely to influence the timing of the implementation. Second, 
extremely detailed spatial data (95,000 local areas) makes it possible to track the progressive 
implementation of the policy across the treated regions over time. 
 
 
1.2.2 The Italian School System  
 
The Italian education system consists of 4 stages: nursery school (children between 3 and 6 years 
of age), primary education (children between 6 and 11), first grade (lower) secondary school 
(between 11 and 14 years of age) and second grade (upper) secondary school (from 14 to 19 years 
of age). Once these stages have been successfully completed, students can access the higher 
education offered by universities, institutes for Higher Education in Art and Music as well as 
Higher Technical Institutes. Education is compulsory for ten years, between the ages of 6 and 16. 
As a result, all students are expected to gain at least a ‘Licenza media’ (lower secondary school 
diploma). Over the last decade, the country experienced a reasonable decrease in the number of 
high school early dropouts. In 2014, only 1.6% (mostly first-generation foreigners) of the 
population in the 16-19 year-old cohorts did not hold a lower secondary school diploma.  
Primary and lower secondary school together form the first cycle of education, lasting 8 years. 
According to the new ministerial guidelines, the general aim of lower-secondary education is ‘the 
harmonious and comprehensive development of the individual, according to the principles of the Italian 
Constitution and European cultural tradition, to be achieved through the promotion of knowledge, respect 
for individual diversity and the active involvement of students and their families’ (Framework for Key 
Competences for Lifelong Learning set up by the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union through the Recommendation). The subjects taught in this stage are: Italian, 
English, a second foreign language, mathematics, science, technology, geography, history, music, 
art, sports science and Catholic religious education (optional). Schools are expected to provide 30 
hours of teaching per week (990 hours per year), allocated according to a common timetable (see 
Table A1. 1 in the Appendix).  
 
School Councils can offer to some or all classes an ‘Extended timetable’ (from 36 to 40 hours per 
week). In this case, the mandatory education goals remain the same, but students are expected to 
allocate less time to at-home study. At the end of the three-year program, students need to pass 
a uniform national examination in order to obtain a diploma and to access the following stage. 
The examination consists of a national written test set by INVALSI (also used by the Institute as 
a national assessment for grade 8) and four written tests set by a mixed (internal-external) 
committee. The subjects covered in the tests are Italian language, mathematics, science, ICT and 
two foreign languages.  
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In contrast to the following two cycles (upper secondary school and tertiary education), the 
primary and lower-secondary schools are characterised by a very low, if not entirely absent, 
degree of autonomy (Ichino & Tabellini, 2014). First, individual schools have almost no autonomy 
in the design of the education programs. The national Ministry designs the course contents, 
defines the number of hours to allocate to each subject and authorises a limited number of 
textbooks for each field. Single institutions are only allowed to use a limited budget to set up 
laboratories and extra-program activities, such as optional courses. Teachers are allowed to 
choose among a certain number of authorised textbooks for each subject and can design their 
classes based on the national program, but need to report each semester to the Ministry. Teaching 
methods and contents must be consistent with each school’s educational offer plan, which in turn 
must be consistent with the educational goals established at the national level. Second, the 
homogeneity in the service is also guaranteed by a rigid financial system. Between 97% and 100% 
of the school budget depends on transfers from the Central Government. Every three years, the 
Ministry allocates resources based on specific criteria (i.e. number of students, number of 
disabled students, specific needs, etc.). The uniformity of the system is also guaranteed by the 
human resource management, which is primarily conducted at the national level. Teachers apply 
to province-level lists and are assigned a ranking. Vacancies in each school are covered on the 
basis of teachers’ preferences and rankings, with little to no involvement of the school directors. 
Salaries and career development are defined by national agreements. 
 
Another relevant feature of the lower secondary education system is the limited competition 
among schools. Classes can have between 15 (down to 10 in remote areas) and 26 students. 
Classes that exceed this number are split using the limited extra budget allocated by the Central 
Government. When the number of students applying exceeds the available places, schools are 
allowed to select entrants according to various criteria, but are expected to take into account 
distance as the main criterion. All of these characteristics together enforce a high degree of 
homogeneity among different schools. Even though national data still show disparities in 
teaching standards among different regions, mostly based on the quality of buildings and 
teachers’ self-selection, there is strong evidence of a generally uniform service quality within 
provinces (Nuts 3 areas).  
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1.3 Theoretical framework  
 
This section presents a basic model to guide the empirical analysis. I study the effect of changes 
in access to high-speed internet on learning outcomes using a simple production function. 
Following Faber et al. (2015) I distinguish two main mechanisms:  
 
1. ICT improvement can change the productivity associated with a given amount 
of time spent studying (MOOC effect).  
2. High-speed internet can affect the supply of time spent studying relative to 
leisure activities (online-gaming effect).  
 
This model simply extends the one proposed by Faber et al. (2015) by taking into account any 
potential background-biased effect of ICT access on students’ productivity. In this framework, 
students with a better family background are expected to maximise productivity gains, whereas 
disadvantaged students may be less likely to offset the negative ‘gaming effect’. This assumption 
is built on the rich - although mostly qualitative - literature investigating the factors related to the 
relationship between student performance and their access to ICT3. Consistently, student i’s 
knowledge production function is given by: 
 
                                                          !"# = %"#&"#' !"(                                                                            (1) 
 
where !") is the educational achievement at the entrance to (t=1) and exit from (t=2) a given school 
cycle, Ait is an individual learning productivity shifter, Li is the time spent studying and α > 0 is 
the elasticity of learning outcomes with respect to time spent studying. I assume both 
productivity and individual labour supply to be functions of student-specific characteristics (*"+ 
and *",), and school characteristics (-.+ and -.,).  
Broadband access to high-speed internet (S) affects both the student productivity shifter and the 
time spent studying:  
                                                          %"# = /0(2)*"+-4+567                                                                     (2) 
                                                          &"# = /8*",-4,569                                                                           (3) 
 
Following a basic labour supply equation, η captures a relative price effect, since S affects the 
relative attractiveness of studying compared to leisure activities, online or offline. On the other 
hand, δ, depending on students’ background (B), captures the effect on individual productivity. 
Substituting (2), (3) into (1) and taking logs, I obtain the following estimation equation:  
 !"# = [;< + >(?)]AB/ + *" + -. + !"( + C                                                                                           (4) 
Where -. = ln-.+ + ;ln-.,,     *" = ln*"+ + ;ln*",,    C = C+ + ;C, + FCG 
 
 
 
3 Several studies suggest that the perception of their own ICT abilities (Aesaert and Van Braak, 2007), their actual 
competencies (Tounder et al., 2010; Aesaert et al., 2015) as well as their profile of ICT use (Scherer et al., 2010) might be 
influenced by family background. 
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The main hypothesis tested is that the interplay between η and δ will determine different effects 
depending on B, a ‘learning multiplier’ linked to household characteristics (parents’ education, 
occupational status, etc...). To simplify the empirical analysis, I rewrite the previous equation as:  
 
                                              !"# = H(?)AB/ + *" + -. + !"( + C                                                          (5) 
where H = ;< + >(?).  
 
 
 
 
1.4 Data  
 
1.4.1 Main Sources 
 
In this study, I create a unique dataset, linking microdata on student achievements to spatial data 
relating to internet broadband coverage in Southern Italy. In this way, I build up a comprehensive 
pupil-level dataset, enriched with regional, town and school-level data.  
 
 
Data come from four main sources: 
 
a. Schooling outcomes 
The Italian National Institute for the Evaluation of the Education System (INVALSI) is a research 
institute with the status of a legal entity governed by public law. It is responsible for the annual 
assessment of the competencies of Italian students in both reading and mathematics. Tests are 
taken at a number of given grades (2, 5, 6, 8 and 10) and at a national level. Historically, the test 
was optional and suffered from a significant spatial bias in response rate. Since 2012, the test has 
become compulsory and recently has reached a 97% coverage at secondary school level 
(2016/2017). Every year, the Institute publishes anonymised microdata on student performance4.  
Since 2008, individual marks have been matched with a rich set of individual information, 
allowing for control of personal, family and school characteristics. I have information on the test 
results for the whole population of students in the 2013/2014 2016/17 school years at grades 5 
and 8 and have retrieved from the dataset individual information for two large samples of Italian 
students: 560,000 primary school students (grade 5) who took the test in 2013/2014 and 548,000 
lower secondary school students (grade 8) who took the test in 2016/17. Invalsi dataset also 
provides a rich set of variables concerning student characteristics. In addition to the student-level 
information, I  have access to the level of education (according to the ISCED scale) of both parents, 
as well as to their occupational status, recorded in the Socio-Economic Index of occupational 
 
4 As highlighted by a vast literature (see Bertoni, 2013 for a review) a common problem with test-based accountability 
systems in education is that they generate incentives for teachers, students and school administrators to manipulate test 
outcomes. For this reason, the dataset reports both raw and cheating-adjusted results, obtained by means of a 
probabilistic algorithm that takes into account personal information (beyond that available to the public), score 
fluctuations and suspicious patterns. Moreover, the algorithm takes into account relevant discrepancies with the 5% 
classes that, for every test, have been assigned an external examiner. 
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status (ISEI) and an index based on individual-level economic, social and cultural information 
(ESCS)5.  
 
b. Ministry of education  
In 2011, the Ministry of Education, in accordance with the Community Guideline on public access 
to information held by public authorities, started to publish data on each State-recognized school, 
for any grade. Since 2012, all schools provide, on a yearly basis, information concerning the 
number of students enrolled in each grade by gender and nationality, number of classes, number 
of teachers, the school basic budget and a self-evaluation document, to be sent to the Ministry at 
the end of the academic year. Moreover, 80% of schools provide information on staff (age, type 
of contract, level of training), environment (desktops, ICT technologies, Wi-Fi coverage) and 
other relevant features. For institutes providing different stages of education, data are gathered 
for each stage. Moreover, each school provides the full address of each building (plesso) belonging 
to the school.  
 
c.  2011 Italian socio-economic Census  
The Italian Census is a large survey conducted every ten years by the National Institute for 
Statistics (Istat). The survey is divided in three main sections. The first section, the Agricultural 
General Census, provides complete information relating to the structure of the agricultural 
system on a national, regional and local level. The Industry and Service Census focuses instead 
on the production system, providing the most detailed source of information available. Both 
censuses are used to develop statistical strategies to conduct any sample-based surveys during 
the following decade. The third and most relevant survey is the Population and Housing census, 
which covers the whole population residing in the country at the census date. The primary 
objective of this survey is to update and review personal data, calculate the legal population level 
and gather information on the number and structural characteristics of houses and other 
buildings. Since the 1991 census, the collected micro-data have been linked to a complete digital 
database in ArcInfo format at a scale of 1:25.000, integrating remote sensing images, IGMI maps 
and technical maps at regional level with information relating to the municipality. This advanced 
methodology allowed the Istat to produce detailed geocoded data on the Italian territory, which 
is divided into 402,000 areas. On average, each section hosts 142 people and for each one, the Istat 
releases information concerning the number of people living in each division, by gender and age 
class. Furthermore, the dataset can be matched to information on wage, occupational status and 
other social features on the basis of a 5-10% population sample living in each division.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 The ESCS is a composite score built by the indicators parental education (ISCED), parental occupation (ISEI), and home 
possessions (HOMEPOS) via principal component analysis. The index was developed by the OECD Pisa (Programme for 
International Student Assessment) and is often used in international standardised tests. Invalsi builds the HOMEPOS 
component using information about the availability of a ‘quiet place to study’, a private room, a desk, encyclopaedias, a 
personal computer and access to the internet. 
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d.  Infratel area-level data  
The Infratel dataset contains information gathered through the monitoring process of the Italian 
Ultra-Broadband Plan. In 2014, a consultation was carried out in order to collect information on 
the availability of broadband telecommunication infrastructures and on the private investment 
plans for the following three years. Infratel divided the entire Italian territory into 94,645 areas 
and separately assessed each one. Once it had obtained data on internet speed and had assigned 
each area to one of the four clusters, according to the presence/interest of private actors, Infratel, 
on behalf of the Ministry of Local Development, started to update the dataset every three months. 
Data are based on information provided by the private sector at the beginning of the process 
together with updated data from the ministry relating to the implementation process. As a result, 
the dataset is able to provide a comprehensive representation only for white areas, where only 
the public sector operates. Specifically, the dataset provides historical data on:  
 
• Population coverage to at least 100 Mbps.  
• Population coverage to at least 30 Mbps.  
• Public Administration coverage to at least 100 Mbps.  
• Businesses coverage to at least 30 Mbps.  
• Businesses coverage to at least 100 Mbps.  
 
Population coverage is measured as the percentage of houses (flats) that have access to 30/100 
Mbps internet speed. The dataset can be linked to a spatial dataset providing geocoded 
boundaries for each section. In this way, the information gathered can be easily matched with 
other spatial datasets.  
 
 
e.  Final Dataset 
In the final dataset, the census areas are matched with the Infratel areas. In this way, I can create 
a new micro-aggregated spatial unit, corresponding to the Infratel areas, reporting weighted 
broadband coverage measures, where the weight is the relative share of students living in the 
area (see section 1.4.2 for a complete explanation of the full procedure). Information relating to 
individual students is matched with school data provided by the Ministry of Education and, via 
the school coordinates, to the data associated with the territory in which each school is located. 
Thus, for each student, I have the results in the national exams, a rich set of individual and family 
characteristics, various information about the school attended and the town in which they live 
and the weighted broadband coverage measured in the proximity to the school. A complete 
description of the variables used in the analysis is reported in Table A1. 2.  
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1.4.2 Broadband Measure and Catchment Areas 
 
Ideally, in order to correctly identify the effect of the policy, I would assign students’ homes to 
treated and control groups. As I do not have information student addresses, I assign students to 
treatment and control groups by defining geographical catchment areas around each school. Each 
area c is defined so as to guarantee that student i attending school s lives within the defined 
borders. In this way, I can assign the whole catchment area to a specific group and subsequently 
focus the analysis on treated and non-treated pupils living in neighbouring areas. De Simone 
(2013) developed a method to identify an area within which most resident students would be 
attending a specific school.  
 
The strategy relies on two main features of the Italian lower secondary school system. First, as 
discussed in section 1.2.2, schools are characterised by a high degree of homogeneity, especially 
at the province level. Second, the enrolment follows rigid geographic criteria. Each school is 
assigned limited funds and a maximum number of students. When applying students exceed the 
available places, schools are allowed to select students according to a number of criteria, but are 
expected to take into account home-to-school distance as the main criterion. In summary, parents 
have little voice in the choice of the school among different institutions that accept students 
primarily on a distance basis. When choice is possible, the high homogeneity between institutions 
still guarantees allocation based mainly on geographical criteria. As a result, the design of the 
catchment areas, especially in rural areas, appears to be a suitable method with which to assign 
each student to a specific broadband area.  
 
This strategy exploits the Italian census 2011, which provides information on population by age 
at a very low spatial scale (402,000 census areas). Specifically, for each school j, the association 
procedure consists of the following steps:  
 
1. identify the school type (primary, lower secondary or upper secondary) and, 
consequently, the relevant student population in the census area (population aged 5-9 
years, 10-14 years or 15-19 years respectively);  
2. compute the distance between school j and the 400 nearest census areas;  
3. for each school, neighbouring census areas are sorted by distance (in ascending order);  
4. compute the areas’ cumulative relevant population;  
5. select the closest N areas so that the cumulative relevant population contains a multiple 
k of the number of students enrolled in school j.  
6. For each school, I create two different catchment areas: a small catchment area (k = 1), 
where at least 80% of the enrolled students live and a large one (k = 3), where all enrolled 
students (and many non-enrolled) live.  
 
Once the data have been extracted and the catchment areas defined, I can build a proxy for 
Broadband Access, ?%I).J, obtained as the weighted average of the broadband coverage measured 
in each catchment area c. The weights used are the share of students living in each Infratel area 
(aggregated from the smaller census areas) to the total catchment area. ?%I).J =KLMN"I) OK B."I)P"I).∈" R"∈I  
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where ICTict is the share of buildings with access to internet broadband in the Infratel area i, 
belonging to catchment area c , nsict is the number of students living in the census area s and Nict 
is the total number of students living in Infratel area i, in catchment area c.   
 
In the analysis, I use two different values of k to define the treatment and control groups. Treated 
schools are defined as schools with a broadband coverage measured in the basic catchment area 
(k = 1) of above 70%. In Table A1. 5 (Appendix), I replicate the main results with 65% and 75% 
thresholds, confirming the results. Control schools are defined as schools with a broadband 
coverage measured in the large catchment area (k = 3) equal to 0%. Finally, I drop any large 
catchment areas where the share of white areas (clusters C and D) is lower than 95%. Figure 1. 2 
reports the catchment areas built around a school in the Matera Province (Calabria region). The 
colours represent the number of students living in each census area, the red line defines the small 
catchment area (k = 1) and the blue line defines the large one. For both regions, the broadband 
coverage value is measured, following the above index, as the weighted average share of 
buildings covered, where the weights correspond to the relative share of students living in each 
census area.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
1.5. Empirical Strategy 
 
 
1.5.1 Basic model  
 
In the analysis, I first estimate the following model: 
 																								T".) = H?%I) + FU". + V/.) + WXI + -Y + Z".)                                                       (6) 
 
where T".) represent student’s i achievement in school s at time t, ?%I) is a dummy that takes 
value equal one if the weighted share of buildings located in catchment area c with access to high-
speed internet broadband exceeds 70%, U". is a vector of time-invariant individual characteristics, /.) is a vector of school-level characteristics, XI is a vector of average socio-economic 
characteristics of the school’s  catchment area, -Y are Province fixed effects and Z".)is the 
unobserved error term. In order to identify the causal effect of high-speed broadband on student 
achievement, I need to address various sources of bias. Many studies in the literature exploit data 
on internet usage, which often represents the only available information. The choice of this 
variable is problematic for a number of reasons. First, survey data, especially when covering 
technical information, are affected by attrition and measurement error. Moreover, internet usage 
is likely to be highly correlated with several variables related to the tested outcome, such as social 
background, profession, individual network and income. In this case, the treatment would not be 
orthogonal with respect to the unobservable individual characteristics (corr(?%I), Z".)) ≠ 0). For 
all these reasons, I choose to focus on the broadband supply, measured as the number of houses 
with access to 30 Mbps internet broadband.   
 
Broadband access measures are not exempted from endogeneity concerns. First, the empirical 
strategy must address possible selection bias. This may occur because broadband access can 
determine a self-selection of different groups across regions with different levels of coverage. 
Moreover, even excluding an active sorting based on internet speed, there are several reasons to 
believe that broadband rollout may be far from random. Exchange stations6 are normally located 
close to central locations, where they can guarantee the best connectivity to high income 
households and offices. Faber et al. (2015) address this problem by adopting a neighbouring 
discontinuity design, able to guarantee a high degree of homogeneity between the treated and 
control group. This strategy is particularly effective in addressing endogeneity concerns, but it 
inevitably requires the analysis to focus on a small sample of the available data. Moreover, it is 
possible to perform a neighbouring discontinuity design only when the treatment and outcome 
variables share the same level of geographical detail. This is not the case for Italian student data, 
which can only be linked to school catchment areas. Data on distance from the closest local 
exchange station are exploited  by Campante et al. (2017), who study the diffusion of access to 
high-speed internet using Italian municipal data from 1996 to 2013. The strategy is based on the 
assumption that the cost of providing ADSL-based broadband services varies depending on its 
relative position in the pre-existing voice telecommunications infrastructure. Since the pre-
 
6 Exchange stations are physical infrastructure through which Internet service providers  exchange Internet traffic 
between their networks. 
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existing infrastructure was not randomly distributed, the authors implicitly assume that the 
correlation between distance and unobserved municipal characteristics has not changed during 
the period considered, other than through the introduction of high-speed internet. In other 
words, firms and households may differ in terms of time-invariant unobservables, but are 
assumed to have, for instance, the same wage/productivity growth. This assumption appears to 
be relatively strong and would require strong supporting evidence to justify. In fact, the regional 
economics literature provides rich evidence of rising regional disparities in most developed 
countries, including Italy (A’Hearn and Venables, 2013).  
 
Instead of relying the existing infrastructure, this paper exploits the specific design of the Italian 
’National Ultra-Broadband Plan’, which guarantees the timing of the rollout to be exogenous. 
This assumption is based on three features of the policy. First, the policy targets white areas, 
consisting in small-to-medium towns in the countryside (where the average population is 20,000) 
and there are no overlaps with the interests of private actors. Second, the introduction of the new 
fibre broadband does not depend on the pre-existing infrastructure, since no compatible 
infrastructure exists in white areas at the time the policy is implemented. Third, even though some 
geographical characteristics associated with the lack of coverage of any previous infrastructure 
may still influence the implementation costs, the policy aims to cover 100% of municipalities 
within three years. As a consequence, implementation costs can hardly be correlated with the 
rollout timing. On the other hand, an efficient implementation would imply a progressive 
geographical coverage. Moreover, the timing and the universal target undermine the risk of a 
spatial sorting of households based on treatment. These assumptions alone do not allow political 
bias in the implementation phase to be excluded. Local administrators may lobby to obtain full 
coverage before neighbouring municipalities, which would result in a selection bias. However, 
this issue does not appear to be particularly relevant in this context, since the program has been 
designed by the national Government and Italian political system and does not have a relevant 
representation at the local authority level.  Moreover, Mayors in small towns lack the political 
power to deliver relevant changes to a national plan, especially when this kind of change would 
involve higher costs for the whole project. This issue is further addressed by using province 
dummies fixed effects. Italian Provinces (NUTS-3 regions according to the European 
nomenclature) are intermediate administrative divisions. They divide the Italian territories in 107 
distinct regions, based on different geological and cultural characteristics. In order to test for 
within-province homogeneity, I report in Table A1. 6 a simple balancing test, regressing the 
treatment on all covariates and reporting the p-values and q-values obtained by adopting the 
Bonferroni correction7. Results exhibit no correlation between the policy and local geographical, 
economic and political variables, with the only exception of the share of population above 64 
years8. Treatment areas appear to be characterised by a slightly higher share of elders. To account 
for this possible source of bias, in Table A1. 4, I perform a robustness exercise, repeating all the 
 
7 When multiple hypotheses are tested, the likelihood of rejecting a null increase. The Bonferroni correction tests each 
individual hypothesis at a significance level of ;/], where ; is the overall desired significance level and m is the number 
of hypothesis. 
8 In the main specifications I add municipality level covariates to partially address any difference in socio-economic 
characteristics. 
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relevant analysis on a sample where every municipality having a share of elders higher than 20% 
(roughly 1/3 of the original sample) is excluded. Results are consistent with the main analysis. 
 
 
 
1.5.2 Value added model  
 
Extending the basic framework, student educational attainment can be described through a 
value-added model (VAM) 																																											T".) = ;T".)^( + H?%I) + FU". + V/.) + WX. + -Y + Z".)                      (7) 
 
where T".) and T".)^( are, respectively, student i’s achievement in school s at time t and t−1, ?%I) 
is the broadband dummy, U". is the vector of time-invariant individual characteristics, /.)	is a 
vector of time-variant school-level characteristics, X.	is a vector of average socio-economic 
characteristics of the school catchment area, -Y are province fixed effects and εist is the 
unobserved error term. Controlling for previous performance, I partially take into account 
potential time-invariant differences between treated and control students. Moreover, even 
assuming treatment to be uncorrelated with the performance at t-1, (_"`, _"( ⊥ 	?%I)), the 
autoregressive specification allows me to investigate the heterogeneity of the treatment across 
different social groups.  In particular, I can test the impact of the access to high-speed broadband 
on student performance, as depending on prior achievement, ethnicity, socio-economic 
background and nursery attendance. 
 
In the economics of education literature, VAMs have been often used to measure the importance 
of productivity inputs (such as teacher quality or peer effects) on student performance. Recently, 
a number of concerns have been raised regarding the opportunity of using VAM models to 
estimate teacher quality (Kane & Staiger 2008; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2010; Rothstein, 2010; Chetty 
et al., 2014; Condie et al., 2014). Most of these studies have discussed the possible bias resulting 
from student sorting and the reliability of standardised tests scores as a proxy for student 
achievement. These issues do not appear to be relevant in the framework of this study. First, as 
explained in section 1.2.2, student sorting across schools appears to be a negligible phenomenon 
in Italy. On the other hand, although unobservable characteristics could, in principle, influence 
the cheating-corrected test scores, they are unlikely to be correlated with the rollout of the 
broadband infrastructure. To further address these concerns, in section 1.7 I show that moving 
home is not correlated with neither the treatment nor the outcome. 
If student performance exhibits a mean reverting pattern at the tails of the previous performance 
distribution, the value-added model might fail to describe the learning process. Therefore, I test 
a quadratic specification: 
 																		T".) = ;T".)^( + cT".)^(# + H?%I) + FU". + V/.) + WX.) + -Y + Z".)                                (8) 
 
Figure 1. 4 suggests this this specification could better describe the autoregressive pattern 
studied. 
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1.6. Results  
 
 
1.6.1 Baseline models 
 
I start the investigation by studying whether the infrastructural policy had an effect on student 
achievements. In Table 1. 1, I regress students’ performance in national standardised tests on the 
policy dummy and a set of covariates. In doing so, I distinguish between results the in literacy 
and numeracy section of the national standardised test. 
Columns (1) and (2) illustrate results when no covariates are considered in the specification.  
High-speed internet broadband seems to have a small but significant effect on student 
performance in math, but no significant effect on literacy scores. Access to high-speed internet 
raises on average student scores in numeracy subjects by 0.88 on a 100-point scale. This 
corresponds to a 5% standard deviation change.  
These results are confirmed in columns (3)-(4), when student-level variables are included. In this 
case, I find an increase in the coefficient size, that might suggest a small self-selection of low-
performing groups in treated areas. This result could raise some concerns regarding the 
exogeneity of the timing of the roll-out of the broadband infrastructure. If for some reasons 
students in treated schools in the sample perform worse than those attending control school, 
results in columns (1)-(2) might be downward biased. In columns (5)-(6) class peer effects (mean 
class values for a set of student level characteristics) and school level variables are included.  Here 
the size of the coefficient for the impact of broadband on numeracy tests is again closer to the one 
in Columns (1)-(2), whereas the policy is confirmed not to have any effects on literacy tests. 
Results are generally confirmed in column (7)-(8) where I add municipality-level variables. In 
Columns (9)-(10) I substitute the ESCS9  variable with HISCED10 and HISEI11. These two variables 
are the main components of the ESCS and adding them separately to the model could increase 
the overall information content. On the other hand, the ESCS is built also on additional 
information (see section 4.1) that are not available in the dataset. Again, results suggest a null 
effect of the policy on student literacy performance and a significantly lower (0.036 standard 
deviation), but still significant effect on numeracy scores. 
In Table 1. 2, I estimate a simple value-added model of cognitive achievement, to investigate the 
effects of the rollout of the broadband infrastructure on students’ learning trajectories. 
In columns (1) and (2), the policy is found to have a relevant effect on student performance in the 
numeracy test, but no significant effect in the literacy assessment. Treated students are found to 
obtain, on average, 0.675 points more than control ones in the normalised test scores.  When 
adding student-level covariates, the magnitude of the coefficient increases by 15%, suggesting 
again a limited overrepresentation of low performers or an underrepresentation of high 
performers in treated areas. Columns (3)-(6) reveal that, once considered the heterogeneity in 
class composition and school quality, the policy has a less relevant effect on math scores. The 
coefficient size decreases and becomes less significant. In columns (7) to (10) municipality-level 
covariates, HISCED and HISEI are included, but the results provide similar conclusions. The 
access to high-speed broadband has a small, but significant effect on student performance in 
 
9 Index of individual economic, social and cultural status 
10 Highest educational level of parents 
11 Highest occupational status of parents 
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numeracy (an increase of 0.5-0.8 test scores, corresponding to 3-5% of a standard deviation) but 
no effect on literacy tests. Students that attended Grade 5 in the academic year 2013/14 and spent 
the last year of the lower secondary school in a treated area were, on average, able to strengthen 
their mathematical skills more than those located in control areas. 
These results are in contrast with the ‘perfect zero-effect’ found by Faber et al. (2017), analysing 
the effect of high-speed internet on student scores in the UK.  In the same way, they contradict 
Vigdor et al. (2014), that find internet access in North Carolina to be associated with a 2.7% 
standard deviation decrease in numeracy scores and a 1% decrease for literacy. These results can 
also be analysed with respect to other policies aimed at improving ICT use in education. 
This effect appears to be significantly lower than the one found by Comi et al. (2017), that analyse 
the ICT-related practices in a small sample of Northern Italian schools. However, the broader 
effect analysed in this study would justify a lower magnitude.  
More generally, the policy is found to have limited effect on student performance when 
compared to the main policy investigated in the literature. For instance, according to recent 
literature reviews (Chingos, 2012; Jepsen, 2015), the effect of reducing class size by 10 students on 
educational performance ranges between 0 to 50% of a standard deviation. However, educational 
outcomes represent only a second order objective of this kind of infrastructural policy and should 
be considered together with medium-long term effects on other socio-economic outcomes. 
 
Thus far, I assumed performance in grade 8 to be a linear function of performance in grade 5. 
In order to account for mean reverting patterns at the lower tale of the test score distribution (see   
Figure 1. 4), in Table 1. 3 I add a quadratic component to the estimation. The new model does not 
lead to significant changes with respect to the basic VAM, although the policy is found to have a 
marginally higher effect on numeracy scores (0.6-0.7 points). 
 
 
 
 
1.6.2 Heterogeneity analysis 
 
Table 1. 4 sheds further light on these findings by looking at the heterogeneous effect of the policy 
on test scores, controlling for student performance in grade 5 and their socio-economic 
background. From this point onwards, the analysis focusses exclusively on numeracy test scores, 
since – consistently with the literature - in previous tables broadband access was found to have a 
zero effect on literacy performance.   
In column (1) I interact the main regressor with the performance in numeracy tests in grade 5. 
The interaction term is found to be not statistically significant, suggesting either a null effect of 
the policy on students’ learning trajectories or a non-linear relationship between the two 
variables. In column (2) I further investigate this relationship, interacting the policy dummies 
with the quartile of the previous test score distribution. Results show a positive and significant 
effect on the first quartile, a negative effect on the third and a still negative, although non 
statistically significant on the second. This result is well explained in Figure 1. 5, showing a 
positive effect of the policy on low-performers in grade 5, a somewhat negative effect on median 
performers and no relevant effect on best performers. In column (3) I focus on the second relevant 
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source of heterogeneity, namely the parental background. In this case, I find positive and 
significant contribution of ESCS index on the policy outcome. Interacting the main regressors I 
find a non-significant effect for students in the first ESCS quartile and a positive and significant 
effect for those in the remaining part of the distribution.  
 
Many studies emphasise the importance of parents’ education for students’ mathematical 
achievements (among others, Lauder et al., 1999; Zimmer & Toma, 2000; Martins and Veiga, 2010; 
Vigdor et al., 2014). In countries where women are underrepresented in the labour market, 
mothers play the main role in supporting children’s education. In Southern Italy, were women 
occupation rate is on average below 40%, MISCED is expected be a strong predictor of students’ 
performance. Therefore, in column (5), I interact the policy-dummy with the 1-5 MISCED scale, 
that describes the level of education of students’ mothers. Results provide strong evidence of an 
important role of this factor on the effectiveness of the policy. Broadband access is found to 
decrease by 1.5 percentage points the scores of students whose mother has only a primary school 
degree, whereas it is positive for the other groups, increasing educational scores up to 3 
percentage points, corresponding to 0.18% of a standard deviation.  
Finally, I investigate school-related factors that might facilitate students’ adoption of information 
devices.   In column (6) I test whether students whose teachers were involved in IT training 
programs in the three years before the policy benefited more from the access to the broadband. 
In this case, confirming a positive role of trained teachers (the large majority of teachers 
considered) on the effectiveness of the policy. This aspect deserves to be better analysed in future 
work, exploiting richer school-level data. Overall, results highlight an important nexus between 
the effectiveness of the policy and students’ socioeconomic background. Low performers whose 
parents are sufficiently educated, might benefit the most from the introduction of new 
information technologies.  
 
In Table 1. 5, I further investigate this dynamic, interacting the main regressor with performance 
in grade 5, within a quadratic VA framework. Column (1) confirms the results of the basic VAM.  
In columns (2) and (3) I distinguish between students above and below the mean ESCS level. As 
expected, low performers with above average parental background benefit the most from the 
policy. These results are consistent with the patterns illustrated in Figure 1. 5.  
 
 
1.7. Channels 
 
Results suggest a positive and significant effect of the policy on educational achievements. 
Consistently with the literature on the ICT effect on student performance, the findings suggest 
that the access to high-speed internet at home could positively affect students’ productivity.  
However, the empirical design does not allow to disentangle the home-internet access channel 
from the potential benefit of better computer access at school.  
Home and school access to high-speed internet are likely to be complementary. Comi et al. (2017) 
highlight that ICT per se might not necessarily be beneficial for student achievement. On the 
contrary, ICT-related teaching methods are likely to increase student performance in math. This 
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prediction seems consistent with the findings of this study. Access to ICT can positively affect 
student performance when associated with a rich parental background and IT-trained teachers. 
 
An alternative explanation is that these results are just second-order effects of the policy. 
The rollout of the high-speed broadband is likely to affect the local economies in two ways. In the 
short-run, the investment is expected to have a positive effect on employment and wages in some 
related industries. In the long-run, the new infrastructure might permanently increase firm 
productivity and benefit the whole economy. On the other hand, an increase in employment and 
wages might improve families’ social status and have non-negligible effects on local public 
finances. I assume the time span of the study to be too short to expect any relevant economic 
effects. However, in order to rule out this hypothesis, in Tables Table A1. 7 – A1.8, I regress some 
socio-economic variables on the policy dummy. I find a significant negative effect on employment 
and a positive effect on unemployment rate in the short period (1 to 3 years). The results are not 
surprising, since the treated areas are likely to be located in poorer regions compared to control 
ones. Once included region FE in the specification, results become insignificant, confirming the 
absence of a direct effect of the policy on local labour market.  
 
In Table A1. 9, I regress the number of taxpayers (proxy for the labour force), the average income, 
personal income and municipality tax revenues on the policy dummy. The former variable is 
particularly important since, while suggesting an improvement in average socio-economic 
conditions in a specific neighbourhood, it could also be associated with higher contributions to 
public schools (that receive on average 2% funds from local government). Results suggest no 
effect of the policy on any of these variables. 
 
The policy outcome could simply result from sorting over space of high-performers. Advantaged 
families might choose to move in a neighbouring town to get access to high speed broadband. 
Alternatively, they might simply face higher commuting time in order to have their children 
attend a school with better access to ICT technologies. As suggested before, this appears rather 
unlikely, since the policy design is such that the difference between treatment and control areas 
is expected not to last more than 3 years. As a result, it is hard to imagine a family moving in 
order to anticipate something they would get in the relatively short period in their own town. 
Moreover, Italy is known to be one of the countries with lower mobility rate in Europe. Few 
people move and when this happens, it is to move to the richer North, rather than to a 
neighbouring town. In Table A1. 10, I regress population change over the policy period for town 
overall population and for the three cohorts interested by the policy. Again, no significant effect 
is found. In Table A1. 11, I investigate movers’ performance. As with the socio-economic 
outcomes, I find a negative and significant effect in the OLS, that becomes non-significant once 
region FE are included. Overall, I find no evidence supporting the hypothesis of high performer 
sorting in treated areas. 
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1.8 Robustness Checks  
 
The estimation of the causal effect of the policy requires the correct definition of treatment and 
control groups. Most treated students are expected to have access to high-speed broadband, 
whereas no student in the control group should receive the treatment. To clearly identify the two 
groups, I choose to drop from the sample intermediate situations, in which broadband coverage 
is above 0% but still significantly below the full coverage. The choice of the minimum threshold 
necessary to access the treatment group is based on the trade-off between estimation precision 
and sample size. In Table 1. 1 – 1.9, I adopt a threshold of 70% coverage, which allows me to 
analyse at least 27,000 students. 
Table A1. 5 reports the results for the basic and VAM regressions using the 65% and 75% 
thresholds.  Columns (1) and (6) can be compared with column (7) in Table 1. 1. Reducing the 
sample to areas where 75% of houses had access to the broadband, increases the policy coefficient 
by 15%. By contrast, lowering the threshold to 65% leads to a marginal decrease in coefficient 
magnitude. Overall, there is no significant deviation from the main analysis. Columns (2) and (7) 
report the results of the same estimation reported in Column (7),  Table 1. 2. 
Again, lowering the threshold, I obtain a slightly lower, although still significant, coefficient, 
whereas the opposite happens when I conduct a more conservative analysis. A similar result is 
shown in columns (3) and (8) reporting the interaction between the main regressor and the ESCS 
index. A difference is found in columns (4)-(5) and (9)-(10), where I report the estimations for the 
quadratic models. In this case both analysis report coefficients of higher magnitude with respect 
to those recorded in the main analysis. However, results confirm the overall pattern shown in the 
previous tables. 
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1.9. Conclusions 
 
In this study, I tested the impact of access to high-speed internet broadband on educational 
achievements. To this aim, I exploited a large infrastructural program implemented by the Italian 
government. Available data allowed me to investigate the heterogeneous effect of the treatment 
with respect to students’ performance in previous grades and their family background. Overall, 
broadband access is found to have a positive and significant effect on educational achievements. 
Consistently with the literature, ICTs play a relevant role in numeracy subjects but do not seem 
to be relevant for literacy. The effect largely depends on the parental socio-economic background 
and prior performance. Low performers in grade 5, when benefiting from a rich cultural 
background, might take advantage of the new learning devices available thanks to the new 
infrastructure in order to reduce the achievement gap with their peers. On the other hand, the 
productivity gain does not seem to characterise pupils with a poor background. This might be 
due to the fact that, without parental supervision, the online-gaming effect might overcome any 
possible positive effect on learning productivity. Alternatively, it might simply reflect a financial 
constraint, with poorer families not able to provide their children with the hardware necessary 
to benefit from the new infrastructure.  
 
Although more work is required to better understand the underlying mechanisms, the 
preliminary empirical evidence may have relevant policy implications. ICT upgrading programs 
can be beneficial for students but need to be accompanied by training programs and other policies 
aimed at allowing disadvantaged students to access the benefits. More generally, infrastructural 
policies, as well as other place-based policies, are likely to affect students’ overall performance 
and inequalities in the educational attainment.  
 
To my knowledge, this work represents a first evaluation of the impact of the Italian Ultra-
broadband policies on second order outcomes. More work is required to shed lights on the main 
drivers associated with the effectiveness of the policy. On one hand, the progression of the 
broadband rollout will allow to compare various ‘cohorts’ of treated municipalities conducting 
an event study or analogous estimation strategies. On the other hand, the recent release by the 
Invalsi of the students’ identification number has made possible to researcher to track pupils’ 
performance over time. In the future, it will be possible to exploit network analysis strategies to 
study the effect of the policy though treated students moving to a different school. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. 1 Basic Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Num.       Lit. Num.       Lit. Num.       Lit. Num.       Lit. Num.       Lit. 
                      
Broadband 
Access 0.758*** 0.0402 0.880*** 0.184 0.696*** 0.143 0.702*** 0.184 0.568** 0.0254 
 
(0.256) (0.229) (0.248) (0.218) (0.253) (0.223) (0.256) (0.225) (0.263) (0.232) 
Male 
  
0.312 -5.04*** 0.298 -5.15*** 0.288 -5.16*** 0.138 -5.321*** 
   
(0.212) (0.185) (0.222) (0.194) (0.222) (0.194) (0.228) (0.199) 
Nursey 
  
1.181*** -0.548 1.271*** -0.481 1.084** -0.535 1.189** -0.566 
   
(0.452) (0.388) (0.453) (0.39) (0.455) (0.391) (0.53) (0.45) 
Non-EU 
Father   
0.398 -0.83 0.467 -0.775 0.492 -0.859 0.55 -1.269 
   
(0.869) (0.748) (0.871) (0.75) (0.874) (0.75) (0.899) (0.779) 
Non-EU 
Mother   
0.899 -0.423 1.113 -0.353 1.097 -0.367 0.991 -0.47 
   
(0.745) (0.645) (0.745) (0.647) (0.745) (0.647) (0.763) (0.662) 
ESCS 
  
4.402*** 4.18*** 4.375*** 4.2*** 4.383*** 4.19*** 
  
 
  
(0.107) (0.0927) (0.107) (0.0932) (0.108)  (0.0941) 
  
HISCED 
        
3.710*** 3.586*** 
 
        
(0.108) (0.094) 
HISEI 
        
1.156*** 1.090*** 
 
        
(0.131) (0.115) 
I Gen. 
migrant   
-0.1 -0.132 -0.329 0.185 -0.35 0.196 -0.369 -0.00095 
   
(1.273) (1.066) (1.346) (1.124) (1.341) (1.125) (1.421) (1.215) 
II Gen. 
migrant   
-2.464** -0.669 -2.491** -0.445 -2.560** -0.409 -2.937** -0.798 
   
(1.2) (1.035) (1.241) (1.069) (1.243) (1.068) (1.301) (1.12) 
Early 
enrolled   
-6.203*** -6.13*** -6.015*** -6.16*** -5.985*** -6.17*** -5.874*** -6.117*** 
   
(1.149) (1.07) (1.147) (1.076) (1.142) (1.079) (1.187) (1.125) 
           
Constant 50.51*** 62.20*** 49.90*** 65.96*** 48.24*** 64.97*** 61.34*** 78.79*** 50.50*** 67.79*** 
 
(0.157) (0.142) (0.467) (0.402) (1.04)  (0.904) (5.229) (4.35) (5.488) (4.543) 
           
Obs. 27,697 27,669 27,659 27,631 27,384 27,356 27,384 27,356 25,561 25,533 
R-squared 0.028 0.011 0.086 0.103 0.089 0.104 0.091 0.105 0.102 0.118 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Peer Effects NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
School 
variables NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic 
variables NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents the results of the linear regression model reported in equation (6). The dependent variables 
are students’ numeracy and literacy scores in grade 8.  Sample includes all students located in white areas, where 
broadband coverage recorded was below 5% or above 70% (see section 1.4.2). The ESCS index is a proxy for student 
individual economic, social and cultural status, based on known and unknown family characteristics. HISCED and 
HISEI measure, respectively, the highest educational level and occupational status of students’ parents. All 
regressions include 27 Province fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level and reported 
in parenthesis.   ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.  
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Table 1. 2 Value-added model 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Num.       Lit. Num.       Lit. Num.       Lit. Num.       Lit. Num.       Lit. 
                      
Broadband 
Access 0.675*** -0.0740 0.779*** 0.0394 0.593** 0.0316 0.596** 0.105 0.574** 0.0240 
 (0.239) (0.206) (0.235) (0.200) (0.239) (0.205) (0.242) (0.207) (0.249) (0.213) Test score - 
Grade 5 0.392*** 0.421*** 0.354*** 0.375*** 0.356*** 0.376*** 0.356*** 0.377*** 0.353*** 0.372*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.0067) (0.0056) (0.00669) (0.00585) (0.00669) (0.00584) (0.00693) (0.00612) 
Male   0.104 
-
4.055*** 0.0658 -4.178*** 0.0575 -4.182*** -0.0920 -4.286*** 
   (0.201) (0.172) (0.210) (0.179) (0.210) (0.179) (0.216) (0.185) 
Nursey   0.639 -0.832** 0.728* -0.765** 0.544 -0.800** 0.599 -0.720* 
   (0.434) (0.359) (0.435) (0.362) (0.437) (0.363) (0.511) (0.421) 
Non-EU 
Father   0.517 -0.559 0.574 -0.466 0.576 -0.566 0.823 -0.696 
   (0.809) (0.689) (0.811) (0.689) (0.815) (0.690) (0.832) (0.716) 
Non-EU 
Mother   1.129 -0.0784 1.339* -0.0477 1.297* -0.0784 1.206* -0.212 
   (0.699) (0.586) (0.697) (0.584) (0.697) (0.584) (0.717) (0.602) 
ESCS   3.408*** 2.776*** 3.380*** 2.799*** 3.367*** 2.772***   
   (0.104) (0.0900) (0.104) (0.0905) (0.105) (0.0911)   
HISCED         2.861*** 2.378*** 
         (0.104) (0.0902) 
HISEI         0.892*** 0.777*** 
         (0.125) (0.108) 
I Gen. 
migrant   0.237 0.393 -0.408 0.115 -0.438 0.122 -0.392 -0.0781 
   (1.164) (1.002) (1.238) (1.041) (1.237) (1.042) (1.306) (1.108) 
II Gen. 
migrant   -2.458** 0.0228 -2.750** -0.0154 -2.788** 0.0398 -3.170*** -0.348 
   (1.113) (0.977) (1.149) (1.000) (1.151) (1.000) (1.208) (1.053) 
Early 
enrolled   -5.07*** -4.37*** -4.926*** -4.389*** -4.868*** -4.364*** -5.014*** -4.091*** 
   (1.068) (0.998) (1.069) (0.995) (1.064) (0.996) (1.100) (1.040) 
Late 
Enrolled   0.201 -0.233 0.154 -0.250 0.181 -0.248 -0.0189 -0.399* 
   (0.281) (0.232) (0.282) (0.234) (0.282) (0.233) (0.291) (0.242) 
Constant 26.32*** 37.00*** 28.43*** 42.97*** 26.64*** 42.63*** 41.78*** 60.02*** 36.02*** 53.86*** 
 (0.436) (0.380) (0.604) (0.522) (1.065) (0.910) (4.934) (4.046) (5.169) (4.167) 
           
Obs. 27,697 27,182 27,659 27,149 27,384 26,875 27,384 26,875 25,561 25,121 
R-squared 0.146 0.197 0.180 0.240 0.184 0.242 0.185 0.244 0.193 0.250 
Province 
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Peer Effects NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
School 
variables NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic 
variables NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents regression results of the value-added model reported in equation (7). The dependent variables are 
students’ numeracy and literacy scores in grade 8. Controls include students’ performance in grade 5.  The sample covers all 
students located in white areas, where broadband coverage recorded was below 5% or above 70% (see section 1.4.2). The ESCS 
index provides a proxy of student individual economic, social and cultural status, based on known and unknown family 
characteristics. HISCED and HISEI measure, respectively, the highest educational level and occupational status of students’ 
parents. All regressions include 27 Province fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level and reported in 
parenthesis.  ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.  
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Table 1. 3: Quadratic value-added model 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Num.       Lit. Num.       Lit. Num.       Lit. Num.       Lit. Num.       Lit. 
                      
Broadband 
Access 0.682*** -0.0163 0.781*** 0.0797 0.599** 0.0700 0.623*** 0.137 0.616** 0.0662 
 (0.237) (0.204) (0.232) (0.199) (0.237) (0.203) (0.240) (0.206) (0.247) (0.212) Test score - 
Grade 5 -0.602*** -0.255*** -0.564*** -0.206*** -0.561*** -0.207*** -0.561*** -0.207*** -0.553*** -0.206*** 
 (0.0431) (0.0327) (0.0421) (0.0316) (0.0421) (0.0318) (0.0421) (0.0318) (0.0439) (0.0334) (Test score - 
Grade 5)^2 0.0083*** 0.0059*** 0.0077*** 0.0051*** 0.0077*** 0.0051*** 0.0077*** 0.0052*** 0.0076*** 0.0051*** 
 (0.00035) (0.00027) (0.00035) (0.00027) (0.00035) (0.00027) (0.00035) (0.00027) (0.00036) (0.00028) 
Male   0.0502 -3.947*** -0.000425 -4.073*** -0.00909 -4.077*** -0.149 -4.179*** 
   (0.199) (0.170) (0.208) (0.178) (0.208) (0.178) (0.214) (0.183) 
Nursey   0.551 -0.726** 0.631 -0.670* 0.459 -0.708** 0.523 -0.683 
   (0.427) (0.357) (0.429) (0.360) (0.431) (0.361) (0.505) (0.419) Non-EU 
Father   0.567 -0.446 0.612 -0.360 0.600 -0.460 0.843 -0.589 
   (0.808) (0.685) (0.809) (0.685) (0.813) (0.686) (0.829) (0.709) Non-EU 
Mother   1.164* -0.0688 1.375** -0.0291 1.335* -0.0579 1.223* -0.194 
   (0.697) (0.582) (0.695) (0.580) (0.695) (0.581) (0.716) (0.598) 
ESCS   3.275*** 2.610*** 3.248*** 2.632*** 3.232*** 2.610***   
   (0.103) (0.0893) (0.104) (0.0898) (0.104) (0.0904)   
HISCED         2.761*** 2.276*** 
         (0.103) (0.0896) 
HISEI         0.861*** 0.727*** 
         (0.124) (0.107) I Gen. 
migrant   0.199 0.110 -0.341 -0.0994 -0.365 -0.0900 -0.427 -0.299 
   (1.157) (0.987) (1.231) (1.030) (1.231) (1.031) (1.301) (1.094) II Gen. 
migrant   -2.411** -0.171 -2.767** -0.155 -2.799** -0.102 -3.153*** -0.430 
   (1.093) (0.960) (1.131) (0.983) (1.132) (0.983) (1.186) (1.035) Early 
enrolled   -5.022*** -4.443*** -4.857*** -4.463*** -4.806*** -4.442*** -4.857*** -4.227*** 
   (1.048) (1.004) (1.048) (1.003) (1.043) (1.004) (1.086) (1.047) 
Late Enrolled   0.246 -0.168 0.204 -0.185 0.225 -0.185 0.0279 -0.337 
   (0.278) (0.231) (0.279) (0.232) (0.279) (0.232) (0.289) (0.240) 
Constant 53.55*** 54.37*** 53.63*** 57.63*** 51.76*** 57.06*** 69.80*** 75.03*** 63.81*** 69.46*** 
 (1.255) (0.938) (1.290) (0.964) (1.550) (1.211) (5.100) (4.091) (5.353) (4.231) 
           
Observations 27,697 27,182 27,659 27,149 27,384 26,875 27,384 26,875 25,561 25,121 
R-squared 0.163 0.212 0.195 0.251 0.199 0.254 0.201 0.255 0.208 0.261 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Peer Effects NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
School 
variables NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic 
variables NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents regression results of the quadratic value-added model reported in equation (8). The dependent 
variables are students’ numeracy and literacy scores in grade 8. Controls include students’ performance in grade 5.  The sample 
covers all students located in white areas, where broadband coverage recorded was below 5% or above 70% (see Section 1.4.2 ). 
The ESCS index provides a proxy of student individual economic, social and cultural status, based on known and unknown 
family characteristics. HISCED and HISEI measure, respectively, the highest educational level and occupational status of 
students’ parents. All regressions include 27 Province fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level and 
reported in parenthesis.   ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.  
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 Table 1. 4: VAM - Interactions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Num.       Num.       Num.       Num.       Num.       Num.       
        
Broadband Access 1.442* 1.233*** 0.693*** -0.554 -1.481* 0.150 
 (0.845) (0.432) (0.251) (0.425) (0.886) (0.251) 
Test score - Grade 5 0.362***  0.350*** 0.351*** 0.349*** 0.343***  (0.00882)  (0.00693) (0.00693) (0.00693) (0.00650) 
Broadband Access x Test score - Grade 5 -0.0136       (0.0130)      
Test score - Grade 5, quartiles:       
II quartile  3.944***       (0.372)     
III quartile  8.728***       (0.383)     
IV quartile  15.85***       (0.399)     
Broadband Access x II quartile  -0.896       (0.562)     
Broadband Access x III quartile  -1.429**       (0.573)     
Broadband Access x IV quartile  -0.156       (0.590)     
Broadband Access x ESCS   0.477**       (0.206)    
ESCS, quartiles:       
II quartile    -0.625   
    (0.411)   
III quartile    1.327***       (0.444)   
IV quartile    2.644***       (0.512)   
Broadband Access x II quartile    2.077***       (0.579)   
Broadband Access x III quartile    1.175**       (0.580)   
Broadband Access x IV quartile    1.462**       (0.595)   
MISCED (1-5)       
MISCED=2     1.163*  
     (0.688)  
MISCED=3     0.772  
     (0.944)  
MISCED=4     2.603***  
     (0.796)  
MISCED=5     5.500***  
     (0.976)  
Broadband Access x MISCED=2     1.704*  
     (0.936)  
Broadband Access x MISCED=3     2.125*  
     (1.285)  
Broadband Access x MISCED=4     2.606***  
     (0.941)  
Broadband Access x MISCED=5     3.015***  
     (1.097)  
IT Training      0.130 
      (0.513) 
Broadband Access x IT Training      3.877*** 
      (0.722) 
Constant 41.46*** 57.59*** 40.27*** 38.01*** 42.57*** 45.26*** 
 (4.941) (4.949) (5.187) (5.175) (5.293) (5.268) 
Observations 27,384 27,384 25,531 25,561 25,531 25,531 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Peer Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
School & geographic variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents regression results of the value-added model reported in equation (7). The dependent variable 
corresponds to students’ numeracy scores in grade 8. In columns (1) and (2) the broadband access dummy is interacted with 
previous performance. In column (3), (4) and (5) the main explanatory variable is interacted, respectively, with family socio-
economic scores, the occupational status of the mother and with teachers’ IT training in the previous years. All regressions 
include 27 Province fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level and reported in parenthesis. ***, 
** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.  
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Table 1. 5: Interactions – quadratic model (Math) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
VARIABLES all ESCS<0 ESCS>0 
        
Broadband Access 8.068*** 7.419** 11.51*** 
 (2.465) (3.190) (3.966) 
Test score - Grade 5 -0.430*** -0.273*** -0.581*** 
 (0.0579) (0.0785) (0.0877) 
Broadband Access x Test score - Grade 5 -0.258*** -0.245** -0.355*** 
 (0.0856) (0.113) (0.134) 
(Test score - Grade 5)^2 0.00659*** 0.00523*** 0.00781*** 
 (0.000482) (0.000668) (0.000714) 
Broadband Access x (Test score - Grade 
5)^2 0.00213*** 0.00212** 0.00277** 
 (0.000712) (0.000964) (0.00109) 
Constant 37.02*** 35.13*** 43.39*** 
 (1.793) (2.366) (2.941) 
    
Observations 25,747 14,261 11,486 
R-squared 0.200 0.147 0.186 
Province FE YES YES YES 
Peer Effects YES YES YES 
School variables YES YES YES 
Geographic variables YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents regression results of  the quadratic value-added model 
reported in equation (8). The dependent variable corresponds to students’ 
numeracy scores in grade 8. The broadband dummy is interacted with students’ 
performance recorded in grade 5. Results in columns (2) and (3) concern, 
respectively, student below and above the average family socio-economic score.  
The sample covers all students located in white areas, where broadband coverage 
recorded was below 5% or above 70% (see Section 1.4.2 ). All regressions include 
27 Province fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level 
and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
levels of significance.   
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. 1: Broadband coverage 
 
 
Notes: the maps show the progressive evolution of 30 mb/ps coverage in Southern Italy. For every year, I access sub-
municipality level data recorded at the end of January. 
 
 
Figure 1. 2: Large (blue) and small (red) catchment areas 
 
Notes: the map shows a large catchment area (blue line) and a small catchment area (red line) built progressively 
linking adjacent Census areas, starting from the one where the school is located (green dot). Overall, small 
catchment areas cover neighbouring census areas where is recorded an 8-grade student population equal or 
greater than the 8-grade student population enrolled in the reference school. On the other hand, large catchment 
areas cover territories that host a population at least three times larger than the number of students enrolled. 
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Figure 1. 3: Test score distributions 
 
 Notes: The histograms report the literacy and numeracy test score distribution for the same cohort of 
students in grade 5 (2013/2014) and grade 8 (2016/2017).  
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Figure 1. 4 Grade 8 numeracy scores by performance in grade 5 and treatment 
 Notes. The graph reports the quadratic prediction for 8-grade students’ test scores based on previous 
performance in grade 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 5: Grade 8 test scores by previous performance, treatment and family 
background 
 
Notes. The graph reports the quadratic prediction for students’ test scores based on previous 
performance and family background (ESCS).  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Table A1. 1 Subjects 
Subjects Hours per week Hours per year 
Italian Language, History, Geography 9 297 
In-depth studies in literary subjects 1 33 
Mathematics and Science 6 198 
Technology 2 66 
English 3 99 
Second foreign language 2 66 
Art and design 2 66 
Sport science 2 66 
Music 2 66 
Catholic religious education 1 33 
Total 30 990 
  Notes. The table reports hours studied by subject in Italian lower-secondary school. 
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Table A1. 2 Final Dataset 
Variables count mean sd min max 
 0 1 0 1 yes no yes no yes no 
Test score - Grade 5 15,531 12,730 61.84 61.55 17.15 17 0 0 98 100 
Male 15,531 12,730 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 1 
Nursey 15,531 12,730 0.94 0.94 0.24 0.23 0 0 1 1 
Non-EU Father 15,531 12,730 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.15 0 0 1 1 
Non-EU Mother 15,531 12,730 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.17 0 0 1 1 
ESCS12 15,505 12,718 -0.09 -0.21 1.02 0.99 -3 -3 3 3 
HISCED13 14,513 12,119 3.39 3.34 1.16 1.13 1 1 5 5 
HISEI14 14,463 12,176 3.77 3.71 0.93 0.92 1 1 5 5 
I Gen. migrant 15,531 12,730 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.1 0 0 1 1 
II Gen. migrant 15,531 12,730 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.12 0 0 1 1 
Early enrolled 15,531 12,730 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.1 0 0 1 1 
Late Enrolled 15,531 12,730 0.15 0.17 0.37 0.36 0 0 1 1 
Male (class share) 15,531 12,730 0.49 0.49 0.14 0.15 0 0 1 1 
I Gen. migrant (class 
share) 15,531 12,730 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0 0 0 1 
II Gen. migrant 
(class share) 15,531 12,730 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0 0 0 0 
Class Size 15,531 12,730 20.48 21.95 3.76 4.52 5 2 32 32 
IT Training 15,531 12,730 0.88 0.85 0.31 0.27 0 0 1 1 
Inclusion Policies 15,271 12,710 5.01 4.93 0.94 1.01 2 1 7 7 
HR Management 15,271 12,710 4.59 4.56 1.01 0.98 2 1 7 7 
evaluation 15,271 12,710 4.67 4.77 1.01 0.96 2 1 7 7 
Student Monitoring 15,271 12,710 4.64 4.74 1 0.99 3 2 7 7 
Strategic Guidance 15,271 12,710 4.75 4.8 0.93 0.98 3 1 7 7 
ln City size 15,531 12,730 9.61 9.93 0.78 1.21 7.1 6.5 13 13 
Ln Avg. Income 15,531 12,730 9.01 8.96 0.36 0.37 5.7 3.9 14 17 
Income below 
10000, share 15,531 12,730 1.87 1.85 0.91 0.84 0.6 0 12 12 
income above 55000, 
share 15,531 12,730 43.7 43.05 5.93 5.88 20 18.7 62 64 
Population below 15 15,531 12,730 14.95 16.54 2.48 2.23 10.6 8.1 24 21 
Population above 64 15,531 12,730 18.54 15.98 3.9 4.05 7.3 8.1 27 34 
Altitude 15,531 12,730 3.7 4.18 1.04 1.25 1 1 5 5 
Notes. The table reports descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Index of individual economic, social and cultural status 
13 Highest educational level of parents 
14 Highest occupational status of parents 
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Table A1. 3 Groups (Math) 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreigner Nursery 
YES NO YES NO 
          
Broadband Access 2.393 0.672*** 0.697*** -4.121*** 
 (1.865) (0.235) (0.238) (1.532) 
Male 1.591 0.183 0.153 0.865 
 (1.428) (0.201) (0.206) (0.822) 
Nursery -0.0656 0.611    
 (2.075) (0.439)    
Non-EU father 4.344* 0.900 0.584 -3.492 
 (2.285) (0.850) (0.834) (3.202) 
Non-EU mother -2.305 1.565** 1.243* 2.074 
 (2.317) (0.726) (0.727) (2.541) 
ESCS 1.665** 3.488*** 3.489*** 3.361*** 
 (0.837) (0.104) (0.106) (0.467) 
Foreigner   -2.802** -0.291 
   (1.157) (3.912) 
Early Enrolled 0.245 -6.213*** -5.209*** -3.654 
 (1.903) (1.224) (1.156) (2.772) 
Late Enrolled 2.156 0.153 0.148 0.889 
 (2.223) (0.280) (0.290) (1.048) 
Test score - Grade 5 0.405*** 0.340*** 0.344*** 0.285*** 
 (0.0460) (0.00653) (0.00669) (0.0268) 
Constant 21.68*** 29.58*** 29.98*** 34.04*** 
 (3.424) (0.601) (0.455) (1.903) 
      
Observations 557 27,990 26,553 1,670 
R-squared 0.202 0.182 0.185 0.179 
Province FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes. This table presents the main results of the value added model 
reported in equation (7), highlighting the different policy effects for foreign 
students and students that did not attend nursery school. The dependent 
variables is students’ numeracy score in grade 8.  Sample includes all 
students located in white areas, where broadband coverage recorded was 
below 5% or above 70%. The ESCS index is a proxy for student individual 
economic, social and cultural status, based on known and unknown family 
characteristics. All regressions include 27 Province fixed effects.  Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the school level and reported in parenthesis. 
***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
Table A1. 4 No municipalities with share of population older than 65 >25% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
BASIC 
MAT VAM MAT 
INTER 
MAT 
VAM MAT 
Q 
INTER 
MAT Q 
            
Broadband Access 0.777** 0.867*** 0.832*** 0.886*** 7.587*** 
 (0.317) (0.285) (0.309) (0.283) (2.942) 
ESCS   1.186***   
   (0.233)   
Broadband Access * ESCS15   0.620**   
   (0.243)   
Test score, Grade 5  0.373*** 0.330*** -0.581*** -0.369*** 
  (0.00792) (0.00830) (0.0511) (0.0742) 
(Test score, Grade 5)^2    0.00805*** 0.00576*** 
    (0.000425) (0.000620) 
Broadband Access * Test score, Grade 5     -0.282*** 
     (0.102) 
Broadband Access * (Test score, Grade 
5)^2 
    0.00260*** 
     (0.000853) 
Constant 55.55*** 26.86*** 49.21*** 52.92*** 35.52*** 
 (6.635) (0.518) (6.366) (1.484) (2.259) 
      
Observations 20,302 20,211 18,594 19,732 18,216 
R-squared 0.114 0.143 0.198 0.159 0.198 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Peer Effects YES NO YES NO YES 
School variables  YES NO YES NO YES 
Geographic variables YES NO YES NO YES 
Notes. The table reports the main regression results presented in Tables 1.1-1.5, estimated using a reduced sample, where 
all municipality where the share of population was above 25% are excluded.  All regressions include 27 Province fixed 
effects.   Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively 
indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 Index of individual economic, social and cultural status 
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Table A1. 5 Alternative thresholds 
  Broadband Coverage>65% Broadband Coverage>75% 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Basic VAM INT Q VAM INT– Q VAM Basic VAM INT Q VAM 
INT– Q 
VAM 
            
Broadband 
Access 0.543* 0.634*** 0.637** 0.732*** 9.026*** 0.661* 0.710*** 0.651*** 0.603*** 9.537*** 
 
-0.272 -0.25 -0.26 -0.247 -2.579 -0.255 -0.232 -0.244 -0.229 -2.403 
ESCS 
  1.519***      1.444***   
   -0.202      -0.193   Broadband 
Access * 
ESCS   
0.444** 
  
  
 
0.398** 
  
   -0.216      -0.202   
Test score - 
Grade 5  
0.384*** 0.341*** -0.613*** -0.442***   0.389*** 0.347*** -0.643*** -0.444*** 
  -0.007 
-
0.00725 -0.0451 -0.0593   -0.0065 -0.0068 -0.0421 -0.0574 
(Test score - 
Grade 5)^2    
0.0084*** 0.0067***   
  
0.0087*** 0.0067*** 
    -0.00037 -0.00049     -0.00035 -0.00048 
Broadband 
Access * Test 
score - Grade 
5     
-0.280***   
   
-0.305*** 
     -0.0896      -0.0835 
Broadband 
Access * 
(Test score - 
Grade 5)^2 
    
0.0022***   
   
0.0024*** 
     -0.00075      -0.0007 
Constant 54.37*** 26.63*** 44.82*** 53.96*** 36.95*** 45.18*** 26.57*** 33.09*** 54.82*** 37.58*** 
 
-5.645 -0.455 -5.33 -1.313 -1.842 -5.273 -0.428 -4.97 -1.226 -1.775 
            
Observations 25,652 25,652 23,565 25,652 23,783 28,787 28,787 26,515 28,787 26,760 
R-squared 0.101 0.139 0.192 0.157 0.193 0.1 0.144 0.193 0.163 0.199 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Peer Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
School 
variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographic 
variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes. The table reports the main regression results presented in Tables 1.1-1.5, estimated using two different 
thresholds to identify the treatment: broadband overage>65% and >70%. Baseline analysis are conducted with a 
70% threshold. All regressions include 27 Province fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the school 
level and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.   
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Table A1. 6 Balancing test 
  Broadband access 
Dependent 
variable: 
OLS 
  
FE 
Coeff. se p_value q_value Coeff. se p_value q_value 
Test score, 
Grade 5- math -0.318 0.196 0.105 1 0.211 0.227 0.352 1 
Test score, 
Grade 5- 
literacy 0.160 0.203 0.427 1 0.497 0.234 0.033 1 
Male -0.002 0.016 0.890 1 -0.019 0.024 0.432 1 
Nursey 0.007 0.019 0.722 1 0.032 0.026 0.226 1 
Non-EU 
Father -0.012 0.006 0.052 1 -0.001 0.009 0.895 1 
Non-EU 
Mother -0.017 0.007 0.020 0.629 -0.001 0.010 0.899 1 
ESCS16 0.002 0.065 0.803 1 0.027 0.084 0.732 1 
HISCED17 0.001 0.045 0.981 1 0.038 0.065 0.561 1 
HISEI18 -0.013 0.037 0.733 1 0.013 0.053 0.805 1 
II Gen. 
migrant -0.007 0.005 0.135 1 -0.001 0.007 0.838 1 
II Gen. 
migrant (class 
share) 
-0.006 0.004 0.125 1 -0.001 0.005 0.826 1 
Early enrolled -0.001 0.005 0.799 1 -0.002 0.007 0.737 1 
Late Enrolled -0.006 0.013 0.650 1 -0.022 0.019 0.244 1 
Male (class 
share) -0.011 0.015 0.477 1 -0.020 0.022 0.367 1 
I Gen. migrant 0.000 0.003 0.990 1 0.000 0.004 0.912 1 
I Gen. migrant 
(class share) 0.000 0.003 0.966 1 0.000 0.004 0.971 1 
Class Size 2.357 0.547 0.000 0.001 1.406 0.710 0.048 1 
IT Training 0.02 0.030 0.475 1 0.058 0.044 0.186 1 
I Gen. migrant 0.000 0.003 0.990 1 0.000 0.004 0.912 1 
I Gen. migrant 
(class share) 0.000 0.003 0.966 1 0.000 0.004 0.971 1 
Inclusion 
Policies 0.125 0.104 0.231 1 -0.107 0.144 0.456 1 
HR 
Management -0.024 0.012 0.047 1 -0.029 0.013 0.030 1 
evaluation 0.281 0.113 0.013 0.409 -0.001 0.157 0.997 1 
Student 
Monitoring 0.134 0.111 0.230 1 0.137 0.158 0.389 1 
Strategic 
Guidance 0.196 0.114 0.085 1 -0.061 0.159 0.702 1 
altitude 0.463 0.165 0.005 0.174 0.222 0.169 0.190 1 
Class Size 2.357 0.547 0.000 0.001 1.406 0.710 0.048 1 
Early enrolled -0.001 0.005 0.799 1 -0.002 0.007 0.737 1 
evaluation 0.281 0.113 0.013 0.409 -0.001 0.157 0.997 1 
ln Avg. 
Income -0.037 0.017 0.036 1 0.004 0.022 0.856 1 
Income below 
10000, share -0.771 0.923 0.404 1 -0.939 0.987 0.342 1 
income above 
55000, share 0.141 0.131 0.281 1 0.087 0.149 0.560 1 
Population 
above 64 -2.572 0.048 0 0 -0.581 0.045 0.000 0 
Altitude 0.4783 0.0140 0 0 -0.036 0.013 0.004 0.134 
Notes. The table reports a simple balancing test, studying the relation between the treatment dummy and the main 
observables. Standard p-value and Bonferroni q-value are reported for the OLS and the FE specification.  
 
 
16 Index of individual economic, social and cultural status 
17 Highest educational level of parents 
18 Highest occupational status of parents 
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Table A1. 7 Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Employment 
rate 1d 
Employment 
rate 2d 
Employment 
rate 3d 
Employment 
rate 1d 
Employment 
rate 2d 
Employment 
rate 3d 
              
Broadband -0.00536*** -0.00711** -0.00446 0.000848 -0.00104 -0.00244 
 (0.00201) (0.00359) (0.00367) (0.00357) (0.00262) (0.00184) 
       
Constant 0.551*** 0.769*** 0.689*** 0.665*** 0.741*** 0.537*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0638) (0.0653) (0.0597) (0.0438) (0.0308) 
       Observation
s 415 415 415 415 415 415 
R-squared 0.017 0.009 0.004 0.190 0.545 0.293 
Region FE NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents regression results for a simple OLS specification studying the relation between the policy and 
the local employment rate recorded 1-3 years after the treatment. The results support the assumption that, within 
provinces, the treatment does not have a significant effect on employment rates. All regressions include 27 Province fixed 
effects.   Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively 
indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1. 8 Unemployment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Unemployment 
rate 1d 
Unemployment 
rate 2d 
Unemployment 
rate 3d 
Unemployment 
rate 1d 
Unemployment 
rate 2d 
Unemployment 
rate 3d 
              
Broadband 0.00350 0.0124** 0.00921*** -0.00121 0.00117 0.00201 
 (0.00356) (0.00493) (0.00297) (0.00287) (0.00374) (0.00274) 
       
Constant 0.164*** -1.347*** -0.278*** 0.186*** -1.295*** -0.245*** 
 (0.0633) (0.0876) (0.0528) (0.0480) (0.0624) (0.0458) 
       
Observations 415 415 415 415 415 415 
R-squared 0.002 0.015 0.023 0.443 0.513 0.285 
Region FE NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents regression results for a simple OLS specification studying the relation between the policy and 
the local unemployment rate recorded 1-3 years after the treatment. The results support the assumption that, within 
provinces, the treatment does not have a significant effect on unemployment rates. All regressions include 27 Province 
fixed effects.   Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively 
indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.  
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Table A1. 9 Income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Taxpayers 1d 
Average 
Employee 
Income 
1d 
Average 
Personal 
Employer 
Income 
1d 
Municipality 
Tax Revenue 
1d 
Taxpayers  
3d 
Average 
Employee 
Income 
3d 
Average 
Personal 
Employer 
Income 
3d 
Municipality 
Tax Revenue 
3d 
                  
Broadband -0.000 -0.00005 0.00155 0.00740 -0.0008 0.00002 0.00137 0.00497 
 (0.000) (0.00015) (0.00099) (0.00590) (0.00011) (0.00016) (0.00118) (0.00686) 
         
Constant -0.0249*** 0.0133*** 0.189*** 0.378*** -0.0250*** 0.0130*** 0.190*** 0.389*** 
 (0.00184) (0.00267) (0.0180) (0.103) (0.00169) (0.00250) (0.0185) (0.106) 
         
Observations 413 413 365 410 413 413 365 410 
R-squared 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.240 0.206 0.063 0.058 
Province FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents regression results for a simple linear model studying the relation between the policy and four different 
proxies of local income. The results support the assumption that, within provinces, the policy does not have a significant effect 
on local income. All regressions include 27 Province fixed effects.   Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level and 
reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1. 10 Mobility 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Pop change 
2000-born 
change 
2001-born 
change 
2002-born 
change 
          
Broadband -0.0001 0.0003 0.00007 -0.0005 
 (0.000113) (0.000419) (0.000313) (0.00185) 
     
Constant -0.00831*** 0.00870 -0.00198 0.0303 
 (0.00179) (0.00661) (0.00494) (0.0291) 
     
Observations 415 415 415 415 
R-squared 0.259 0.037 0.065 0.024 
Province FE YES YES YES YES 
                            Notes: This table presents regression results for a simple OLS specification studying the 
relation between treatment and mobility patterns characterising the entire population and 
the three student cohorts considered in this study. The results support the assumption that, 
within provinces, the policy does not have a significant effect on mobility patterns. All 
regressions include 27 Province fixed effects.   Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
school level and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
levels of significance.  
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Table A1. 11 Sorting 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Num.       Num. Num. Num. Num. Num. Num. Num. 
                  
Mover -2.29*** -2.227*** -0.240 -0.518     
 (0.386) (0.420) (0.579) (0.617)     
Mover (from 
control to 
treatment areas)     -2.413*** -2.265*** -0.380 -0.804 
     (0.538) (0.587) (0.758) (0.803) 
Male  0.574***  0.452***  0.570***  0.452*** 
  (0.190)  (0.164)  (0.190)  (0.164) 
Full Time  0.389**  0.829  0.388**  0.826 
  (0.195)  (0.625)  (0.195)  (0.625) 
EU born  -0.692  -0.680  -0.717  -0.686 
  (0.989)  (0.860)  (0.989)  (0.860) 
Nursery  1.541***  1.246**  1.547***  1.249** 
  (0.304)  (0.594)  (0.305)  (0.594) 
Italian Parents  -0.354  0.243  -0.325  0.243 
  (0.331)  (0.298)  (0.331)  (0.298) 
HISEI  1.029***  0.822***  1.026***  0.823*** 
  (0.111)  (0.0978)  (0.111)  (0.0978) 
HISCED  2.335***  2.402***  2.332***  2.402*** 
  (0.0930)  (0.0837)  (0.0931)  (0.0837) 
Constant 61.84*** 48.86*** 61.73*** 48.83*** 61.78*** 48.79*** 61.72*** 48.82*** 
 (0.0927) (0.570) (0.0818) (0.782) (0.0914) (0.570) (0.0777) (0.781) 
         
Observations 36,843 31,484 36,843 31,484 36,843 31,484 36,843 31,484 
R-squared 0.001 0.038 0.357 0.381 0.001 0.037 0.357 0.381 
School FE NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Notes: This table presents regression results for a simple linear model studying the performance of students changing 
municipality of residents between grade 5 and grade 8. These students constitute less than 0.1% of the population and 
are excluded from the sample in the baseline analysis. However, a higher performance could produce positive 
externalities on classmates in treated areas. The results confirm the main results are not driven simply by spatial sorting 
of high performers. All regressions include 27 Province fixed effects.   Robust standard errors are clustered at the school 
level and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.  
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Table A1. 12 Primary School 
  (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
Primary 
Literacy 
Primary 
Literacy 
Primary 
Literacy 
Primary 
Numeracy 
Primary 
Numeracy 
Primary 
Numeracy 
              
Male 1.732*** 1.759*** 1.753*** -2.814*** -2.826*** -2.836*** 
 (0.0539) (0.0580) (0.0544) (0.0536) (0.0575) (0.0550) 
Nursey 0.810*** 1.074*** 2.023*** 0.654*** 0.842*** 1.869*** 
 (0.107) (0.122) (0.205) (0.108) (0.122) (0.213) 
Non-EU Father -1.787*** -1.722*** -1.715*** -2.000*** -1.912*** -1.858*** 
 (0.172) (0.186) (0.178) (0.173) (0.186) (0.181) 
Non-EU Mother -1.209*** -0.844*** -0.925*** -1.647*** -1.311*** -1.297*** 
 (0.151) (0.162) (0.156) (0.151) (0.162) (0.158) 
BFMJ19  -0.186*** -0.151***  -0.334*** -0.276*** 
  (0.0422) (0.0404)  (0.0420) (0.0409) 
BMMJ20  0.250*** 0.253***  0.111*** 0.130*** 
  (0.0300) (0.0287)  (0.0297) (0.0289) 
MISCED21  1.437*** 1.468***  1.648*** 1.647*** 
  (0.0375) (0.0359)  (0.0374) (0.0364) 
FISCED22  1.171*** 1.238***  1.373*** 1.379*** 
  (0.0334) (0.0322)  (0.0332) (0.0326) 
ESCS23 2.641*** 1.558*** 1.568*** 3.230*** 1.955*** 1.948*** 
 (0.0738) (0.0596) (0.0570) (0.0732) (0.0590) (0.0574) 
I Gen. migrant -2.212*** -2.119*** -1.870*** -4.656*** -4.700*** -4.581*** 
 (0.224) (0.250) (0.241) (0.226) (0.253) (0.248) 
II Gen. migrant -1.579*** -1.597*** -1.499*** -2.823*** -2.912*** -2.918*** 
 (0.182) (0.203) (0.196) (0.183) (0.204) (0.200) 
Early enrolled -1.280*** -1.769*** -0.408* -1.322*** -1.849*** -0.864*** 
 (0.264) (0.278) (0.244) (0.255) (0.266) (0.237) 
Late Enrolled -4.293*** -4.227*** -3.889*** -5.426*** -5.407*** -5.078*** 
 (0.230) (0.252) (0.247) (0.234) (0.256) (0.252) 
Male (class 
share)  -0.505** -0.341  -0.0856 -0.0452 
  (0.249) (0.280)  (0.245) (0.282) 
I Gen. migrant 
(class share)  -2.706*** -2.839***  -2.806*** -1.934*** 
  (0.583) (0.659)  (0.572) (0.654) 
II Gen. migrant 
(class share)  -1.584*** -2.639***  -1.018*** -2.036*** 
  (0.389) (0.477)  (0.381) (0.479) 
HISCED 1.646***   1.810***   
 (0.0482)   (0.0481)   
HISEI -0.602***   -0.902***   
 (0.0580)   (0.0577)   
Constant 59.25*** 54.59*** 53.21*** 60.61*** 54.86*** 53.59*** 
 (0.351) (0.304) (0.339) (0.349) (0.301) (0.344) 
       
Observations 338,497 307,200 307,200 331,693 301,258 301,258 
R-squared 0.104 0.107 0.231 0.128 0.131 0.225 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
School FE NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Notes: This table presents regression results for a simple linear model studying the relation between several 
individual characteristics and test scores in grade 5. All regressions include 27 Province fixed effects.   Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the school level and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.   
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Chapter 2: Out of the darkness: Re-allocation of 
confiscated real estate mafia assets  
 
2.1 Introduction  
Urban areas are often characterised by pockets of poverty, crime, and marginalisation (Rosenthal 
& Ross, 2015). In light of that, addressing urban deprivation by means of effective regeneration 
measures represents a key challenge for policymakers (Bailey & Robertson, 1997). In particular, 
crucial objectives for interventions aimed at fostering the overall quality of cities - especially in 
underprivileged neighbourhoods - include tackling criminal activities and improving public 
spaces and housing (Atkinson & Helms, 2007; Koster & van Ommeren, 2019). Yet, evidence on 
the effectiveness of urban renewal policies of this kind is very limited.  
This paper focuses on a large-scale, nationwide policy intended to reach the double goal of 
opposing organised crime and also contributing to the revitalisation of local urban areas. The 
Italian law allows to seize any real estate asset previously owned by organised crime members 
or affiliates and, through re-allocations, re-assign these assets to local communities by converting 
them into public housing amenities (e.g. centres for disadvantaged groups, green spaces, police 
stations). The intention of re-allocations, as conceived by the Italian legislator, is to contribute to 
the development and revitalisation of local areas in which they are made. As such, this measure 
not only acts as a crucial device for the appropriation of relevant resources from criminal 
activities, but also allows its redistribution to local communities. In this way, it contributes to 
eradicate criminal organisations in the areas where they are most rooted and prevent their 
spreading in territories selected by criminal groups for investment and money laundering, while 
also providing new opportunities and facilities to the residents of neighbourhoods plagued by 
the mafia. The buildings re-assigned to the citizenry, in their new role, should stimulate the 
development of a ’culture of legality’, favour local entrepreneurship, and help recovering 
disadvantaged people from their conditions (Falcone et al., 2016).  
While some descriptive and anecdotal evidence exists on the use and application of the policy 
(Camera dei Deputati, 2009; 2018; Transcrime, 2013; Falcone et al., 2016), this evidence tells little 
on its actual effectiveness. When confiscated assets are discussed in the media, the monetary 
value of the assets is systematically presented (e.g. Repubblica 2019), but other local effects - let 
alone overall capitalisation effects - are seldom considered. In spite of the fact that policies to 
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recover organised crime assets are widely diffused in several countries across the world24, the re-
allocation measure adopted by the Italian State has thus far been ignored by the academic 
literature. Whether and how real estate asset confiscations and re-allocations have had an impact 
on the wider society has not yet been investigated.  
In this paper, we aim to fill this gap and investigate whether the re-allocation of confiscated mafia 
real estate assets produces any external effects on the local territory where such initiative takes 
place. Following the literature evaluating the impact of urban renewal policies, we capture the 
spillover effects of the intervention by looking at how the monetary value of buildings in the 
surrounding of confiscated and re-allocated assets responds to the implementation of the policy. 
The evidence produced by previous studies assessing the external effects of regeneration policy 
measures is mixed. While some works reveal that localised investments to revitalise urban areas 
have converted into higher house prices of neighbouring buildings (Santiago, Galster, & Tatian, 
2001; Schwartz et al., 2006; Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, & Owens, 2010; Ooi and Le, 2013; Koster & van 
Ommeren, 2019), others find that they have no effect on the property value of surrounding areas 
(Lee et al., 1999; Ahlfeldt et al., 2017). It is worth noticing that almost all these studies focus on 
specific neighbourhood of single cities where the programme has been implemented, producing 
hardly generalizable findings25. In contrast to that approach, we perform our analysis on the 
entire Italian territory, thus focusing on a very large and highly heterogeneous context. Hence, 
the main contribution of our work relates to the peculiarity of the intervention we examine, 
aiming to improve neighbourhoods by both increasing the stock of amenities and by tackling 
organised crime, as well as to the size and the spatial scale of the policy initiative.  
Furthermore, our analysis is based on a unique database which allows to better identify the 
policy’s impact. We exploit detailed information on the exact location and timing of over 15,000 
confiscated and re-allocated properties in Italy and investigate their spillover effect in two ways 
adopting difference-in-differences empirical settings. First, we develop a panel model estimating 
how micro-aggregated local housing markets across the entire Italian territory respond to real 
estate asset confiscation and re-allocation. Second, exploiting information on over 60,000 geo-
localised house sale points in the 55 major Italian cities, we provide a close examination of the 
impact of re-allocations on the housing value of neighbouring buildings, as well as a detailed 
investigation of the spatial decay of the estimated effect. These two empirical strategies 
complement each other. The first covers the whole of the Italian territory, focuses on a longer 
time period (2005-2016) but is relatively less geographically accurate, given that it is based on 
local area data. The second presents a more limited temporal span (2011-2017) but the precision 
and accuracy of the analysis are higher due to the use of georeferenced real estate data as units 
of observation, and to the possibility of accounting for a very large set of buildings characteristics 
as controls. This setting allows to minimise any issue of selection by local area/building 
 
24 According to the Asset Recovery Office of the European Commission, organised crime assets worth over 4 billion euros 
have been recovered in Europe alone in 2014 (the last year for which data is available) (ARO, 2014). Of this amount, over 
1.6 bn was recovered in Italy.  
25 The only exception if the recent contribution by Koster and van Ommeren (2019), estimating the external benefits of a 
programme improving the quality of public housing in 83 deprived neighbourhoods throughout the Netherlands.  
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characteristics, as well as to control for any potentially confounding housing market dynamics. 
In addition, detailed information on confiscated/re-allocated assets make it possible to separately 
identify the two aspects of the policy (i.e. the confiscation and the re-allocation).  
The results reveal strong and robust evidence of an external effect of re-allocations on 
neighbouring properties, noticeably increasing their value following the conversion of 
confiscated buildings into new amenities. This finding, consistent across estimation 
methodologies, reveals that for every building re-allocated in a territory, surrounding properties 
increase their monetary value between 0.4% and 0.8%. Examining the temporal dynamics of the 
effect by means of an event study, we show that the impact materialises the year following the 
re-allocation. Additionally, we demonstrate that this effect decays with distance and becomes 
insignificant 350m from the re-allocated building. When sub-dividing our sample into mafia and 
non-mafia regions, we show that the effect is driven by mafia-rigged areas, where the majority of 
confiscations and re-allocations take place. Furthermore, the impact appears stronger in deprived 
neighbourhoods. This suggests that the legislator’s intent to improve the quality of 
neighbourhoods where the mafia presence is more pronounced may be effective.  
A number of channels may be driving the uncovered effect. On the one hand, property values 
are directly influenced by the stock of amenities of the kind of those chosen for the re-allocations. 
A higher provision of green spaces, cultural facilities, social engagement centres, and similar 
buildings are expected to positively affect the monetary value of the neighbourhood they are in 
(Gibbons & Machin, 2008; Gibbons et al., 2014). On the other hand, the confiscation/re-allocation 
policy can influence disamenities such as the level of violence and crime, whose reduction also 
increases property prices (Gibbons, 2004, Linden & Rockoff, 2008, Ihlanfeldt & Mayock, 2010). 
Other mechanisms which may be triggered by the policy have to do with housing market 
dynamics, i.e. variations in the supply of real estate properties. An increase (decrease) in housing 
supply would reduce (increase) house prices (Glaeser et al., 2005; Caldera & Johansson, 2013).  
Our research, in addition to contributing to the literature on urban renewal policy evaluation, 
adds up to the growing studies on organised crime (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2013; Barone & Narciso, 
2015; Pinotti, 2015; Alesina et al., 2018; Di Cataldo & Mastrorocco, 2018; Pinotti & Stanig, 2018) 
and, more specifically, to the recently developing literature studying the societal implications of 
public initiatives against criminal organisations. The most widely analysed policy is the Italian 
law allowing the dissolution of local governments upon clear evidence of links between mafia 
clans and local public officials. Acconcia et al. (2014) exploit the temporary contraction in public 
investment occurring in post-dissolution periods to obtain estimates of the fiscal multiplier for 
Italian provinces. Daniele and Geys (2015) and Galletta (2017) demonstrate that dissolutions 
affect the quality of elected politicians and the proportion of public investments in neighbouring 
municipalities. Another examined policy is the accomplice-witnesses regulation. Acconcia et al. 
(2009) show the policy to be more effective the less efficient the prosecution system and the higher 
the internal cohesion of mafia organisations, while Garoupa (2007) analyses the policy within a 
principal-agent theoretical environment. No study has yet looked at confiscations and re-
allocations of mafia real estate assets as we do in our paper.  
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the legislative measures 
we aim to evaluate, providing some key descriptive statistics. Section 2.3 presents our data. 
Section 2.4 introduces our empirical strategy at local housing market (OMI zone) and sale-point 
(micro) levels. Section 2.5 presents our findings. Section 2.6 concludes.  
 
2.2 Institutional background: confiscation and re-allocation of mafia assets  
The rise in mafia activities throughout the 1980s and a series of violent attacks led the Italian 
government to introduce a set of tougher anti-mafia measures. On 13 September 1982, in the 
aftermath of the murders of politician Pio La Torre and anti-mafia prefect Carlo Alberto Dalla 
Chiesa in Palermo, the national Parliament approved the ‘Rognoni-La Torre’ law (646/82), which 
represented a turning point in the fight against organised crime. This bill introduced two key 
measures fighting mafia activities, namely the inclusion in the Penal Code of membership of a 
mafia-type criminal organisation as a crime independent of other criminal acts (so-called 416-bis 
article), and the possibility for the courts to confiscate any asset belonging to members of the 
criminal associations, as well as to relatives, partners and other subjects who in the previous five 
years played a cover-up role for criminal organisations. Any individual condemned with article 
416-bis would immediately get their assets seized. The seizure may be converted into confiscation 
by the judges. To make law enforcement quick and effective, the law granted the judiciary full 
access to bank records in order to follow money trails.  
The ‘Rognoni-La Torre’ law (646/1982) prescribes four steps to obtain the final confiscation:  
1. The properties of suspects of belonging to mafia groups are scrutinised by the 
competent tribunal;  
2. The seizure is decided upon by a panel of 3 judges. The asset goes under judiciary 
administration;  
3. The judges provide a motivation for confiscation. The asset goes under first degree 
confiscation;  
4. If appealed, the confiscation decision is reviewed by the Court of Appeal. The order can 
be ’revocation’26 or confirmation (second degree confiscation).  
The possibility of confiscating mafia-related goods and properties represents an extremely 
powerful tool in the hands of the Italian State in its fight against criminal organisations. Real 
estate asset confiscation is nowadays recognised as a fundamental instrument contributing to 
eradicate the pervasive presence of the mafia in the areas where it is most deeply rooted (Dalla 
Chiesa et al., 2016; Falcone et al., 2016). This is because real estate properties have a strong 
symbolic meaning for criminal groups. They are a physical representation of their power on the 
local territory and are often chosen by mafia families for their meetings. In addition, considering 
the large share of liquidity laundered by mafia groups into real estate properties - more than 50% 
 
26 Of all the confiscated buildings, only 14 have been ’revoked’. This suggests that judge bribing, even if taking place, is 
ineffective and plays little role as a confounder of our analysis  
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of illegal mafia profits are reinvested into the legal economy, with real estate as one of the 
preferred sectors of investment (Transcrime, 2015) - the confiscation policy is a way to harm their 
business model and earnings.  
A fundamental step in the management procedure of seized assets is their re-allocation to a new 
use by ‘returning them to the citizenry’ (Frigerio & Pati, 2007). This is operated by the Italian 
State, after the confiscation has been completed. The procedure of re-allocation, already 
introduced in the 646/82 law, has been regulated more clearly in 1996, when law 109/96 has been 
promulgated. As can be seen in Figure 2. 1, the number of re-allocations has increased drastically 
in the aftermath of the approval of the 1996 law, and the large majority of re-allocations have 
occurred in the last few years.  
Figure 2. 2 illustrates the geographical location of re-allocated properties across the Italian 
national territory. The confiscated and re-allocated mafia assets seem to be concentrated in 
metropolitan urban areas. Clusters can be observed in cities such as Milan, Rome, Naples, Reggio-
Calabria and Palermo. A concentration of assets also seems to emerge in Southern Italian cities, 
with fewer clusters in Northern cities and even less in the central regions of Italy. The regions of 
Sicily, Puglia, Calabria and Campania also present higher concentrations of confiscated assets, 
which comes as no surprise given the publicised presence of mafia in these regions.  
The approval of the 1996 law on re-allocation was the result of lobbying activity from the anti-
mafia association Libera, asking for a faster management of confiscated assets and the possibility 
to use re-allocated goods for social purposes. As a result of that, the law lists a whole set of 
different uses for the re-allocated assets. The two broader categories are: ‘social use’ and 
‘institutional, justice and public order’ (Figure 2. 3). The former category includes conversions of 
buildings into: anti-mafia/non-for-profit associations, senior centres, under18 centres, disable 
centres, health care centres, sport centres, green spaces. The latter includes: tribunal, police 
station, centre for migrants, archive, council houses. The logic of the policy is to use re-allocated 
assets to establish the principle of legality precisely where the control of the mafia is most 
entrenched, for example with the creation of police stations. Alternatively, buildings re-allocated 
for social use (e.g. by creating centres for employment-seekers) may contribute to provide 
concrete alternatives for individuals potentially attracted by organised crime. In all cases, the 
main principle behind this measure is the possibility for re-allocated assets to contribute to the 
regeneration of a local area and/or to become a fundamental resource in the fight against criminal 
organisations.  
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2.2.1 Local areas of confiscation/re-allocation  
 
By exploiting 2011 Census data, it is possible to descriptively examine the characteristics of the 
areas where confiscated and re-allocated buildings are located. In order to do that, we construct 
a dataset at the level of Census areas for the entire Italian territory and focus on micro-areas with 
100 or more inhabitants. For each of them, we are able to say whether there have been 
confiscations/re-allocations. We subsequently test for the correlation between a treatment 
dummy (taking value 1 if in a given Census area there has been at least one episode of confiscation 
and re-allocation, and 0 otherwise) and a number of Census characteristics. The results of this test 
are reported in Table A2. 4 in the Appendix. As visible in the table, territories where the policy 
has been applied are relatively smaller in size, as shown by the negative association between the 
treatment dummy and the log population variable, and they have a higher proportion of 
unemployed people, of families renting their house, and buildings in bad conditions. All in all, 
this evidence seems to suggest that, as hypothesised, the policy is most often being implemented 
in underprivileged territories27. Crucially, when we replicate the empirical test with the inclusion 
of local housing market fixed effects (OMI FE), it can be noted that none of the Census variables 
returns a significant coefficient, indicating that area characteristics are balanced in this case.  
 
2.2.2 Re-allocation timing  
 
The implementation of law 109/96 and the creation in 2010 of a National Authority for Mafia-
Confiscated Assets (hereafter ANBSC) has contributed to speed up the application of the law, 
progressively increasing the number of confiscated real estate assets being re-allocated. Yet, the 
average time between confiscation and re-allocation has been of over 8 years even after 1996, with 
only 83 properties in total being re-allocated in the same year or the year following the 
confiscation, as visible in Table A2. 1. The average length of the re-allocation procedure is sharply 
varying across the national territory, as illustrated in Figure A2. 1 in the Appendix, with no clear 
identifiable geographical pattern. Table A2. 3, reporting the count and share of re-allocations by 
political colour of local governments over the 1998-2017 period, suggests that the length of the 
re-allocation procedures is unrelated with the political colour of the municipal government where 
the asset is located. The proportion of buildings taking either less than 10 years or 10 years or 
more to re-allocate is almost the same for each government type28.  
Next, we examine how the length of re-allocation procedure correlates with the characteristics of 
local areas and the type of building being assigned to a new use. Table A2. 4 reports the results 
of an exercise testing for the correlation between the duration of re-allocation procedures, 
computed as the difference between the year of re-allocation and the year of confiscation, and a 
number of variables measured either at the Census level or at the level of re-allocated building. 
 
27 In Italy, approximately 72% of the houses are owned by residents. As a result, being rented is often a condition of 
more disadvantaged families balanced in this case. 
 
28 Comparing column (4) with column (2) of Table A2. 3, it also appears that re-allocations occur less than 
proportionally under governments run by civic lists - i.e. politicians with no clear ideological affiliation - than in 
governments ruled by left-wing, right-wing, or centre governments. As a consequence, it appears important to account 
for the political colour of the local governments in our analysis, which we do as we control for any municipality time-
varying characteristics by means of municipality-year fixed effects. 
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The correlation between these variables and the length of re-allocations is estimated first by 
accounting for re-allocation year fixed effects, then including local housing market (OMI) fixed 
effects. Table A2. 4 illustrates that re-allocations tend to take longer in territories with higher 
unemployment, i.e. in more deprived territories where it may be presumed that courts are 
relatively less efficient. However, as fixed effects are included in the model, none of the local 
characteristics emerges as significantly associated with the policy implementation timing. 
Furthermore, re-allocations take generally longer for buildings assigned to institutional use, 
while they take less time for buildings assigned to social use. Again, this correlation disappears 
with the inclusion of fixed effects in the model29. 
 
2.2.3 Heterogeneity of re-allocated assets and policy impact  
Mafia organisations generally own both operational and economic assets. The former are critical 
resources to exercise sovereignty over their market, whereas the latter are investments and 
money laundering machines. Operational assets such as real estate properties serve both as 
inputs for the illicit activities, insurance system against detection for the family of the members 
of the organisation and institutional signals for the entire community. The different role played 
by these assets suggests to differentiate between different regions where they are located. 
Another important source of heterogeneity is linked to the different types of re-allocation.  
The policy’s impact can materialise in various ways. First, the confiscation/re-allocation may be 
weakening criminal organisations. Asset seizure and confiscation might have a direct effect on 
the mafia’s economic power, and act as a deterrent reducing ex ante its size30. In addition, the 
policy might be particularly effective when complemented with plea-bargaining and other forms 
of amnesty for the agents, since it counterbalances the potential savings in labour cost for the 
organisation, with a higher punishment in case of detection for the employer. Decreasing the 
welfare of individuals linked by strong ties to the mafia could constitute a relevant deterrent even 
in absence of detection. Moreover, the simple confiscation could have per se an effect on the 
perception of impunity that often characterise criminal organisations. A weaker presence of 
criminal groups is expected to materialise into a higher value of buildings in the area where 
confiscations take place (Gibbons 2004, Linden & Rockoff 2008, Ihlanfeldt & Mayock 2010).  
Second, the re-allocation measure could serve as an extraordinary engagement device for the 
local community (Falcone et al., 2016). Non-profit organisations could use assets located in critical 
areas to organise bottom-up initiatives and sustain institutional change. This process may 
contribute to the revitalisation of the targeted areas also through the attraction of competitive 
 
29 This exercise has been reproduced also by including fixed effects for local Court instead of OMI fixed effects, obtaining 
very similar results.  
30 This second dynamic is consistent with the model proposed by Garoupa (2007), where a higher punishment for the 
employer fosters a decrease in the number of agents and in information diffusion.  
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firms and skilled workers (Storper & Venables, 2004). All this would capitalise into higher house 
prices in the neighbourhood area.  
Third, the involvement of local authorities in the decision process regarding the allocation of the 
real estate asset could counterbalance the influence exerted by the criminal organisation. A 
corrupted politician might selfishly decide to support the fight against the organisation, in order 
to obtain political support thanks to the provision of a new public asset.  
All these sources of heterogeneity are investigated in section 2.4.3. 
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2.3 Data  
The empirical analysis relies on a novel dataset constructed from a wide range of sources. First, 
data on confiscated and re-allocated real estate assets have been extracted from the National 
Agency for the Administration and Destination of Seized and Confiscated Assets from Organised 
Crime (ANBSC). This includes detailed information on all the 15,698 re-allocated buildings on 
the whole Italian territory with their full address, the date of confiscation and re-allocation, the 
type of building and of re-allocation, the local court responsible for completing the procedure, 
the administrative entity responsible to manage the building once re-allocated. Each asset has 
been correctly geolocalised. Of these buildings, a relatively small portion is sold on the housing 
market (746) or demolished (2). These assets are dropped from our sample.  
In the first part of our analysis, we use housing transaction data at a micro-aggregated zone level 
(Osservatorio del Mercato Immobiliare, or OMI), a spatial division of the Italian territory defined 
by the Italian Revenue Agency. OMI zones are smaller than neighbourhoods and correspond to 
functional local housing markets, i.e. homogeneous real estate markets for similar property 
types31. The dataset spans from 2006 to 2016. For each OMI zone of Italy and for each real estate 
asset typology, the dataset includes maximum and minimum selling prices of properties. 
Following (Manzoli et al.), we compute simple averages between the minimum and the 
maximum price for each OMI zone – asset type. The values, computed for each quarter, are 
subsequently averaged at the year level. Within each OMI, the square deviation is usually lower 
than 1.5. OMI areas are drawn at the infra-municipality level, based on similar socio-economic 
and urban characteristics, building infrastructures and quality. All these features are crucial to 
determine prices32 (Budiakivska & Casolaro, 2018).  
We decide not to exploit all the information of the OMI dataset and to consider the value of prices 
only for the most representative categories, i.e. civil properties in normal state of conservation 
which are usually private residential buildings (excluding chalet, villas and boxes). We retain 
over 38,000 OMI zones per year from 2005 to 2016, 1718 of which have had at least one episode 
of re-allocation over the analysed period. Figure 2. 4 zooms into three major Italian cities, Milan, 
Naples, and Rome, to show their OMI zones and re-allocations.  
The second part of our analysis exploits 53,728 geo-localised house sale points, spanning from 
2011 to 2017 and collected from Immobiliare.it, the biggest Italian real estate website. These data 
are based on real estate properties sold in the 55 major Italian cities33,  with homogeneous 
 
31 According to the National Real Estate Agency, OMI areas are defined as: ‘a continuous portion of the municipal area that 
reflects a homogeneous section of the local real estate market, where there are uniform prices for similar economic and socio-
environmental conditions. This uniformity is translated into homogeneity in the positional, urban, historical-environmental, socio-
economic characteristics of the settlements, as well as in the provision of services and urban infrastructure’. In each OMI zone, the 
lowest unitary market value recorded for each building type should not be lower than 50% of the value recorded the most 
expensive asset in the same category. 
32 The prices reported in the OMI dataset are obtained from various sources, principally the analysis of actual prices 
specified in administrative archives or quoted by market operators. In cases of missing observations, the data is integrated 
with assessments of local experts aimed at correcting imperfections or attributing a reference price whenever the low 
number of transactions limits the representativeness of the reported values. 
33 These are: Alessandria, Ancona, Aosta, ,Ascoli Piceno, Bari, Bergamo, Bologna, Bolzano, Brescia, Cagliari, Campobasso, 
Caserta, Catania, Catanzaro, Cosenza, Firenze, Foggia, Genova, Isernia, La Spezia, L’Aquila, Latina, Livorno, Matera, 
Messina, Milano, Modena, Monza, Napoli, Novara, Nuoro, Padova, Palermo, Parma, Perugia, Pesaro, Pescara, 
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coverage of the website across different cities as shown in Figure 2. 5. The dataset does not 
provide actual selling prices but asking prices that we use as proxies for the actual transaction 
prices34. The files have been then compiled, cleaned and checked for duplicates through the 
website unique identifier for each ad35. Finally, some of the missing values were filled by using 
the textual description of the ads. A recent paper by Loberto et al. (2018) which focuses on the 
comparison between Immobiliare.it data and OMI data provided by the real estate market 
observatory of the Italian Tax Office, found the Immobiliare.it data provides an appropriate 
picture of the Italian housing market, consistent with official sources.  
The micro-level dataset includes a wide range of structural attributes including floor space (m2), 
building height, type of property (studio, apartment, house, villa), the number bedrooms and 
bathrooms, floor, the date of construction, garage or parking facility and the type of heating an 
energy consumption.  
In addition, a long list of controls is collected from the Italian census (2011), the Italian National 
Geoportal of the Environment, the Real Estate Observatory of the Agenzia del Territorio (AT), the 
Ministry of Education and Open Street Map. These include a series of controls for pre-existing 
amenities (i.e. already in place before re-allocations) such as typology of buildings on the street 
of the asset, distance to a range of natural and commercial amenities, distance to parking and 
transport controls, as well as the locations of schools (see Table A2. 5). Labour market, education, 
real estate quality and demographic data collected for the 2011 Italian Census were also obtained 
from the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). Descriptive statistics for treatment and control 
variables are reported in the Appendix (Table A2. 6, A2.7, and A2.8).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pordenone, Potenza, Prato, Reggio di Calabria, Roma, Salerno, Sassari, Savona, Taranto, Teramo, Terni, Torino, Trento, 
Trieste, Udine, Venezia, Verona, Viterbo.  
34 Following Loberto et al. (2018), we assume that the removal of the ad corresponds to the sale of the property 
 
35 When a change of price was tracked, the final most conservative price was recorded. 
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2.4 Empirical Strategy  
In order to correctly estimate the effect of the confiscation and re-allocation of Mafia assets, we 
develop two complementary empirical strategies. First, we focus on the longitudinal trends of 
local homogeneous housing markets (OMI), exploiting the 2005-2016 time period and considering 
the entire Italian territory. This difference-in-differences strategy allows us to first test for a 
significant policy effect on micro-aggregated local housing markets. Next, we perform our 
analysis at the level of sale point, further testing for the spillover effect of the policy on house 
prices, capturing the spatial decay of the estimated effect and investigating the heterogeneous 
treatment effect. This hedonic pricing model is estimated as a repeated cross-sectional difference-
in-differences.  
 
2.4.1 OMI areas  
First, we analyse the effect of confiscation/re-allocation policies on property prices aggregated at 
the OMI area level. Average values are computed starting from the minimum and maximum 
market values per zone to obtain average euro/]# house prices.  
In order to test for the effect of confiscation and re-allocation of real estate assets on house prices, 
we rely on a differences-in-differences panel model accounting for the timing of confiscation and 
re-allocation of one or more properties in each OMI zone.  
The estimated model is as follows:  
													ABde) = ;Me) + Hfe) + ∑ FhUeh) + >e + *) + 5e)ihj( 																		                                                    (1) 
Where ABde), the natural logarithm of average housing prices per square meter in OMI j and year 
t, is a function of a different set of variables. The two key variables in the model are the treatment 
variable Me), switching on for OMI j in the year(s) when confiscation(s) took place, until the 
moment of the re-allocation, and the treatment variable fe) switching on from the moment in 
which a confiscated property has been re-assigned to a new use until the end of the sample 
period. As per our hypotheses, we expect a general increase in house prices in ’treated’ OMI areas 
during the post-re-allocation period. This model captures the extensive margin effect of 
confiscations/re-allocations.  
To control for different sources of heterogeneity in the sample, we exploit time-variant variables 
(Ueh)) retrieved from the 2011 Italian Census. We control for the number of properties in each 
area, the status of the buildings and other socio-economic conditions of the household living there 
(unemployment, level of education). In all specifications, we include time (*)) and OMI (>e) fixed 
effects. Year dummies allow to control for significant sudden generalised shocks in the Italian 
housing market, while OMI dummies account for any time-invariant factors at the level of local 
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housing markets36. Furthermore, standard errors are clustered at the level of municipality, so to 
correct for the presence of spatial autocorrelation. The model is estimated for the 2005-2016 
period.  
In order to isolate the effect of confiscations and re-allocations, we focus exclusively on OMI 
zones having experienced only one episode of confiscation(s) or re-allocation(s) in time. That is, 
we exclude all OMI zones where confiscations and re-allocations have occurred over multiple 
years. The single episodes of treatment we consider may involve more than one single building 
confiscated/re-allocated if the confiscations/re-allocations of buildings in that OMI area have 
been established all in the same moment. To minimise the effects of confiscations on re-
allocations, we test our findings by excluding all OMI zones where the re-allocation took less than 
10 years to be completed.  
 
2.4.2 Sale-point analysis  
In our main specification, we estimate a hedonic pricing model using micro geo-localised data at 
the level of sold building. Although this is considered the ideal approach in the hedonic literature, 
few studies have used this strategy to explore the impact of public policies as punctually localised 
as the one under consideration in this paper. Moreover, our dataset is novel in terms of size and 
spatial detail for the Italian territory. In line with other policy evaluations (e.g. Ahlfeldt et al., 
2017), our first assumption lies in expecting a very localised effect of confiscated assets on 
surrounding real estates.  
Using geographic information system (GIS), we begin by drawing perimeters up to 500m radii 
around each of the re-allocated assets. These buffers roughly correspond to an average 5 minutes 
walking distance from the real estate asset, spatially translating the expected local effect 
(EVSTUDIO, 2016; Gibbons & Machin, 2008). The buffers of 500m represent the maximum extent 
to which we expect to measure a local effect. Given the punctuality of the policy, we in fact expect 
externalities to be more localised, with radii varying between 100m to 500m from confiscated/re-
allocated assets37. 
Figure 2. 7 provides an illustration of our approach. All sale points with no assets in the buffer 
zone act as controls, while sale points located in the same OMI area, with at least one confiscated 
asset within their buffer radius act as treated units. We drop from the sample any observation 
with no confiscated asset within 2km distance, excluding in this way the large majority of OMI 
areas with no treated units. Exploiting information on each building’s sale date, we can exploit 
the timing of the re-allocation and identify the impact of the policy on the prices of buildings 
 
36 Adopting OMI zones as our unit of analysis allows to minimise unobserved heterogeneity potentially confounding our 
estimates, given that these geographical units correspond to functional local housing markets.  
37 In choosing our buffer radii we follow the literature on the evaluation of the spillover effects of urban renewal policies 
(i.a. Linden & Rockoff 2008; Schwartz et al., 2006; Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010; Ahlfeldt et al., 2017)  
 65 
inside the buffer and being sold after the re-allocation took place. This method allows us a highly 
accurate focus on the neighbourhood of the confiscated and re-allocated asset, identifying with 
precision the treatment area.  
To compute the external impact of the confiscated and re-allocated real estate assets we estimate 
the following hedonic pricing model:  
ln d"ek) = H(M",)^i(l) + H(f",)^i(l) + HmM",)ni(l) + Hof",)ni(l) + VU" + >e + Wk) + 5"ek)    (2) 
where ln d"ek)	is the natural logarithm of house price per m2 of real estate property i in OMI zone 
j, municipality m, sold in year t. M",)^i is a treatment indicator, defined as number of buildings 
confiscated within a radius d from building i in year t-n (n=1,2,3) before it was sold. Similarly, f",)^i is a treatment indicator defined as the number of buildings re-allocated within distance d 
from building i in year t-n. The two treatment variables capture the intensive margin effect of 
confiscations and re-allocations on house prices of neighbouring buildings.  
The variables M",)ni	and f",)ni (n=0,1) are post-treatment covariates, that allow us to account for 
pre-treatment differences in housing prices. U" is a vector of structural and amenity controls of 
property i, the latter which were constructed from multiple geographical datasets for all the 
Italian territory and 	5"ek) is the error term for property i.  We compute distances to a large range 
of amenities as specified in the data section (including distance to city CBD) to account for 
omitted variable bias. We also control for socio-economic conditions by census tract from the 2011 
Italian Census. Although our temporal dimension is shorter than for our OMI analysis, we control 
for local time-invariant factors and for common shocks, adopting OMI zone (>e) and 
municipality-year (Wk)) fixed effects. The model is estimated for the 2011-2019 period, for every 
distance d = {50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350, 400, 450, 500}. Standard errors are clustered at the 
OMI zone level so to correct for the presence of spatial autocorrelation.  
This research design allows to separate the effect on property values of confiscation or re-
assignment of real estate assets from correlated location effects (Koster et al., 2012; Noonan & 
Krupka, 2011).  
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2.4.3 Estimation issues  
In order to correctly identify the effect of confiscation/re-allocations on housing prices, a number 
of estimation issues need to be addressed.  
First, we need to consider potential problems of selection. According to Transcrime (2017), mafia 
organisations tend to invest more often in territories they control. If housing prices in these areas 
have peculiar trends for reasons not associated with the analysed policy, our results may be 
biased.  
Second, the application of the policy may depend on the quality of public institutions. In areas 
where public authorities are more likely to be captured by criminal organisations through bribes 
and/or where the re-allocation procedure takes more time to be completed, we expect a lower 
density of seized (and re-allocated) assets. Figure A2. 1 in the Appendix shows no clear 
geographical/regional pattern in relation to the efficiency of local courts responsible for re-
allocations, suggesting that court efficiency is semi-random. Re-allocation procedures exhibit a 
high degree of heterogeneity, with no clear differences in the average duration between Northern 
and Southern Italian regions. However, Table A2. 3 shows some evidence that the duration of the 
re-allocation procedure may vary depending on the political colour of the local government 
administrating the municipality where the asset is located.  
In order to deal with these issues, we include a number of controls in our models. To start with, 
we always include OMI zone fixed effects in the estimates. As mentioned above, OMI are micro-
geographical areas, smaller than neighbourhoods, characterised by homogeneous real estate 
markets. Areas are revealed at the infra-municipality level, sharing similar socio-economic and 
urban characteristics, building infrastructures and quality, namely the features which are crucial 
to determine house prices (Budiakivska & Casolaro, 2018). In Table A2. 2, we exploit data 
retrieved from the 2011 Italian Census to test the balancing properties of our setting on a number 
of local area characteristics, finding no significant difference within OMI areas (when OMI fixed 
effects are controlled for), confirming the homogeneity of these geographical units.  
As a further test for that, we also verify if OMI areas can be considered as homogeneous units for 
less ’tangible’ characteristics such as social capital38. To study the endowment of social capital 
within OMI areas we follow Putnam’s (1993) seminal contribution and more recent literature 
(Peri, 2004; Guiso et al., 2004; Buonanno et al., 2009) and exploit variation in voter turnout within 
OMI areas as a proxy for civic engagement. We are able to measure this variable at the level of 
polling station in the four largest Italian cities: Rome, Milan, Naples, and Palermo, which are also 
those with most confiscated and re-allocated assets (see Figure 2. 2). To minimise any distortion 
of electoral competition from organised crime (more common for elections held at the municipal 
level) we focus on the 2009 European Elections39. Our assumption is that differences in voter 
 
38 Scholars sub-divide social capital into bridging and bonding, the former referring to linkages between different groups 
in society, while the latter referring to strong ties within the same groups. In Southern Italy, a lower level of bridging and 
an excess of bonding social capital has been connected with the activity of criminal organisations (Trigilia, 2001)  
39 European Elections are known to be hardly influenced by criminal organisations, due to the size of electoral 
constituencies (the Italian territory is divided in 5 macro-constituency). Moreover, in contrast to mayors and 
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turnout between treated polling areas and areas where no confiscation is recorded would 
undermine our claim of institutional homogeneity of neighbourhoods within OMI areas. The 
results shown in Table A2. 9 unveil a negative association between voter turnout and re-
allocations, which however becomes insignificant when OMI fixed effects are accounted for, thus 
again confirming the homogeneity of OMI zones.  
In addition to OMI fixed effects, our hedonic models control for Census area characteristics, 
further minimising any potential confounder within OMI areas. Moreover, the specifications 
account for generalised shocks in housing markets by means of year fixed effects, as well as for 
any municipality-specific characteristics varying over time with municipality-year fixed effects. 
The latter control allows to account for any change in the political composition of the local 
government potentially influencing the timing of the policy and its implementation. To conclude, 
the very large set of control variables at the level of building - including a number of variables 
identifying pre-existing amenities - further minimises the possibility that any observed policy 
effect is due to non-random characteristics of the local area where the policy is put in place.  
Finally, we include in our model two pre-treatment variables, measuring the assets confiscated 
the same year of the transaction and the following year40. In this way, we test for pre-treatment 
differences in housing prices between treatment and control groups.  
Another possible issue relates to the fact that our study focuses on a policy being implemented 
in two steps: first the confiscation, and then the re-allocation. In order to minimise any possible 
effect of confiscations on re-allocations, our analysis focuses on re-allocations taking ten years or 
more to be completed. The ’double’ treatment may give rise to one additional concern, namely 
the fact that the confiscation affects other outcomes such as labour mobility. To minimise this 
issue, we test the impact of the policy within a very limited distance from the treatment site, as 
low as 150m, where the probability of any labour/firm relocation is unlikely to be more 
concentrated than in the outer ring.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Municipality/regional councillors, Members of the European Parliament do not have the power to affect the allocation 
of funds at the local level.  
40 According to Frigerio and Pati (2009) and Transcrime (2017), the large majority of assets become operative between 6 
months and 18 months after the reallocation time. Fort this reason, we do not expect any treatment effects in the treatment 
year.  
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2.5 Results 
 
 
2.5.1 OMI-level analysis  
We begin by performing the analysis at the level of OMI areas, focusing on the whole Italian 
territory and relying on a panel dataset between 2005 and 2016. The OMI dataset includes 
information on house prices - our dependent variable - for a large variety of real estate properties. 
In order to obtain comparable observations and minimise heterogeneity, we perform our 
estimates by focusing on the monetary value of the most common type of property in Italy, i.e. 
civic houses , further restricting the analysis to those whose quality status is classified as ’normal’ 
by the Italian land registry. While this strategy marginally reduces the number of OMI areas in 
the sample, it prevents differences in property prices to be driven by the diverse composition of 
buildings in a given area.  
We restrict our analysis to OMI zones having experienced confiscation and/or re-allocation 
events only once over the full period of implementation of the policy (1982 to date). In other 
words, we exclude from the sample all local areas having experienced multiple episodes of 
confiscation/re-allocation. The results of the difference-in-differences analysis are reported in 
Table 2. 1.  
We begin by testing the relationship between confiscation and property prices. The first 
specification in column (1) only includes the treatment variable accounting for whether an OMI 
zone has experienced a confiscation of one or more real estate assets at any point in time during 
2005-2016. This variable switches on in the year of confiscation until the moment of the re-
allocation. In column (2) we exclude all re-allocation years from the analysis. In both cases, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant, suggesting that house prices have not varied 
significantly in the aftermath of a confiscation episode.  
Next, we test the effect of re-allocation on OMI zones house prices. In column (3) we include the 
treatment variable for re-allocation, switching on at the time of the re-allocation episode in the 
OMI zone. This specification considers all re-allocated buildings, regardless of the time it took to 
re-allocate them, while in column (4) we focus our attention only on re-allocation that took 10 or 
more years to be completed. Finally, in column (5) we include both treatment variables at the 
same time. It can be seen that in all cases the estimates return a positive and strongly significant 
coefficient, indicating that the selling price of houses within OMI areas in which the re-allocation 
took place increased in the aftermath of the re-allocation. In our favourite specification, a 
reallocation of a single asset is associated with a 4.2% increase in property prices in the OMI area.  
It must be noted that, as all the sold re-allocated buildings are dropped from our sample, these 
estimates are testing the effect of real estate assets which are appropriated and managed by public 
institutions (mainly municipalities). Therefore, the observed increase in value in the OMI zones 
is due to a higher price of the buildings in the same local housing market of the re-allocated one(s).  
In Figure 2. 8 we examine the timing of the estimated re-allocation effect. We perform an event 
study (Angrist & Pishke, 2008) by including a full set of leads and lags dummy variables for the 
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entire period before the treatment year and during the treatment, using the year before the re-
allocation as reference category41. As before, the sample is restricted to OMI zones having 
experienced only one re-allocation in time. The figure reports the coefficients for each year 
pre/during treatment with 90% confidence intervals, providing further evidence on a positive 
and significant effect of the re-allocation event. In all years before the re-allocation, there is no 
significant difference in house prices between treated OMI zones (i.e. those in which real estate 
assets will be re-allocated) and other OMI zones, as all coefficients specifically referring to years 
prior to the re-allocation are not statistically different from zero. The significant difference in 
prices emerges in the following years, already visible in the first post-treatment year. 
 
 
2.5.2 Sale-point analysis  
Having shown some evidence of a significant re-allocation effect of the value of buildings 
surrounding those re-allocated, we further examine this relationship with micro-level data. Table 
2. 2, A2.10, and A2.11 report the results for the hedonic analysis conducted at the sale point level, 
using different radii to define the treatment area.  
Results for the model estimated at a distance threshold of 250m are reported in Table 2. 2. The 
first specification in column (1) includes structural controls and OMI/year fixed effects only. It 
can be seen that the estimate returns a positive and significant coefficient one and three years 
after the treatment kicks in. Results are consistent in column (2)-(4), where we progressively add 
building, pre-existing amenity and socio-economic controls. No significant difference between 
treatment and control groups are recorded in the treatment year and before. It must be noted that, 
as no information is available on the exact period of the year when each property is re-allocated, 
re-allocations in p`	might happen prior to the housing sale event. As a result, it is not surprising 
to find no significant result at p`, consistently with the event study in Figure 2. 8. Overall, the 
regression results suggest positive and lasting effect of the re-allocation policy.  
In column (5) we extend the specification to include municipality-year FE, in order to control for 
city-level exogenous shocks. Doing that, we implicitly rule out any municipal-level treatment 
effect. While this strategy is expected not to affect results concerning the largest cities in our 
sample, medium-size urban areas might still record an overall benefit from the policy. 
Nevertheless, results appear consistent with previous estimates. The coefficient in column (5) is 
positive and significant in the year following the treatment and in the third year after the 
treatment. Once identified the time trend in the event study, we estimate the overall effect of the 
policy. Column (6) only includes a cumulative treatment proxy, corresponding to the sum of the 
neighbouring assets re-allocated over the 3-year period. Finally, in column (7) we include in our 
specification a similar proxy for confiscated assets. Once again, the estimates report a positive 
 
41 While this implies including dummies up to 11 years before and during the treatment, the reliability of estimated 
coefficients reduces for years far away from the start of the treatment, as the number of observations for each year is 
inevitably lower.  
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and significant coefficient for re-allocations, while insignificant for confiscations. Overall, the 
findings are consistent with the existence of a positive externality arising from the reallocation of 
confiscated assets. For each asset confiscated in the previous 3 years, neighbouring property 
prices are expected to rise by 0.4%. Although the results generally confirm the dynamic found in 
the OMI analysis for confiscation and re-allocation events, the magnitude is significantly lower. 
This difference is probably due to the specific features of the two empirical strategies. The OMI 
analysis focuses on OMI areas where only one confiscation/reallocation event took place. By 
contrast, the sale-point analysis allows for multiple treatment. The difference might be partially 
explained with decreasing returns of confiscated/reallocated assets. Moreover, the second 
strategy guarantees a more precise identification of the policy effect. Controlling for property 
observable characteristics and unobservable time-invariant area characteristics, we better identify 
the effect of the confiscation policy on the properties located in the immediate neighbourhood 
around the seized assets. Positive effects on property prices taking place beyond the distance 
threshold chosen are likely to determine a downward bias in our estimates. 
Despite the fact that a proper cost-benefit analysis is beyond the scope of this study, it is possible 
to discuss the magnitude of the policy effect. To our knowledge, this is the first study to 
investigate the impact of confiscation policies on property prices. As a result, it is not immediate 
benchmark to compare our results with. However, our result can be compared with studies 
analysing the effect of crime at a similar spatial scale. Thaler (1978) finds that a one standard 
deviation increase in the incidence of property crime reduces home values by about 3 percent. A 
more significant effect is reported by Gibbons (2004), that finds a standard deviation decrease in 
local density of criminal damage to be associated with a 10% price increase in the average Inner 
London property.  
Our results can then be analysed in relation to studies investigating the effect of local amenities 
on property prices. Machin (2011) reviews 11 studies investigating the nexus between school 
quality and housing prices, finding a median change of 4% in housing prices following a standard 
deviation change in school quality. Similarly, the presence of sex offenders reduce property prices 
by 2-4% (Linden and Rockoff, 2008; Pope, 2008). On the other hand, changes in toxic emissions 
from industrial plants is associated with a 10% change in house price (Currie et al., 2015). 
With respect to different amenities, our estimates appear to be significantly lower. However, the 
policy considered is likely to be significantly cheaper for local authorities. Moreover, the strategic 
position of confiscated assets, mostly located in deprived neighbourhood, is such that the policy 
is likely to particularly benefit deprived social groups. 
In Table A2. 10 in the Appendix we report regression results for the hedonic micro-level model 
estimated within a radius of 150m, that we consider the minimum area of analysis, on the basis 
of our sample size and the related literature (e.g. Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010). The basic 
specification in column (1) reports positive and significant coefficients for the third year following 
the treatment. The results are generally confirmed in magnitude and significance while adding 
to the specification the full set of housing sale level controls. While estimating the cumulative 
treatment in column (6) and (7), the treatment coefficient is higher than the one estimated with a 
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250m radius. Overall, at 150m distance, we again find evidence of a positive effect of the re-
allocation policy.  
This result, obtained with such a small distance from the treatment point, allows to further 
minimise any potential concern of endogeneity due to the presence of time-varying confounding 
factors at the OMI level. If, for instance, the confiscation has activated some dynamics we are not 
explicitly accounting for in the model (e.g. related to labour mobility), this may bias our estimates. 
However, the likelihood that these dynamics are stronger within the 150 metres from the 
treatment sites than in the rest of the OMI area is extremely low.  
In Table A2. 11 we investigate treatment effects at 500m radius. Columns (1) to (5) report results 
for our main specification. Overall, we find some evidence of a positive effects in the years after 
the treatment. The coefficients exhibit a lower magnitude with respects to the one estimated in 
the 250m distance specification. Consistently, the coefficient is lower than with other threshold 
distances when considering the cumulative treatment and non-significant. Conversely, we do 
find some evidence of a negative effect of confiscations on house prices.  
In order to investigate the distance decay of the policy, in Figure 2. 9 we combine together the 
estimated coefficients from 100 to 500m, with relative confidence intervals, controlling for 
confiscation and all other set of controls and fixed effects. The Figure allows to appreciate the 
spatial decay characterising the cumulative treatment. The coefficients are monotonically 
decreasing, with a larger standard error up to 150m due to the lower sample size. Overall, the 
policy is found to have a positive and significant effect up to 350m. At a radius of 350m the policy 
still has a positive effect, but the declining coefficient suggest the transactions localised further 
than the 300m threshold to be less affected. At 400m distance the coefficient is still positive, but 
no longer significant.  
In Table A2. 12 , we test the robustness of these results by including in the model a control for the 
buffer zone. If there are time-invariant characteristics which are specifically located at a 100m to 
500m distance from the re-allocated real estate asset and have an influence on house prices, this 
would act as an omitted variable and bias our estimates. The specification including a buffer zone 
dummy variable is fully controlling for that. The inclusion of this control leaves the main results 
virtually unaltered, as the re-allocation retains significance and the magnitude of the coefficients 
is lower as we move away from the treatment point. Interestingly, the buffer zone dummy is 
statistically insignificant up until 300m from the re-allocated asset, suggesting no generalised 
difference in house prices in the treatment areas vis-à-vis the untreated area within OMI zones.  
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2.5.3 Where is the effect stronger?  
To conclude our analysis, we further characterise the estimated external impact of re-allocations 
on the value of surrounding real estate buildings by testing where is this impact stronger.  
To begin with, the results commented above suggest that the impact of re-allocations on property 
prices is larger the higher the number of re-allocations - i.e. in presence of a higher density of re-
allocated buildings. Hence, we may expect that the policy would produce the larger impacts in 
areas where organised crime groups are more rooted and where they invest the most. While we 
cannot directly measure the presence of organised crime, their strongholds are well known. 
Campania, Calabria, Sicily and Puglia are the regions in which Italian criminal groups have their 
roots42 (Transcrime, 2013). More generally, criminal groups tend to prosper in more deprived 
areas, where public institutions are often perceived as weak and distant, the provision of public 
services is sometimes deficient, and employment opportunities are lower. 
To test this hypothesis, we exploit the geographical extension of our dataset. We sub-divide our 
sample into regions of high mafia intensity (Campania, Calabria, Puglia and Sicily) and all 
remaining regions. The results, shown in Table 2. 3, indicate that the effect we obtain appears to 
be driven by the regions where organised crime has a stronger presence. As shown in Figure 2. 
2, these regions are also those where the majority of re-allocations have been made. 
 
Finally, we estimate the model by focusing on specific areas, selected on the basis of their 
characteristics. In particular, we attempt capture the degree of urban deprivation by means of 
two indicators related to labour market conditions and real estate characteristics of the area. We 
begin by sub-dividing the sample among OMI with average recorded unemployment rate above 
and below the 75th percentile of the national distribution (Census data). As visible in Table 2. 4, 
the effect of re-allocations on house prices only appears for areas with higher unemployment 
levels. Next, we sub-divide the sample according to the proportion of buildings classified as in 
’bad’ conditions, again relying on Census 2011 information. Once again, the estimated effect 
appears to be driven by the most deprived and disadvantaged neighbourhoods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 While organised crime is spread across the entire Italian territory (and beyond), it still maintains its strongest presence 
in the areas where it was originally formed. According to Transcrime (2013), the Cosa Nostra (Sicily), ’Ndrangheta 
(Calabria), Camorra (Campania) and Sacra Corona Unita (Puglia) preserve their strongholds in their regions of origin. 
The cities in our sample belonging to the four regions of high mafia intensity are: Bari, Foggia, Taranto (Puglia); Napoli, 
Caserta, Salerno (Campania); Catanzaro, Cosenza, Reggio di Calabria (Calabria); Palermo, Messina, Catania (Sicily)  
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2.5.4 Channels  
In this study, we presented evidence that confiscation and reallocation policies can be powerful 
tools to regenerate deprive neighbourhoods. However, we have not discussed what are the 
mechanisms driving the increase in housing prices.  In part, the capitalisation of re-allocations 
into higher house prices of surrounding buildings may be due to a safer environment, ’cleaner’ 
from the activity of criminal organisations. This kind of dynamic would be consistent with the 
fact that a stronger effect is visible in mafia-rigged regions, where the larger proportion of mafia 
investment into real estate are made (Transcrime, 2013). The effect we obtain may also be the 
result of the improved view of a previously more deprived and less attractive neighbourhood, 
thanks to the new amenities. This explanation is linked to the fact that the majority of re-
allocations take place in local areas characterised by a high share of buildings in bad state, and 
that the effect of the policy is stronger in more disadvantaged areas.  
In absence of detailed geocoded data, we are not able to investigate in depth the underlying 
channels. However, in this section we run a simple exercise that could provide at least some 
indications regarding the mechanisms that explain our results. We exploit 2013-2018 annual 
reports produced by the DIA, the Anti-Mafia Investigation Directorate, that provide very detailed 
information on the territories under the influence of mafia organisation in 5 Southern cities 
(Naples, Reggio Calabria, Palermo, Messina). In particular, the DIA maps the power exerted by 
each single mafia family on the territory. The data are updated every year and make it possible 
to follow the evolution of mafia presence in small neighbourhoods and even in single streets (see 
Figure 2. 11). 
 
Thanks to these data, we have constructed a street-level panel dataset on organised crime 
presence in Naples (see Figure 2. 12). Exploiting DIA data, we estimate the following model: 
 Mq]rssq.) = ;M.) + Hf.) + t. + *) + >u) + 5.)                                                                                    (3) 
 
where Mq]rssq.) is the number of camorra families active in street s, year t, or  a dummy for 
camorra activity, M.)	is confiscation dummy and f.) is the treatment dummy. The confiscation 
variable switches on from the year of confiscation(s) taking place in street s to the year before the 
re-allocation, while the re-allocation variable switches on from the year of confiscation(s) taking 
place in street s to the year before the re-allocation. The specification includes time-invariant 
street-specific factors (t.), time shocks (*)) and OMI-year FE (>u)). Due to the high heterogeneity 
recorded in street-level data, we only focus on a 100/200 meters radius from each road. 
This empirical strategy can be interpreted in two ways. The analysis of the effect of confiscation 
on Mafia presence could provide some evidence on the actual effectiveness of the State in 
eradicating criminal organisations. However, criminal organisation activities are likely to be 
affected by unobservable factors correlated with public enforcement. 
On the other hand, assuming the timing of reallocation to be exogenous with respect to mafia 
activity on the territory, the re-allocation of mafia assets could be seen as a ‘deterrent 
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technology’43. The signal given to local communities by the re-allocation to a new use of an asset 
previously associated with the power of the organisation on the territory, as well as the new 
services provided by the asset itself, could both increase the costs associated with the control of 
the territory. Considering the strong assumptions required to claim causality in such a 
framework, we perform it as a descriptive exercise to test our predictions that part of the effect of 
the policy on property price is due to changes in organised crime behaviour. 
 
 In Table 2. 5, we regress the number of family operating in one street over the cumulative re-
allocation variable, using a 100 meters radius. In the baseline specification (column (1)), 
confiscation is found to have a positive effect on the number of families per road, whereas the 
opposite effect is found for re-allocation events. When OMI-year FE are included (column (2)), 
the confiscation event becomes insignificant, while the coefficient for re-allocations, although 
losing magnitude, remains negative and significant. In Column (3) we focus only on treated 
roads, exploiting variation over time in the treatment variable. Results are consistent with the 
previous specification. Overall, confiscation is found to have an ambiguous effect on the influence 
of mafia families on Naples roads, while a significant and negative effect is found for the re-
allocation of former mafia assets. I columns (4)-(6) we estimate the same specification using a 200 
meters radius. Results are confirmed, but the coefficient magnitudes for re-allocation significantly 
declines. 
 
Results suggest that re-allocation policies could decrease mafia activity in the neighbourhood 
where the reallocation takes place. However, the number of family could be a poor proxy for the 
actual power of Mafia on a territory. In Table 2. 6 we run a similar exercise, but this time we use 
a simple dummy that takes value of 1 if mafia presence is recorded in the street and 0 otherwise. 
The previous results are generally confirmed. Confiscation has a positive or no effect on the 
presence of mafia, while a significant negative effect is found following the re-allocation of 
confiscated assets. In this case however, when we focus on treated roads only, we find a positive 
and significant effect of confiscation while the negative effect of re-allocation events become less 
significant. 
 
This exercise, conducted on a single city, does not allow us to draw conclusions regarding the 
effect of this policy on mafia activity. However, it supports our hypothesis that at least part of the 
regeneration effect of the re-allocation policy is obtained with the eradication of the pervasive 
presence of the mafia in the treated areas. On the other hand, the positive effect of the confiscation 
event on Mafia presence could be explained with the clan wars that often follow the conviction 
of important members of the organisation. 
 
 
 
43 Due to the lack of detailed geocoded data on deterrent policies and crime activities, most papers in the literature only 
focus on measures of expenditure in each policy. Two relevant exceptions are Draca et al. (2011) and Bell et al. (2014). 
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2.6 Conclusions  
In an effort to tackle criminal organisations, the Italian State allows for the possibility to seize and 
confiscate real estate properties previously belonging to mafia groups. Such policy, widely 
considered as one of the most crucial tools to undermine the power of organised crime in local 
areas, entails the re-allocation of confiscated assets to a new use, supposedly contributing to the 
revitalisation of the territory in which this policy intervention takes place.  
This paper assesses the extent to which re-allocations contribute to such regeneration process by 
testing their external effects on the monetary value of properties in the surrounding areas. Our 
estimates, performed at different geographical units of analysis and making use of unique micro-
level datasets, unveil a robust positive relationship between re-allocation cases and the property 
price of neighbouring buildings. The increase is equal to 0.5%-0.8% per each re-allocated 
building, lasting a minimum of three years following the re-allocation.  
This finding suggests that, as hypothesised (and as expected by the Italian legislator), re-
allocations lead to significant spillover effects that add value to the whole territory where they 
are implemented. Such effect is visible in the range of up to 350m from each episode of re-
allocation. The impact is stronger in more deprived neighbourhoods and in regions characterised 
by a stronger presence of criminal organisations.  
With the available data, we are not currently able to investigate to what extent the observed effect 
is due to the eradication of the presence of criminal organisations or to a simple amenity effect. 
However, the exercise conducted at the street level suggests that at least a part of the effect could 
be associated with a reduction of the depressive effect of mafia activity on local economy.  
In all cases, what emerges with clarity from our study is that the policy of re-allocating real estate 
assets recovered from criminal organisations has the important effect of increasing the value of 
local neighbourhoods where such buildings are located. The policy we have assessed is not 
explicitly characterised as ’place-based’ in nature, in the sense that it is not specifically intended 
for poor neighbourhoods, but rather can be implemented in both more and less developed areas. 
Nevertheless, we have shown that its primary application has been in local areas characterised 
by high unemployment and more unattractive buildings. Furthermore, its effect is noticeably 
larger in cities where the presence of organised crime is stronger. Hence, this suggest that an 
effective and rapid implementation of the re-allocation policy may favour the revitalisation of 
urban areas at higher disadvantage where mafia groups hold the upper hand.  
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Tables 
 
Table 2. 1: OMI-level estimates 
Log euro per m2       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Confiscation 0.0180 0.0179   0.0159 
 (0.0145) (0.0138)   (0.0186) 
      
Re-allocation   0.0374*** 0.0421** 0.0421** 
    (0.0142) (0.0187) (0.0186) 
      
Census controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
OMI FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Re-all. time Any No re-all. years Any 10+ 10+ 
Observations 255,995 253,080 253,562 251,779 251,779 
R-squared 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.966 
Notes. The table reports the estimation results for the difference-in-difference model testing the relationship 
between confiscation/re-allocation and property prices (see Section 2.4.1). The dependent variable is the 
average price per m2  recorded for private properties in each OMI area. The confiscation dummy switches 
on in the year of confiscation until the time of reallocation. Consistently, the re-allocation dummy equals 
one from the year of re-allocation onwards. In columns (1) and (3), the analysis covers the whole sample. 
In column (2) re-allocation years are excluded from sample. In columns (4)-(5) only re-allocations taking 10 
or more years from confiscation are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality level 
and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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Table 2. 2: Sale point analysis – d=250 
Log euro per m2  
Buffer radius: 250m 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
1 year before re-
allocation 0.00249 0.00211 0.00188 0.00301 0.00212   
 
(0.00319) (0.00315) (0.00315) (0.00322) (0.00332)  
 
Re-allocation year -0.00085 -0.00107 -0.00119 -2.57e-05 -0.00261   
  (0.00313) (0.00312) (0.00312) (0.00282) (0.00294)   
1 year after re-allocation 0.0083*** 0.0079*** 0.0076*** 0.0081*** 0.00556**    
  (0.00260) (0.00255) (0.00263) (0.00254) (0.00241)    
2 years after re-
allocation 0.00299 0.00271 0.00253 0.00331 0.00130    
  (0.00260) (0.00256) (0.00259) (0.00236) (0.00265)    
3 years after re-
allocation 0.0071*** 0.0064*** 0.0063*** 0.0064*** 0.0058***    
  (0.00225) (0.00220) (0.00219) (0.00181) (0.00164)   
Re-allocation           0.00383** 0.00379** 
            (0.00150) (0.00151) 
Confiscation       -0.00438 
       (0.00276) 
        
Structural controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Building controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Amenity controls   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Socio-econ. controls    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
OMI FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality-year FE     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 52,526 52,513 52,513 52,513 51,906 51,906 51,906 
R-squared 0.768 0.769 0.771 0.777 0.784 0.784 0.784 
Notes. The table reports the estimation results for hedonic analysis presented in Section 2.4.2. The dependent variable is 
the price recorded for each sale point i in year t. The main explanatory variables are the number of 
confiscation/reallocation events taking place n years before/after the transaction. Columns (1)-(5) report the effect of 
property re-allocation 1-3 years after the event. Housing prices differences recorded the same year or the year before 
make it possible to account for pre-treatment differences in housing prices. Columns (6) and (7) report the cumulative 
effect of confiscation and reallocation events on housing prices. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality 
level and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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Table 2. 3: Sale point analysis – regional heterogeneity 
 
 Campania, Calabria, Puglia, Sicily Other Italian regions 
Dep. variable: 
Log euro per m2 100m 250m 500m 100m 250m 500m 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Re-allocation 0.00718** 0.00427** 0.00137 -0.00985  0.00431  -0.00210  
  (0.00329) (0.00190) (0.00106)  (0.00948)  (0.00776)  (0.00776) 
Confiscation 0.00302 0.00155 0.00155 0.00691 -0.00604 -0.00833 
 (0.00290) (0.00185) (0.00185) (0.0340) (0.0115) (0.0068) 
       
Structural controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Building controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Amenity controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Socio-econ. controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
OMI FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality-year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 11,891 11,891 11,891 40,015 40,015 40,015 
R-squared 0.719 0.719 0.719 0.787 0.787 0.787 
Notes. The table reports the estimation results for hedonic analysis presented in Section 2.4.2. The dependent 
variable is the price recorded for each sale point i in year t. The main explanatory variables are the number of 
confiscation/reallocation events taking place n years before/after the transaction.  Columns (1)-(3) report the 
effect of property re-allocation 1-3 years after confiscation/re-allocation events in the regions where mafia 
organisations are more rooted. Column (4)-(6) report the estimates for the remaining territory.  Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively 
indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
 
Table 2. 4: Sale point analysis – local deprivation 
 
Log euro per m2 Buffer: 250m 
 Unemployment Bad real estate conditions 
 High (>75
th 
perc.) 
Low (<75th 
perc.) 
High (>75th 
perc.) 
Low (<75th 
perc.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Re-allocation 0.00385** 0.00185 0.00519*** 0.00270 
 (0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00158) (0.00353) 
     
Confiscation -0.000690 0.00184 -0.00354 -0.0176 
 (0.00285) (0.00674) (0.00288) (0.0324) 
     
Structural / building / amenity 
controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Socio-econ. controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
OMI FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality-year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 7,028 44,878 14,836 37,070 
R-squared 0.601 0.769 0.794 0.772 
Notes. The table reports the estimation results for hedonic analysis presented in Section 2.4.2.  The dependent 
variable is the price recorded for each sale point i in year t. The main explanatory variables are the number of 
confiscation/reallocation events taking place n years before/after the transaction. Columns (1)-(3) report the effect 
of property re-allocation 1-3 years after  confiscation/re-allocation events took place. The model is estimated using 
different samples, based on two proxies for local deprivation. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level and reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of 
significance. 
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Table 2. 5: Street-level analysis: number of Mafia families 
Dependent 
variable: 
number of 
Mafia families  
  
100 m buffer 
  
  
200 m buffer 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
confiscation 0.311*** -0.0989 0.0703 0.570*** 0.0696 0.166** 
 (0.0664) (0.0613) (0.0647) (0.0502) (0.0603) (0.0681) 
re-allocation -0.583*** -0.153*** -0.364*** -0.435*** -0.0964*** -0.210*** 
 (0.0444) (0.0301) (0.0380) (0.0318) (0.0207) (0.0252) 
       
Observations 84,174 84,162 9,036 84,174 84,162 20,748 
R-squared 0.849 0.942 0.928 0.849 0.942 0.933 
Notes. The table reports the estimation results for linear regression model presented in Section 2.5.4. The dependent 
variable is the number of camorra families recorded in each road. In columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) the sample covers all 
Naples roads, whereas in column (3) and (6) it is restricted only to roads with confiscations/re-allocations. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * respectively indicate 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
 
 
 
Table 2. 6: Street-level analysis: Mafia presence 
Dependent 
variable: 
Mafia dummy 
  
  
100 m buffer 
  
  
200 m buffer  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
confiscation 0.0307*** 0.00125 0.0187*** 0.0386*** 0.0208** 0.0362*** 
 (0.00370) (0.00384) (0.00692) (0.00214) (0.00822) (0.0124) 
re-allocation -0.0182*** -0.0201*** -0.0135* -0.0142*** -0.0152*** -0.00831* 
 (0.00586) (0.00538) (0.00710) (0.00437) (0.00417) (0.00483) 
       
Observations 84,588 84,576 9,054 84,588 84,576 20,880 
R-squared 0.874 0.944 0.936 0.874 0.944 0.935 
Notes. The table reports the estimation results for linear regression model presented in Section 2.5.4. The dependent 
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if mafia activity is recorded in the street. In columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) the sample 
covers all Naples roads, whereas in column (3) and (6) it is restricted only to roads with confiscations/re-allocations. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * respectively 
indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 1: Re-allocated real estate assets by year 
 
The figure shows the number of assets re-allocated by year, over the period 1982-2018. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 2: Re-allocations in Italy 
 
The figure shows the geographical location of confiscated assets across the Italian territory 
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Figure 2. 3: Re-allocation types 
 The figure shows the distribution of re-allocated assets by broader category. 
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Figure 2. 4: : OMI zones (Italy, Milan, Rome, Naples) 
 
The figure shows re-allocated assets and OMI zones for the whole Italian territory and, in detail, for the three largest cities 
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Figure 2. 5: : Sale points in Italian cities 
 The figure shows the distribution of sale points across the 55 main Italian cities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 6: : Sale points in major Italian cities 
 
The figure shows 100m, 250m and 500m buffers around each sale point recorded in the three main Italian cities 
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Figure 2. 7: Buffer zones 
 The figure provides a detailed representation of our methodology. Red dots represent re-
allocated assets, black dots are sale points and blue, yellow and red areas represent, respectively 
the 100m, 250m and 500m buffer measured around each re-allocation. The point sales that in a 
given year fall inside a certain buffer d are said to be treated at distance d. 
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Figure 2. 8: Event study – re-allocation 
 The figure reports coefficients and confidence intervals for the event study conducted using OMI-level data.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 9: : Sale point analysis – distance decay 
 
The figure reports coefficients and confidence intervals estimated in the hedonic specification.  The figure  
allows to appreciate spatial decay characterising the cumulative treatment.   
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Figure 2. 10: Mafia families in 
Naples, 2013 
Figure 2. 11: Mafia families in 
Naples, 2018 
  
The figure retrieved from Transcrime (2018) shows the spatial distribution of mafia families in Naples in 2013 and 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 12: Street-level dataset 
 
The figure shows the Naples road network and the buffer constructed within 100m from both 
side of each road 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Table A2. 1: Timing of re-allocations 
 Years between confiscation and re-allocation 
 0-1 2-3 4-5 6-7 8-9 10+ 
Number of re-allocated real 
estate properties 83 603 1,684 2,830 2,585 7,913 
% of total re-allocated 0.5 3.8 10.7 18.0 16.5 50.4 
Source: own elaboration with ANBSC data. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. 2: Re-allocation and local area characteristics 
 
 Local area characteristics: 
Dep. variable:   
Re-allocation Ln pop Illiterate pop Unemployed Rented pop 
Buildings  
bad conditions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
-0.0153* 0.00851 0.01758** 0.00695*** 0.00441** 
 (0.00859) (0.00674) (0.00710) (0.00229) (0.00182) 
      
Observations 123,718 123,718 123,718 123,718 123,648 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.017 0.002 
      
 -0.000189 0.000228 0.000092 6.53e-05 -0.00337 
 (0.000682) (0.000369) (0.000250) (6.36e-05) (0.00660) 
OMI FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 121,174 121,174 121,174 121,174 121,107 
R-squared 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable: Re-allocation 
dummy. Local area conditions: Log population, percentage of residents with tertiary education, 
percentage of illiterate population, percentage of unemployed, percentage of foreigners, Buildings being 
occupied and used as percentage of total in local area, buildings in excellent conditions as percentage of 
total in local area, buildings in bad conditions as percentage of total in local area.  
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Table A2. 3: Local governments and re-allocation duration 
 Italy local Governments 1998-
2017 
Re-allocations 1998-2017 Re-allocations timing: 0-9 years 
Re-allocations timing: 
10+ years 
 Count Percentage Count 
Percenta
ge Count 
Percenta
ge Count 
Percenta
ge 
Party 
colour (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Right 5,886 14.3 2,436 26.9 1,256 27.9 1,777 39.2 
Centre 5,158 12.6 595 6.6 305 6.8 290 6.4 
Left 9,950 24.3 3,359 37.2 1,582 35.2 1,180 26.1 
5Star 425 1.1 290 3.2 49 1.1 241 5.3 
Civic 
list 23,664 57.7 2,280 25.3 1,332 29.7 948 20.9 
Dissolv
ed 274 0.7 300 3.3 202 4.5 98 2.1 
Party colour: ideological leaning/party type of municipal governments during 1998-2017 in Italy. Civic lists: 
electoral lists/parties different from national parties, often created ad hoc for local elections. Right, Centre and 
Left include civic lists of that political colour. Civic list includes both ideologically identifiable lists and non-
identifiable lists. Dissolved: municipal governments dissolved for any reason, such as collusion/corruption, 
financial disarray, vote of no confidence. 
 
 
Table A2. 4: Re-allocation and local area characteristics 
 Local area characteristics Re-allocated building characteristics 
Dep. variable:  
Re-allocation 
timing 
Ln pop Illiterate pop 
Unemplo
yed Rented pop 
Buildings  
bad 
conditions 
Social 
use Institutional 
Residential 
buildings Terrains 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
           
 6.23e-06 0.0274 0.429*** 0.0460 0.0746 -1.967*** 2.440** -0.269 -0.386 
 (0.306) (0.102) (0.105) (0.0342) (0.0732) (0.652) (1.023) (0.493) (0.540) 
          
Re-allocation 
year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 5,999 5,999 5,999 5,999 5,999 8,969 8,969 8,969 8,969 
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007 
          
 -0.284 0.0915 0.403 -0.0105 -0.0140 -1.862 1.883 -0.202 -2.458 
 (0.531) (0.168) (0.402) (0.0647) (0.120) (1.669) (2.211) (0.318) (2.630) 
          
Re-allocation 
year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
OMI FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 5,593 5,593 5,593 5,593 5,579 8,438 8,438 8,438 8,438 
R-squared 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.077 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 
          
Notes. The table illustrates the relation between the length of re-allocation procedure and characteristics  of the area where 
the confiscation took place and of the asset. . Independent variable: columns (1)-(5): local area conditions. Log population, 
percentage of residents with tertiary education, percentage of illiterate population, percentage of unemployed, percentage 
of families being rented, buildings in bad conditions as percentage of total in local area. Columns (6)-(9): re-allocated 
building characteristics (dummy variables). Re-allocated for social use, re-allocated for institutional use, residential 
buildings, terrains. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and 
* respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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Table A2. 5: Property characteristics 
Type of data Variables 
Identifiers 
Unique ad identifier, date in which the ad was created in the 
database, date in which the ad was removed from the database, date 
in which one of the characteristics of the ad was modified for the last 
time 
Numerical Price, floor area, rooms, bathrooms, year built 
Categorical Property type, kitchen type, heating type, maintenance status, floor, air conditioning, energy class 
Type of building Elevator, garage/parking spot, building category 
Geographical  Longitude, Latitude, address 
Temporal Ad posted, ad removed, ad modified 
Contractual Foreclosure auction 
Textual Description 
The table illustrates the main variable types available in the hedonic dataset 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. 6: Descriptive statistics: treatment variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
OMI zones:    
Price €/m2 262,740 1188.5 778.9 
Re-allocation 388,884 0.0166 0.128 
Confiscation 388,884 0.0134 0.115 
     
Sale points:    
Price €/m2 52,651 2415.3 1525.3 
Re-allocation  52,651 0.166 1.269 
Confiscation  52,651 0.0391 0.721 
Re-allocation year 52,651 0.0487 0.608 
1 year after re-allocation 52,651 0.0521 0.615 
2 years after re-allocation 52,651 0.0339 0.594 
3 years after re-allocation 52,651 0.0169 0.286 
4 years after re-allocation 52,651 0.0142 0.197 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. 
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Table A2. 7: Descriptive statistics: sale point characteristics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Distance to green area 6,647.6 4,305.6 
Distance to beach max 20km 172,000 335,000 
Distance to city viewpoint 1km 19,962.3 10,809.2 
Distance to a University 50,317.5 27,780.2 
Distance to bus, tram or metro 3,081.6 755.6 
Distance to Intercity transport, railway 6,017.8 1,750.8 
Distance to airport 17,593.4 17,172.7 
Distance to commercial centre 25,858.5 14,489.2 
Distance to church 729.5 406.9 
Distance to state schools 6,896.7 994.2 
Noise - within 500m of a highway 0.23 0.06 
Dummy industrial area 0.16 0.03 
Distance to factory 5,859.9 2,665.2 
Distance to construction site 19,820.4 9,124.5 
Month of offer 3.51 5.00 
Lift dummy 0.49 0.41 
Building height 8.04 14.05 
Typology of building 1.24 2.62 
Area of building 1,141.1 538.4 
Average typology of building in street 0.66 2.71 
Property up for auction 0.14 0.02 
Type of property 0.71 4.02 
Number of rooms 1.30 2.80 
Number of bathrooms 0.69 1.51 
Type of kitchen 0.70 1.46 
Floor number 2.61 2.01 
Parking with property 0.47 0.33 
Periods year built 2.01 2.49 
Property condition 1.08 2.19 
Property heating type 0.73 0.93 
Air conditioning 0.44 0.27 
Energy Efficiency 0.83 0.87 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the sale-point-level variables used in 
the analysis. 
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Table A2. 8: Descriptive Statistics: Census area characteristics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
    
Population 123,718 341.7 265.8 
% Illiterate population 123,718 0.94 1.43 
% Unemployed 123,718 3.24 1.82 
% Rented families 123,718 8.30 7.20 
% Buildings bad conditions 123,648 1.15 4.28 
The table reports descriptive statistics for census-area-level variables used in the 
analysis. 
 
 
 
Table A2. 9: Re-allocation and electoral turnout 
 Dep. variable:   Re-allocation 
Dep. variable:   
Re-allocation timing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Turnout -0.168*** 0.0115 -17.46*** -0.984 
 (0.00935) (0.0162) (1.857) (5.306) 
     
OMI FE  ✓  ✓ 
Observations 26,898 26,898 633 633 
R-squared 0.003 0.044 0.123 0.445 
Notes. The table illustrates the relation between re-allocation events, 
duration of the re-allocation procedure and  local turnout. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in 
parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of 
significance. 
.  
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Table A2. 10: Sale point analysis – d=150 
Log euro per m2  Buffer radius: 150m 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
1 year before re-
allocation -0.000447 -0.00114 -0.00158 0.000269 -0.000654   
 (0.00531) (0.00548) (0.00543) (0.00581) (0.00569)   
Re-allocation year -0.00376 -0.00439 -0.00475 -0.00263 -0.00556   
 (0.00600) (0.00580) (0.00580) (0.00522) (0.00542)   
1 year after re-
allocation 0.00754 0.00692 0.00628 0.00756* 0.00574   
  (0.00514) (0.00495) (0.00499) (0.00464) (0.00398)   
2 years after re-
allocation 0.00449 0.00400 0.00390 0.00433 0.00224   
  (0.00492) (0.00484) (0.00488) (0.00431) (0.00443)   
3 years after re-
allocation 0.00549* 0.00503* 0.00487* 0.00494** 0.00549**   
  (0.00303) (0.00294) (0.00288) (0.00222) (0.00219)   
Re-allocation      0.00439** 0.00442** 
       (0.00220) (0.00222) 
Confiscation       -0.00544 
       (0.00376) 
        
Structural controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Building controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Amenity controls   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Socio-econ. controls    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
OMI FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality-year FE     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 52,526 52,513 52,513 52,513 51,906 51,906 51,906 
R-squared 0.768 0.769 0.771 0.777 0.784 0.784 0.784 
Notes. The table reports the estimation results for hedonic analysis presented in Section 2.4.2. Columns (1)-(5) report the 
effect of property re-allocation taking place within 150m from the sale point. Housing prices differences recorded the 
same year or the year before make it possible to account for pre-treatment differences in housing prices. Columns (6) and 
(7) report the cumulative effect of confiscation and reallocation events on housing prices. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the municipality level and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels 
of significance. 
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Table A2. 11: Sale point analysis – d=500 
Log euro per m2  Buffer radius: 500m 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
1 year before re-
allocation 0.00220 0.00215 0.00194 0.00248 0.00115   
 (0.00175) (0.00172) (0.00173) (0.00176) (0.00203)   
Re-allocation year 0.00202 0.00212 0.00198 0.00235* 0.000879   
  (0.00139) (0.00134) (0.00133) (0.00126) (0.00130)   
1 year after re-
allocation 0.00311** 0.00277** 0.00254* 0.00314** 0.00139    
  (0.00146) (0.00140) (0.00145) (0.00140) (0.00117)    
2 years after re-
allocation 0.00180 0.00186 0.00174 0.00229** 8.38e-05    
  (0.00119) (0.00116) (0.00118) (0.00104) (0.00110)    
3 years after re-
allocation 0.00254* 0.00241* 0.00226* 0.00312*** 0.00307***    
  (0.00137) (0.00133) (0.00132) (0.00114) (0.00113)    
Re-allocation           0.000954 0.000872 
            (0.00086) (0.00086) 
Confiscation       -0.0035** 
       (0.00151) 
        
Structural controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Building controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Amenity controls   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Socio-econ. controls    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
OMI FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality-year FE     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 52,526 52,513 52,513 52,513 51,906 51,906 51,906 
R-squared 0.768 0.769 0.771 0.777 0.784 0.784 0.784 
Notes. The table reports the estimation results for hedonic analysis presented in Section 2.4.2. Columns (1)-(5) report the 
effect of property re-allocation taking place within 500m from the sale poin. Housing prices differences recorded the same 
year or the year before make it possible to account for pre-treatment differences in housing prices. Columns (6) and (7) 
report the cumulative effect of confiscation and reallocation events on housing prices. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the municipality level and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels 
of significance. 
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Table A2. 12: Sale point analysis controlling for buffer zone 
Dep. variable: 
Log euro per m2 100m 200m 300m 400m 500m 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Buffer zone -0.00762 -0.0188 -0.0192 -0.0301* -0.0328* 
  (0.0112) (0.0169) (0.0149) (0.0172) (0.0175) 
Re-allocation  0.00706**  0.00402**  0.00335**  0.00222**  0.00175* 
   (0.00342)  (0.00171)  (0.00153)  (0.00110)  (0.00088) 
      
Structural controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Building controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Amenity controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Socio-econ. controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
OMI FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality-year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 51,906 51,906 51,906 51,906 51,906 
R-squared 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 
Notes In this table we test the robustness of these results by including in the model a control for the 
buffer zone, controlling for time-invariant characteristics located at a distance d from the sale point. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and 
* respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
 
 
 
Figure A2. 1: Re-allocation duration by Court 
 
The figure shows the average time required for local cohorts to re-allocate confiscated 
mafia assets 
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Figure A2. 2: Polling station areas 
 
The figures report the average voter turnout in the European elections by polling station area in four Italian cities 
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Chapter 3:   
Within-industry co-agglomeration patterns 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
 
This chapter analyses the spatial distribution of manufacturing and service firms in France and 
the United Kingdom. By exploiting a large micro-dataset covering the whole population of 
French and British establishments over the period 2008-2015, I analyse the specific co-
agglomeration patterns that characterise various types of plants within each industry. 
 
It is a fact that industries tend to be geographically concentrated. The benefits that firms gain by 
locating near each other have been studied by an extensive and heterogeneous literature (among 
others, Sveikauskas,1975; Moomaw, 1981; Carlton, 1983; Henderson, 1986; Nakamura, 1985; 
Glaeser et al, 1992; Henderson et al, 1994; and Ciccone & Hall, 1996). Marshall in 1890 was the 
first economist to theorise and analyse this specific dynamic; he argued that the cities foster firm 
productivity through labour market pooling, input sharing and technological spillovers.  
Modern empirical literature on the topic has focused on the concept of agglomeration economies, 
i.e. the idea that firms benefit mutually from their presence on the same territory. Thesekinds of 
studies are usually referred to as ‘urbanisation economies’ (Jacobs externalities),when the 
benefits arise from the size of the overall market, and ‘localisation economies’ (Marshall-Arrow-
Romer externalities), when they depend on geographic concentration at the industry level 
(Dicken & Lloyd, 1990; Glaeser et al., 1992).  
 
In recent decades, a new branch of the literature has questioned the implicit assumption that 
agglomeration economies are driven by the same forces in different economic environments and 
industries. Several studies have separately analysed Marshall’s agglomeration forces, offering 
empirical evidence for each of them (Fallick et al., 2006; Almazan et al., 2007; Holmes, 1999; 
Arzaghi & Henderson, 2008; Lin, 2012). Duranton and Puga (2004) further analysed the sources 
of agglomeration economies, proposing a different taxonomy on the basis of the concepts of 
sharing, matching and learning. Modelling each mechanism, they suggested a relevant role for 
firms’ and workers’ heterogeneity in determining the effective outcome of agglomeration forces. 
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Strange et al. (2006) analysed the three mechanisms in relation to both urbanisation and 
localisation economies, suggesting competitive instability and technological innovativeness to be 
associated with city size, and skill-orientation to be more relevant for industry clustering. Glaeser 
and Kerr (2009) and Rosenthal and Strange (2010) focused instead on firm dimension, theorising 
an organisational dimension for agglomeration effects.  In order to disentangle the drivers 
responsible for agglomeration dynamics in different industries, Ellison and Glaeser (2010) 
proposed a new approach, focusing on the concept of coagglomeration, the tendency of 
industries to locate together.Following this approach, Faggio, Silva and Strange (2014) develop 
a unified framework to analyse heterogeneity in industrial agglomeration and its implications for 
the micro-foundations of agglomeration economies. On the basis of a comprehensive analysis, 
they question the external validity of the mixed resultsfound in the literature. Specifically, they 
demonstrate that agglomeration economies and, in particular, the relative and absolute strength 
of the underlying drivers vary consistently with respect to the specific characteristics of industries 
and firms.   
 
Other studies argue that agglomeration effects could be heterogeneous even within industries. 
The way external economies affect firm behaviour and performance would depend on various 
firm-specific characteristics.Békés, Kleinert and Toubal (2009), using Hungarian data, report a 
heterogeneous response from agglomeration spillovers, demonstrating that while the most 
productive firms gain substantially, laggards lose out on higher presence of foreign firms. 
Combes et al. (2012) develop and econometric strategy to distinguish firm selection from the other 
factors behind the productivity premium of denser areas, studying the distribution pattern of 
total factor productivity at the firm-level.The study concludes that the observed productivity 
advantages that characterise French metropolitanfirms are not simply due to the selection of the 
most productive firms, but are also driven by external economies of scale. It also demonstrates 
that agglomeration effects increase with the firm productivity.  
 
This study contributes to this literature by shedding new light on the specific agglomeration and 
co-agglomeration patterns that characterise certain plant types within industries. Plants are 
analysed with respect to size, ownership, demographic characteristics and other firm and plant-
level dimensions. Results are discussed on the basis of the main predictions of the recent literature 
on agglomeration economies. 
 
The literature on regional and urban economics has produced various measures to analyse the 
distribution of industries over space. Traditional discrete indices of spatial agglomeration, such 
as the one proposed by Ellison and Glaeser (2003), depend heavily on the spatial unit of analysis 
used. This well-known issue is commonly described in the literature as the modifiable area unit 
problem (Openshaw & Taylor, 1979, Arabia 1989, Briant et al., 2010). Although discrete indices 
can still provide interesting insights with respect to the actual distribution of a set of industries 
belonging to a common sector at a given moment in time, they fail to provide comparable 
estimates for cross-country or cross-sector analysis. A new class of continuous indices have been 
proposed as a valuable alternative to the traditional discrete measures. In this regard, the first 
contribution dates back to Ripley (1976). Ripley’s K measures the spatial concentration or 
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dispersion of points in space, compared to a complete spatial randomness benchmark. The K 
function is estimated by calculating the average number of neighbouring plants within circles of 
increasing radius around the establishment.  Since it requires the calculation of bilateral distances 
between all spatial points analysed, computational constraints limited its application in the early 
urban economics literature. Marcon and Puech (2003) proposed a Besag L-transformation of 
Ripley’s K, with a benchmark value of 0. This index and the different extensions provided by the 
literature (see Marcon and Puech, 2017 for a comprehensive review) do not generally allow the 
weight of points on the basis of meaningful characteristics, nor provide meaningful benchmarks 
other than the unrealistic random distribution.  With respect to the agglomeration literature, 
Duranton and Overman (2005) define a set of properties a spatial agglomeration index should 
satisfy: 
 
• be comparable across industries;  
• control for the overall agglomeration of manufacturing; 
• control for industrial concentration in the sense of Ellison and Glaeser (1997); 
• be unbiased with respect to scale and aggregation; and 
• provide an indication of the significance of the results 
 
Duranton and Overman develop an index that satisfies all these properties. The DO function can 
be interpreted as the probability density to find a neighbouring spatial point at a given distance 
from the point of interest. The function is subsequently analysed against a confidence interval 
estimated through Monte Carlo simulations over 1,000 random draws from the overall sector. 
 
In this study I use the DO function to analyse the spatial distribution of plants within industries. 
Its specific characteristics make it possible to compare plant-types across industries, countries 
and years. 
Moreover, in contrast to main discrete indices, it provides meaningful values even when 
analysing small group of plants and establishments of different sizes. Following Behrens (2017), 
I integrate the function up to different distance threshold, to get the probability for a random firm 
pair bilateral distance to be lower or equal than d. 
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3.2.  Data  
 
Establishment- and firm-level data are retrieved from two sets of confidential datasets provided 
by the French and British Institutes of Statistics. 
 
 
France  
 
Data are retrieved from two administrative sources made available by the INSEE (the French 
national statistical agency) to researchers with access to CASD secure lab. The first source is the 
Declarations Annuelles de Donnes sociales (DADS). Every year all French workers are expected 
to submit to the tax authority information about all incomes earned over the previous 12 months. 
The INSEE receives these data from the tax authority, merges them with other information on 
workers and households provided by various sources, and uses them to produce statistics about 
employment and wages. 
The data used in this process are recorded in an exhaustive dataset, where each observation 
corresponds to every job contract linking a worker to a firm in a given year. For every worker, 
the dataset provides job-spell level information on gross and net wage, employment periods, age, 
sex and skills, number of hours worked, type of contract and occupational category (Professions 
et categories socio-professionnelles, PCS 2003) at the 4-digit level. 
 
The dataset FICUS/FARE, produced by INSEE/DGFiP, provides balance sheet information 
(output, capital, inputs, exports, number of employees, sector, etc.) for each firm registered in 
France from 1993 to 2016 (approximately 47 million observations). Data are retrieved from the 
compulsory reporting of firms and income statements to fiscal authorities in France, with no 
limiting threshold in terms of firm size or sales. By merging the dataset with the information 
provided by the Sirene (Système Informatique pour le Répertoire des Entreprises de leurs 
Etablissements) dataset, it is possible to assign address and precise spatial coordinates to 27 
million establishments (the entire population of establishments that ever operated in France over 
the past 20 years). In this analysis, I drop from the sample firms subject to the micro-bin/micro-
bic regimes, namely firms: 
 
• whose principal activities are services relating to the category of business profits (BIC) 
or non-commercial profits (BNC)  
• whose turnover does not exceed €32,600 (for 2011), excluding taxes  
• which operate VAT free and do not perform an excluded activity (for example, the 
rental of equipment and durable consumer goods);  
• which do not opt for the régime du réel simplifié tax system   
 
The Liaison Financiére dataset (LIFI) provides data on all relevant financial linkages involving at 
least one firm located in France. For each observation, I can determine the country of residence 
of all foreign subsidiary/parent firms and the capital share. The median voting share owned 
upon acquisition is 99%, with the result that the acquisition event represents a near complete 
takeover of assets and control for the overwhelming majority of the sample.  
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Geocoded plant level data are retrieved from the Sirene database. Each plant is assigned to 
specific coordinates, corresponding to the address reported for fiscal purposes. 
 This information is missing for a small number of plants (<5%), located primarily in rural areas. 
In these cases, I assign the coordinate of the applicable IRIS. IRIS are the smallest French 
administrative unit (the French territory consists of over 49,000 IRIS areas) and plants with 
missing coordinates are expected to be located, on average, 400 m from their estimated location.  
 
 
 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Confidential establishments’ data are retrieved from the ONS Business Structure Database 1997-
2015 (Secure Access), that covers any business liable for value-added taxation and/or with at 
least one employee registered for tax collection.  Overall, the dataset covers 99% of economic 
activity in the UK. The dataset provides information on postcode, ultimate owner, 5-digit 
industrial classification, date of creation, and number of employees foreach single plant. I use 
this detail to assign to each plant active in England, Wales and Scotland to the coordinates of its 
postcode centroid. The raw data include approximately 2.8 million local units every year. I carry 
out a series of checks, excluding a number of anomalous cases and checking the consistency of 
plants postcodes, employment and sectors of activity over the years.  
 
Firm level data are retrieved from the Annual Respondent Database (ARD) for the period 2001-
2007 and from the Annual Business Survey for the remaining years. The two datasets provide 
balance sheet data for a large sample of firms with more than 20 employees. In particular, the 
survey is known to provide particularly good coverage of manufacturing firms. 
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3.3.  Empirical Strategy  
 
In this section I illustrate the empirical strategy used. Following Behrens at al. (2017), I extend the 
continuous agglomeration index developed by Duranton and Overman (2003) and I compute 
agglomeration and co-agglomeration measures for a set of industries and plant types within 
industries. Subsequently, the distribution of the plant-type/industry-specific agglomeration 
indices is analysed in a common framework, to test some relevant predictions proposed in the 
literature. 
 
 
3.3.1 Continuous agglomeration indices 
 
Duranton and Overman’s localisation index (henceforth referred to as ve) is a continuous 
estimator of localisation based on the distance between every pair of plants. Denoting lwx	the 
Euclidean distance between plants x and y, the estimator of the density of bilateral distances at 
any point d is:  
 
ve(l) = 1B(B − 1)ℎK K |}l − lwxℎ ~ixjwn(i^(wj(  
 
where h is the bandwidth and f  is the kernel function. ve(l)	will be larger when the distance 
between many establishment pairs is approximately d.   
A slightly more advanced – although much more computationally intensive – version of the index 
illustrates the distribution of bilateral distances between workers in a given industry. 
 
ve(l) = 1ℎ∑ ∑ Ä5w + 5xÅixjwn(i^(wj( K K |}l − lwxℎ ~ixjwn(i^(wj(  
 
Where lwx is the distance between plant x and plant y, h is the bandwidth (500 meters), 5w and 5x are the employment levels in the two establishments. 
 
For each industry, ve(l) is subsequently compared with the counterfactual K-density estimated 
from 1,000 simulations of bilateral distances between n randomly sampled (distinct) 
establishments in the aggregate industry. Local confidence intervals are then estimated for any 
distance between 0 and l̅.  
For each industry j, they select the 5-th and 95-th percentile to obtain a lower 5% and an upper 
5% confidence interval that denote v(l) and v(l) respectively. For each industry, when ve(l)> v(l) for at least one d ∈ [0, l̅], the industry is said to exhibit localisation at distance l̅ 
(at a 5% interval).  By contrast, when ve(l)< v(l) for at least one d ∈ [0, l̅], the industry is said 
to exhibit dispersion at distance 	lÉ  (at a 5% interval).  
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The authors propose two simple indices to summarise the distribution pattern of each industry: 
 
Global localisation index:  Fe = maxÄve(l) − v(l), 0Å 
 
Global dispersion index:  àe = maxÄv(l) − ve(l), 0Å 
 
 
Graphically, global localisation is detected when the weighted ve(l)  function lies above its 
upper confidence band, whereas global dispersion is detected when it lies below the lower 
confidence band and never lies above the upper confidence band.  
In Figure 3. 1, I report the DO function estimated for the Nace Rev.2 industry 2361 (‘Manufacture 
of concrete products for construction purposes’) in 2008. In that year the industry counted 1,158 
plants and, consequently, 1,340,964 bilateral distances. The blue line reports the weighted 
probability of finding a bilateral distance in each 500m bin, between 0 and 180km. The dotted 
lines limit the confidence interval, obtained by means of a Monte-Carlo process, where the same 
procedure is randomly repeated 1,000 times, on each occasion drawing a sample of 1,158 plants 
from the overall population of manufacturing firms (850,000 plants). For any distance threshold, 
the upper boundary represents the 95th percentile of the agglomeration distribution of all random 
draws. Symmetrically, the lower bound corresponds to the 5th percentile of the distribution. The 
chart shows that the probability of a pair of firms to be at a distance d from each other range 
between 0.01% and 0.3%. 
Comparing the function with the sector benchmark, we can say that the concrete industry is 
agglomerated up to a distance threshold of 50km, while it does not deviate from the probability 
distribution of sector for longer distances.  
The weighted K-density proposed by Duranton and Overman describes the distribution of 
bilateral distances between workers in a given industry. In order to obtain an index providing 
information on the degree of agglomeration/dispersion, I integrate the distribution function, 
obtaining its cumulative (CDF) up to a distance d. The values obtained represent the weighted 
share of plant-pairs located less than distance d from each other. Alternatively, we can view this 
as the probability that two randomly drawn plants in an industry will be at most d km away from 
each other. 
 vâääää(l̅) =K ve(l)ãåãä  
 
This procedure was used by Behrens (2017) to study the agglomeration of Canadian 
manufacturing industries. The blue area in Figure 3. 2 corresponds to the vâääää computed at a 
180km threshold. 
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Figure 3. 1: DO function Figure 3. 2: CDF 
  
The charts report the vçe (l) agglomeration functions for the whole industry (blue line) and the confidence interval (gray 
area) 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Localisation and co-localisation patterns 
 
If the CDF can be directly used to study the location pattern of a given industry j in a given time 
t, a different approach is required in order to describe the location pattern of a specific group of 
plants i within an industry j. 
 
Consider Figure 3. 3. Plants (blue and red dots) are clustered in three different areas. If we focus 
on group types and we consider the share of plants located within a distance d from each other, 
establishments i are found to be more agglomerated than the other plants in the area.  As a matter 
of fact, 100% bilateral distances fall below the distance threshold. By contrast, if we measure the 
bilateral distances between all establishment in the industries, irrespective of the plant type, we 
find that i plants are somewhat dispersed than plants p (Figure 3. 4). 
 
Figure 3. 3: Agglomeration Figure 3. 4: Co-agglomeration 
  
 
 
It is not hard to think about similar scenarios in the real world. For instance, we might find an 
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industry characterised by a relevant share of multi-plant firms exhibiting high levels of 
agglomeration of headquarters (primarily located close to the CBD) and a certain degree of 
dispersion when the same headquarters are related with productive plants, located in different 
environments, far from the CBD.  It follows that industry-level measures that do not take 
establishment heterogeneity into account could fail to detect agglomeration or co-agglomeration 
patterns characterising the plants that are more sensible to agglomeration and dispersion forces. 
Therefore, while studying spatial agglomeration within industries, it is possible to describe 
three main features: 
 
I. The agglomeration of all plants in the industry: vâääää 
II. The agglomeration of plants belonging to a certain type (group agglomeration): véâääää 
III. The co-agglomeration between i-type plants and all establishments in the industry 
(joint agglomeration): véâ,âäääää 
 
Within each industry, we can identify various types of firms and plants on the basis of 
demographic characteristics, size, productivity level, foreign status, etc… All these factors might 
determine a different spatial configuration with respect to the other plants located in the industry.  
Fig. 3.5 illustrates the distribution of headquarters in the industry 2825 ‘Manufacture of non-
domestic cooling and ventilation techniques’. In this case, the green line corresponds to the 
distribution of all 700 plants (490,000 bilateral distances) in the industry. The red line corresponds 
to the  véâääää(l) function estimated for headquarters only, while the blue line shows co-
agglomeration véâ,âäääää(l) estimated for all bilateral distances between a headquarter and another 
plant in the industry.  In the case of the cooling industry, headquarters exhibit a relevant 
agglomeration at short distances. However, when we consider the co-agglomeration with non-
headquarter, the function almost mimics the more dispersed pattern that characterise the whole 
sector. I provide a further example in  Figure 3. 6, that illustrates the distribution of the industry 
2651 ‘Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation’. In this 
case, the distribution of the whole industry is compared with the specific spatial pattern of high-
productive firms. Interestingly, firms in the top 10% of the labour productivity distribution are 
significantly more dispersed than less productive ones up to a 70km distance. 
 
Figure 3. 5: DO functions, Headquarters Figure 3. 6: DO functions, High LP 
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3.4. Agglomeration trends by macro-sectors 
 
 
In this section, I analyse the evolution in agglomeration patterns of manufacturing and service 
firms in France and the United Kingdom.  To this end, I estimate the vâääää(l) of 124 manufacturing 
industries and 178 service industries in France and the United Kingdom in every year, over the 
period 2008-2015. Industry estimates are subsequently aggregated using employment weights. 
 
First, it is worth noting certain geographical features that can explain the overall agglomeration 
(agglomeration up to 180km) in the two countries. The UK is characterised by a very 
agglomerated structure, with London alone accounting for more than 28% of British GDP and a 
very large share of service plants in many industries. Some traditional manufacturing industries 
are concentrated in a limited area that includes East and West Midlands, Wales and Yorkshire. 
France, on the other hand, has a more decentralised structure. Although Paris and the Ille de 
France represent a massive share of the whole economy, other important economic centres such 
as Lyon and Marseilles are located on the opposite side of the country, over the rural diagonal 
that cross the country from south-west to north-east. If the two countries cannot be compared in 
terms of levels, we can still compare the evolution of the respective economic geographies.   
 
Figures 3.7-3.8 and 3.9-3.10 describe, respectively, the trends in local agglomeration patterns (up 
to 30km) of manufacturing and service sectors in France and the United Kingdom. In both 
countries, local agglomeration fluctuated over the period, with a downward trend inverted in 
2012, in the aftermath of the debt crisis. France demonstrates a strikingly different pattern when 
plants are associated with their firm industry code, a dynamic probably associated with the 
general trend of domestic fragmentation. French service plants exhibit a U-shaped pattern, 
whereas a constant decline is registered in the UK. 
 
Global agglomeration trends (Fig. 3.11-3.14) are more consistent, with a relevant decline in service 
spatial agglomeration up to 180km and a common pattern in manufacturing up to 2015, a year in 
which the UK experience a steady jump. Besides the fluctuating pattern that characterise the 
dynamic, spatial agglomeration levelled off or decreased over the period. This evidence is in line 
with other studies that identify a trend of de-concentration encompassing most manufacturing 
activities and business services in Germany (Dauth et al., 2018) and Canada (Beherens et al., 2013).  
 
In the eight-year period under consideration, manufacturing was exposed to two main forces: 
technological change and trade liberalisations. On the one hand, new technologies caused a 
consistent reduction in labour demand for routine occupations, that once employed the large 
majority of British and French workers. On the other hand, reductions in trade and 
communication costs fostered foreign competition and offshoring. The progressive 
disappearance of most labour-intensive industries was complemented by the relocation of a 
significant part of production processes of most industries to cheaper countries. The general 
decline in the manufacturing sector and the consequent tertiarization process has recently been 
linked not only to job disruption but also to significant changes in the production process and the 
organisation of firms across industries. Fort (2013) analyses the recent rise of multi-plant firms in 
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the US manufacturing sector. In addition to merger and acquisitions (M&A) decisions, a firm 
might decide to segment its production over space in order to access cheaper labour or to locate 
different plant types in areas where they can achieve the preferred distance with respect to 
customers, suppliers and competitors. She demonstrates that domestic fragmentation is far more 
prevalent than offshoring, especially when firms can access advanced communication 
technology. For all these reasons, it is not surprising to see an evolution in the aggregate spatial 
agglomeration patterns.  The same dynamics described above have driven a constant expansion 
of Service sector in recent years. Unlike manufacturing, however, the extreme heterogeneity that 
characterises the sector in terms of tradability and B2C/B2B relations makes it more difficult to 
define common centripetal and centrifugal forces. On the one hand, the rise in non-tradable 
service industries could be associated with a more dispersed distribution of plants, aimed at 
reaching customers far from the city centres. In contrast, new technologies have the potential to 
increase the tradability of certain types of services, fostering spatial agglomeration. In addition, 
for certain industries the dispersion could simply be driven by the dynamic pattern characterising 
some manufacturing industries they are connected with by significant input-output linkages.  
 
 
3.5 Industrial agglomeration patterns 
 
In this section I briefly analyse the industrial location patterns of some manufacturing and service 
industries. In particular, I will focus on industries exhibiting highest and lowest agglomeration 
levels, according to the indices used. 
In Table 3. 1, I list the manufacturing industries recording the highest and lowest average levels 
of spatial agglomeration at 30 and 180km distance in France and in the United Kingdom. 
The table shows that the two countries are not symmetrical in the agglomeration ranking.  
However, it is possible to identify some common patterns. Among the industries recording the 
highest levels of local agglomeration (share of bilateral distances below 30km), I find textile and 
wearing  apparel industries, chemical industries, industries characterised by very low transport 
costs (Reproduction of recorded media) or technologically advanced products (Manufacture of 
communication equipment) and industries that require specific environments (Manufacture of 
wine from grapes).  
These features are also common among industries exhibiting high degree of global agglomeration 
(share of bilateral distances below 180km), where we also find luxury product industries 
(Building of pleasure and sporting boats) and craft manufactures. Among the industries at the 
opposite site of the local agglomeration distribution we find manufactures of products with high 
storage or transport costs (manufacture of ice cream, wood, structural metal and concrete 
products) and industries requiring proximity to customers or dispersed geographic 
environments (Building of ships and floating structures). Similar patterns characterise most 
dispersed industries at 180km distance.  
 
Table 3. 2 illustrates most agglomerated and dispersed service industries. In this case the patterns 
are even more evident. Services characterised by high tradability, such as television, sound-
recording and book publishing, show the highest local and global agglomeration scores, together 
with the wholesale of luxury products. 
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The lowest local agglomeration levels are recorded for the wholesale of agricultural products and 
the services that are usually predominant in remote regions (Camping grounds and recreational 
vehicle parks, holiday and other short-stay accommodation). At 180km distance we also find the 
retail of products characterised by high frequency of consumption. In Appendix (Table A3. 1 and 
Table A3. 2), I report spatial agglomeration indices for all industries in the two economies, 
aggregated at the 2-digit industry level using employment weights.   
 
Overall, results are consistent with previous studies (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; Duranton and 
Overman, 2005, 2008).  However, before moving to the main analysis, it is important to evaluate 
how the continuous agglomeration index performs with respect to the standard indices used in 
the urban economics literature. In Table 3. 3, I report the same agglomeration rankings obtained 
using the Ellison and Glaeser agglomeration index (EGI). The EGI is a discrete measure that 
normalise spatial agglomeration with the market concentration. The way the index is constructed 
and its economic meaning are significantly different from the agglomeration measures used in 
this study. However, industry level results appear very similar. The relation between the two 
measures can be further appreciated in Table 3. 4, where I analyse the linear relation between the 
estimates obtained with the two indices. Results confirm that the two measures reach very similar 
results at the industry level.  
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3.6 Within-industry agglomeration patters 
 
In this Section I analyse the co-agglomeration patterns that characterise certain plant-types and I 
compare them with the distribution of overall industries.  The analysis separately focusses on the 
two macro-sectors and is conducted for both French and British plants, to allow cross-country 
comparisons. For each plat-type, sector and country, I report two kernel density plots, one 
illustrating the distribution of industry specific agglomeration indices (vâääää) and the other 
showing the distribution of the co-agglomeration indices  (véâ,âäääää)  estimated on the basis of the 
bilateral distances between type-i plants and all other establishments in the industry. 
 
 
3.6.1 New entries and exiters 
 
Spatial agglomeration of new-entries and plants that are going to quit the market the following 
year may result from spatial heterogeneity in turnover rates and/or from mobility patterns in 
business lifecycle. 
Denser markets are generally associated with higher competitive pressure and productivity 
thresholds. Combes et al. (2012) extend the theoretical framework proposed by Melitz (2003) to 
justify the higher productivity threshold that characterises denser areas. This explanation, 
however, might be relevant only for industries characterised by high storability or transport costs. 
Industries facing negligible costs to ship their products to remote areas of the country should not 
be affected.  
By contrast, the three traditional drivers of agglomeration – labour pooling, input sharing and 
knowledge spillovers (Duranton & Puga, 2002) – could affect differently entrants and 
incumbents. First, new firms are often the result of spinoffs from incumbents. Even when this is 
not the case, a new firm in the start-up phase often relies on the existing business environment. 
As a result, it is likely to locate in areas with good access to relevant labour markets and suppliers. 
 Heterogeneous agglomeration patterns may also result from firm lifecycle mobility. Firms that 
manufacture a new product are more likely to locate in so called ‘nursery cities’ (Duranton & 
Puga, 2000), which are large diversified urban areas, where they can ‘test’ different kinds of 
production process at a reasonable cost (thanks to localisation economies). Once a firm produces 
a prototype with its ideal production process and moves to mass-production, internal economies 
of scale make it less beneficial to remain in diversified areas, and the firms can relocate to the 
specialised cities, where all firms use the same production process. This second model would 
suggest that entrants exhibit lower industrial agglomeration patterns than incumbent firms. 
 
The kernel density distributions in Figures 3.15-3.16 compare French entrants’ spatial 
agglomeration to the agglomeration recorded for the sector as a whole. Both manufacturing and 
service firms exhibit a limited degree of local dispersion with respect to other plants. Moving to 
the global distribution (Fig. 3.17-3.18), we find a more heterogeneous pattern, with a higher share 
of plants at the opposite tails of the distribution.   
UK plants in both manufacturing and service entrants sector exhibit a limited degree of spatial 
agglomeration (Fig. 3.19-3.20). This pattern disappears for manufacturing establishments at a 
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larger distance threshold, whereas service entrants keep exhibiting higher agglomeration than 
benchmark plants (Fig. 3.21-3.22). 
More pronounced differences are found among French exiters, which exhibit a significant local 
dispersion (Fig. 3.23-3.24), whereas global location patterns are again heterogenous (Fig. 3.25-
13.26). 
In contrast, UK plants are characterised by limited local agglomeration in the manufacturing 
sector and global agglomeration in the service sector (Fig. 3.27-30). 
Overall, industries and countries do not exhibit clear patterns in the spatial distribution of 
demographic events.  
 
 
3.6.2 Large and small plants 
 
In this section I investigate within-industry differences in spatial distribution between plants of 
different size. In particular, small plants are defined by a size equal to or lower than the 25th 
percentile of the industry plant-employment distribution recorded over the period. Similarly, 
establishments with employment equal to or greater than the 10th percentile are categorised as 
large plants. 
Figures 3.31-3.32 demonstrate a clear local dispersion of both small manufacturing and service 
plants in France. Consistent results are obtained at a 180km distance (Fig. 3.33-3.34). British 
manufacturing plants exhibit a similar pattern (Fig. 3.35-3.36), whereas this is not the case for the 
service sector, where no clear pattern is recorded (Fig. 3.37-3.38). 
 
Specular results are found for plants at the opposite tail of the size distribution. Large plants in 
France demonstrate high local and global agglomeration (Fig. 3.39-3.42). The patterns is partially 
confirmed by British plants, with the exception of global dispersion in Service sector (Fig. 3.43-
3.46). 
 
This spatial configuration could be explained by the trade-off between external economies of 
scale and proximity. Large manufacturing firms co-agglomerate in dense economic areas, where 
they can benefit from labour pooling and access to a multitude of suppliers, whereas smaller 
plants maximise proximity to local demand and lower labour costs. 
The different spatial distributions in the service sector could be due to the specific agglomeration 
pattern that characterises British service plants, largely concentrated in the capital city, as against 
to the polycentric French system.  
Kim (1995) analyses industrial agglomeration in the US, finding a positive correlation between 
concentration and average plant size per worker. Holmes and Stevens (2002) investigate within-
industry differences, finding establishments located in denser areas to be larger than those 
located in remote regions. Lafourcade and Mion (2007) investigate whether the geographic 
distribution of manufacturing activities in Italy differs according to the scale of plants. They find 
a positive relation between size and co-agglomeration, explained by the capability of large plants 
to serve customers far beyond the boundaries of neighbouring markets. By contrast, small plants 
co-locate in wider areas, where they can share certain basic input but save in transport cost by 
locating close to local demand.  
 113 
3.6.3 Single-plant and multi-plant firms 
 
The industrial economics and trade literatures provide several theoretical frameworks to 
understand the way offshoring affects the economic environment. However, despite the 
increasing attention devoted to international fragmentation by media and by researchers, 
relatively few studies have analysed the domestic fragmentation of plants.  
Markusen and Venables (2013) propose a simple theoretical framework to understand the 
fundamentals of firm fragmentation. According to the model, firms can be ‘integrated’, operating 
in one location, or ‘fragmented’, operating in various locations. Fragmented firms incur 
additional costs, but they benefit from higher labour productivity, thanks to functional 
agglomeration economies. Different combinations of fragmentation costs, local endowments and 
wage elasticities can determine different equilibria, ranging from a fully fragmented to a fully 
integrated industry. Fort (2013) empirically investigates how coordination and communication 
costs foster firm fragmentation and, conditionally on fragmentation, how they influence firms’ 
choice to fragment production in the domestic market or offshore. Empirical evidence confirms 
a clear nexus between electronic communication and domestic fragmentation. Davis and 
Henderson (2007) analyse the determinants of headquarters agglomerations. Their results 
demonstrate that separation between production plants and headquarters is particularly 
beneficial for the firm when the headquarters can access a higher supply of differentiated local 
service inputs and locate close to other headquarters. 
 
Figures 3.47-3.50 demonstrate that French single-plant French firms are characterised by location 
patterns identical to or slightly more dispersed than the overall plant distribution. No noticeable 
pattern is found for UK plants, although in this case both manufacturing and service single-plant 
firms show a limited degree of agglomeration (Fig. 3.51-3.54). In contrast, significant 
agglomeration patterns are found for establishment belonging to multi-plant firms in French and 
British manufacturing sectors and in the French service industries). An opposite pattern is found 
for British service multi-plant firms, that are noticeably more dispersed in the industrial spatial 
network (Fig. 3.55-3.62). 
 
In Fig. 3.63-3.66 I focus on French plants, comparing the spatial agglomeration of headquarters 
only with the overall industry. Like other establishments belonging to multi-plant firms, 
headquarters demonstrate spatial concentration at both 30 and 180km distance. However, the 
difference with the benchmark is less significant, especially in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Together these results confirm a tendency of multi-plant firms to collocate single establishments 
in more central areas of the industrial spatial network. Plant specialisation on their core business 
is therefore associated with a better access to inputs or local demand. However, this pattern is 
less evident for manufacturing headquarters, that are often located in dense urban areas, far from 
production plants.   
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3.6.4 Top decile of labour productivity 
 
Thus far, I have analysed the way agglomeration patterns vary on the basis of plant-specific 
characteristics. When it comes to analysing the distribution of plants on the basis of firm-level 
characteristics, it is worth considering a number of issues that might limit the interpretation of 
the results. First, assigning the same productivity to different plants means not considering the 
combinations of input intensity, technologies and local organisation that might characterise 
plants belonging to the same company. A functional agglomeration of particularly efficient plants 
belonging to firms with a generally low productivity would not be recorded in this estimation 
strategy. Second, productivity is often associated with firm size. Larger firms are likely to be more 
productive, to offer higher wages and to engage in export activities (Altomonte et al., 2010). It 
follows that the location decision of a few large multi-product plants might affect the whole 
distribution of productivity over space.  
 
The limitations of the analysis having been pointed out, the next section discusses Figures 3.67-
3.74. At a 30km distance, most productive French and British firms are characterised by higher 
levels of agglomeration with respect to the whole industry. This is true for both the 
manufacturing and service sectors, with the latter exhibiting the more relevant differences (Fig. 
3.67-3.68 and 3.71-3.72). 
Most productive firms in France are also agglomerated at a 180 km distance (Fig. 3.69-3.70), while 
the pattern is less clear in the UK (3.73-3.74), where high performers are more represented at both 
tails of the distribution. 
The empirical evidence could result from confounding factors, as suggested above, or be 
somewhat related to the micro-foundations of agglomeration economies. Among the three 
Marshallian forces, knowledge spillovers are generally associated with co-location patterns that 
characterise most productive and innovative firms. At the industry level, Faggio et al. (2019) find 
knowledge spillovers to be the main drivers of agglomeration patterns not only in the computer 
industry but also in less technological advanced sectors, such as the manufacturing of ceramic 
goods, the manufacturing of cement, lime and plaster and the preparation/spinning of textile 
fibres. 
At the firm level, a significant literature in international trade and industrial economics has 
provided considerable empirical evidence and theoretical arguments supporting the presence in 
most industries of a limited group of frontier firms, characterised by larger size, a high degree of 
internationalisation and high productivity (Mayer & Ottaviano, 2008). My findings seem to 
support the importance of intra-industry disparities in productivity with respect to the overall 
spatial distribution of each industry.  
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3.6.4 Foreign firms 
 
The final section illustrates the spatial distribution of foreign firms. Some studies suggest that 
location choice of foreign firms would be driven by the opportunity to maximise market and 
supplier access. For example,  Amiti and Javorcik (2008) show that these features largely explain 
the spatial distribution of foreign firms in China. Even firms facing relatively low transport costs 
in the foreign countries could choose to locate close to other foreign firms more interested in the 
local economic environment. Head et al. (1995) examine the location choices of 751 Japanese 
manufacturing plants in the US, finding evidence of a significant co-location pattern. Bloigen et 
al. (2005) examine 1485 investment decisions of Japanese firms between 1985 and 2001, 
demonstrating that firms belonging to invest in the same foreign region. 
On the other hand, the evidence provided is primarily based on large countries. It is possible that 
the limited size and the low transport costs of European countries would sizeably reduce 
agglomeration externalities for foreign firms. Figures 3.75-3.76 show that both foreign 
manufacturing and Service plants tend to co-locate at short distances. The pattern is confirmed 
at a 180 km distance. In contrast, the pattern is less clear-cut in the UK, where foreign 
manufacturing firms – and to some extent even service ones - are characterised by higher degrees 
of agglomeration, whereas no difference is found in terms of global agglomeration (Fig. 3.79-
3.82). 
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3.7 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have proposed a composite strategy to analyse the dynamic agglomeration 
patterns of industries and specific firm types. 
Using the continuous agglomeration measures proposed by Duranton and Overman (2006) and 
extended by Behrens (2017), I have investigated two large micro datasets covering the whole 
population of French and British establishments from 2008 to 2015. Despite some significant 
differences, the results are generally consistent, supporting the external validity of the main 
results.  I find significant within-industry heterogeneity in spatial agglomeration. Large plants, 
and more productive and multi-plant firms are generally more agglomerated, although the 
difference with the overall distribution varies across sectors and countries.  
On the other hand, I do not find specific location patterns for new entries and exiters. This 
suggests that the general dispersion trend characterising the two sectors might be driven 
primarily by between-firm reallocation of resources rather than demographic events. 
From a methodological perspective, this study demonstrates that continuous agglomeration 
indices represent a valuable tool in cross-country studies. First, working on continuous space 
avoids any measurement issue related to scale and aggregation and makes it possible to compare 
countries characterised by different geographies. Secondly, the possibility to analyse at the same 
time spatial distributions at different spatial scale allows the researcher to choose a distance 
threshold that is at once meaningful from an economic point of view and suitable for the 
characteristics of the territory analysed. Finally, these indices produce valuable results even when 
applied to the analysis of small population of plants, making it possible to analyse within-firm 
heterogeneity in spatial location patterns. 
There are several directions this work could be taken. First, this methodology should be extended 
and applied to relevant policy questions (in this regard, a short application is presented in 
Chapter 4). In particular, it would be interesting to develop a dynamic framework to investigate 
co-location patterns of different economic actors.  For instance, continuous agglomeration 
measures could be used to study occupational dynamics across industries. 
Second, this approach can be used to test the external validity of the main result of the 
agglomeration literature, extending the analysis to more countries (i.e. Spain, Germany and Italy). 
Finally, work is required to further extend this measure beyond the continuous space dimension 
to allow them to map more significant economic dimensions, such as time and carbon emissions. 
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Tables 
 
Table 3. 1: Most and least localised manufacturing industries, by country and distance threshold   
 DO, 30km DO, 180km 
  France United Kingdom France United Kingdom 
Most 
agglomerated 
1413 - Manufacture of other 
outerwear 
0.2139 2341 - Manufacture of ceramic 
household and ornamental 
articles 
0.4894 3012 - Building of pleasure and 
sporting boats 
0.5704 2341 - Manufacture of ceramic 
household and ornamental 
articles 
0.8175 
2630 - Manufacture of 
communication equipment 
0.1985 1310 - Preparation and 
spinning of textile fibres 
0.3257 2053 - Manufacture of essential oils 0.4634 1414 - Manufacture of 
underwear 
0.769 
2053 - Manufacture of essential oils 0.1805 2013 - Manufacture of other 
inorganic basic chemicals 
0.2181 2042 - Manufacture of perfumes and 
toilet preparations 
0.4532 2594 - Manufacture of 
fasteners and screw machine 
products 
0.7644 
3212 - Manufacture of jewellery and 
related articles 
0.14928 1820 - Reproduction of 
recorded media 
0.21335 2319 - Manufacture and processing 
of glass, including technical 
glassware 
0.4336 1393 - Manufacture of carpets 
and rugs 
0.7637 
1102 - Manufacture of wine from 
grape 
0.1343 1520 - Manufacture of 
footwear 
0.2128 2313 - Manufacture of hollow glass 0.3817 2451 - Casting of iron 0.7065 
Least 
agglomerated 
1052 - Manufacture of ice cream 0.0071 1052 - Manufacture of ice 
cream 
0.019 1086 - Manufacture of homogenised 
food preparations and dietetic food 
0.1374 3315 - Repair and 
maintenance of ships and 
boats 
0.2392 
1610 - Sawmilling and planning of 
wood 
0.0088 1610 - Sawmilling and 
planning of wood 
0.019 2370 - Cutting, shaping and 
finishing of stone 
0.1403 1020 - Processing and 
preserving of fish, 
crustaceans and molluscs 
0.2518 
2511 - Manufacture of structural 
metal products 
0.0104 3011 - Building of ships and 
floating structures 
0.0205 2512 - Manufacture of doors and 
windows of metal 
0.1423 1712 - Manufacture of paper 
and paperboard 
0.328 
2593 - Manufacture of wire 
products, chain and springs 
0.011 1623 - Manufacture of other 
builders’ carpentry and 
joinery 
0.0231 1082 - Manufacture of cocoa, 
chocolate and sugar confectionery 
0.1436 2670 - Manufacture of optical 
instruments and 
photographic equipment 
0.3288 
2361 - Manufacture of concrete 
products for construction purposes 
0.0112 2611 - Manufacture of 
electronic components 
0.0237 2363 - Manufacture of ready-mixed 
concrete 
0.145 1610 - Sawmilling and 
planning of wood 
0.333 
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Table 3. 2: Most and least localised service industries, by country and distance threshold   
 DO, 30km DO, 180km 
  France United Kingdom France United Kingdom 
Most 
agglomerated 
5911 - Motion picture, video and 
television programme production 
activities 
0.656 5913 - Motion picture, video 
and television programme 
distribution activities  
0.3065 5912 - Motion picture, video and 
television programme post-
production activities 
0.7646 5912 - Motion picture, video 
and television programme 
post-production activities 
0.6888 
5912 - Motion picture, video and 
television programme post-
production activities 
0.6178 5920 - Sound recording and 
music publishing activities 
0.2908 5811 - Book publishing  0.7037 5913 - Motion picture, video 
and television programme 
distribution activities 
0.6755 
5814 - Publishing of journals and 
periodicals 
0.6076 5911 - Motion picture, video 
and television programme 
production activities  
0.2903 5814 - Publishing of journals and 
periodicals 
0.6987 5920 - Sound recording and 
music publishing activities 
0.6686 
5811 - Book publishing  0.5776 6020 - Television 
programming and 
broadcasting activities 
0.2799 5920 - Sound recording and music 
publishing activities  
0.694 7320 - Market research and 
public opinion polling 
0.6345 
5920 - Sound recording and music 
publishing activities  
0.594 4648 - Wholesale of watches 
and jewellery 
0.205 6391 - News agency activities  0.6758 6202 - Computer consultancy 
activities 
0.5987 
Least 
agglomerated 
4661 - Wholesale of agricultural 
machinery, equipment and supplies 
0.0075 5530 - Camping grounds, 
recreational vehicle parks and 
trailer parks  
0.0152 4674 - Wholesale of hardware, 
plumbing and heating equipment 
and supplies  
0.1445 5520 - Holiday and other 
short-stay accommodation  
0.2615 
4621 - Wholesale of grain, 
unmanufactured tobacco, seeds and 
animal feeds  
0.0102 5520 - Holiday and other 
short-stay accommodation  
0.0169 4764 - Retail sale of sporting 
equipment in specialised stores  
0.1464 5530 - Camping grounds, 
recreational vehicle parks and 
trailer parks  
0.2728 
7500 - Veterinary activities 0.0154 4621 - Wholesale of grain, 
unmanufactured tobacco, 
seeds and animal feeds  
0.0174 4774 - Retail sale of medical and 
orthopaedic goods in specialised 
stores  
0.151 4723 - Retail sale of fish, 
crustaceans and molluscs in 
specialised stores 
0.2842 
4677 - Wholesale of waste and scrap  0.0163 4661 - Wholesale of 
agricultural machinery, 
equipment and supplies 
0.0177 4532 - Retail trade of motor vehicle 
parts and accessories 
0.1513 5222 - Service activities 
incidental to water 
transportation  
0.2908 
4519 - Sale of other motor vehicles  0.0169 4623 - Wholesale of live 
animals  
0.0183 4726 - Retail sale of tobacco products 
in specialised stores 
0.152 5010 - Sea and coastal 
passenger water transport  
0.2955 
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Table 3. 3: Five most and least localised manufacturing industries, by country and distance threshold  (EGI index) 
 
EGI Zone d'emploi 
Manufacturing sector Service Sector 
France United Kingdom France United Kingdom 
Most 
agglomerated 
2053 - Manufacture of essential oils  0.1793 2341 - Manufacture of ceramic 
household and ornamental 
articles 
0.456 5912 - Motion picture, video and 
television programme post-
production activities 
0.3858 5913 - Motion picture, video and 
television programme 
distribution activities  
0.3895 
1101 - Distilling, rectifying and 
blending of spirits  
0.1353 1310 - Preparation and spinning 
of textile fibres  
0.2132 5911 - Motion picture, video and 
television programme production 
activities  
0.3398 5912 - Motion picture, video and 
television programme post-
production activities 
0.2842 
1439 - Manufacture of other knitted 
and crocheted apparel 
0.1232 1439 - Manufacture of other 
knitted and crocheted apparel 
0.169 5110 - Passenger air transport 0.336 6391 - News agency activities  0.2825 
2451 - Casting of iron 0.0992 1101 - Distilling, rectifying and 
blending of spirits  
0.1078 5814 - Publishing of journals and 
periodicals 
0.2663 5920 - Sound recording and 
music publishing activities 
0.246 
1399 - Manufacture of other textiles 
n.e.c.  
0.0906 1520 - Manufacture of footwear  0.1028 6020 - Television programming and 
broadcasting activities 
0.2465 6020 - Television programming 
and broadcasting activities 
0.2416 
Least 
agglomerated 
2051 - Manufacture of explosives  -0.143 2110 - Manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products  
-0.004 7721 - Renting and leasing of 
recreational and sports goods  
-0.012 4638 - Wholesale of other food, 
including fish, crustaceans and 
molluscs  
-0.005 
2314 - Manufacture of glass fibres -0.115 1107 - Manufacture of soft 
drinks; production of mineral 
waters and other bottled waters 
-0.001 4636 - Wholesale of sugar and 
chocolate and sugar confectionery 
-0.009 7430 - Translation and 
interpretation activities 
-0.004 
2620 - Manufacture of computers 
and peripheral equipment  
-0.004 1812 - Other printing  0.003 4613 - Agents involved in the sale of 
timber and building materials  
-0.004 5914 - Motion picture projection 
activities  
-0.002 
2740 - Manufacture of electric 
lighting equipment  
-0.003 2059 - Manufacture of other 
chemical products n.e.c.  
0.0035 6010 - Radio broadcasting -0.004 4665 - Wholesale of office 
furniture  
-0.002 
2041 - Manufacture of soap and 
detergents, cleaning and polishing 
preparations 
-0.001 1813 - Pre-press and pre-media 
services  
0.0047 5813 - Publishing of newspapers  -0.003 4743 - Retail sale of audio and 
video equipment in specialised 
stores 
-0.001 
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Table 3. 4: DO and EGI agglomeration indices 
 Dependent 
variable: !"#$$$$ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 30km 180km 30km 180km 30km 180km 
VARIABLES Commune 
Zone 
d'emploi Commune 
Zone 
d'emploi Commune 
Zone 
d'emploi Commune 
Zone 
d'emploi Commune 
Zone 
d'emploi Commune 
Zone 
d'emploi 
                          
EGI 2.957*** 1.432*** 3.400*** 1.497*** 2.957*** 1.432*** 3.400*** 1.497*** 0.258*** 0.465*** 0.552*** 0.674*** 
 (0.302) (0.0477) (0.280) (0.0365) (0.302) (0.0477) (0.280) (0.0365) (0.0775) (0.0794) (0.126) (0.0858) 
Constant 0.0823*** 0.0606*** 0.239*** 0.218*** 0.0823*** 0.0606*** 0.239*** 0.218*** 0.0971*** 0.0862*** 0.255*** 0.240*** 
 (0.00231) (0.00200) (0.00273) (0.00255) (0.00231) (0.00200) (0.00273) (0.00255) (0.000456) (0.00206) (0.000720) (0.00222) 
             
Observations 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 
R-squared 0.151 0.388 0.153 0.324 0.151 0.388 0.153 0.324 0.990 0.991 0.986 0.988 
Industry FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes. The table reports the regression for a simple linear regression model testing the relation between the Duranton and Overman agglomeration index, measured at different distant thresholds, and the  
Standard error are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.  
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Graphs 
 
 
Figure 3. 7: Manufacturing local 
agglomeration trends, France 
Figure 3. 8: Manufacturing local 
agglomeration trends, UK 
  
Notes. The graphs show the evolution of the Weighted mean !"#$$$$, computed at a 30 km distance for all manufacturing 
industries 
    
 
Figure 3. 9: Service local agglomeration 
trends, France 
Figure 3. 10: Service local agglomeration 
trends, UK 
  
Notes. The graphs show the evolution of the Weighted mean !"#$$$$, computed at a 30 km distance for all service industries 
 
    
 
Figure 3. 11: Manufacturing global 
agglomeration trends, France 
Figure 3. 12: Manufacturing global 
agglomeration trends, UK  
  
Notes. The graphs show the evolution of the Weighted mean !"#$$$$, computed at a 180 km distance for all manufacturing 
industries 
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Figure 3. 13: Service global agglomeration 
trends, France 
Figure 3. 14: Service global agglomeration 
trends, UK  
 
  
Notes. The graphs show the evolution of the Weighted mean !"#$$$$, computed at a 180 km distance for all service industries 
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New entries – France 
 
 
Figure 3. 15: New entries, Manufacturing, 
d=30km, France 
Figure 3. 16: New entries, Service, d=30km, 
France 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between new entries and all other plants in the industry. 
 
  
 
Figure 3. 17: New entries, Manufacturing, 
d=180km, France 
Figure 3. 18: New entries, Service, d=180km, 
France 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between new entries and all other plants in the industry. 
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New entries– United Kingdom 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 19: New entries, Manufacturing, 
d=30km, UK  
Figure 3. 20: New entries, Service, d=30km, 
UK 
  Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between new entries and all other plants in the industry. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3. 21: New entries, Manufacturing, 
d=180km, UK 
Figure 3. 22: New entries, Service, d=180km, 
UK 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between new entries and all other plants in the industry. 
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Exiters – France 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 23: Exiters, Manufacturing, 
d=30km, France 
Figure 3. 24: Exiters, Service, d=30km, France 
  Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between plants that exit the market and all other plants in the industry. 
 
     
  
      
Figure 3. 25: Exiters, Manufacturing, 
d=180km, France 
Figure 3. 26: Exiters, Service, d=180km, 
France 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between plants that exit the market and all other plants in the industry. 
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Exiters – United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 27: Exiters, Manufacturing, 
d=30km, UK 
Figure 3. 28: Exiters, Manufacturing, 
d=30km, UK 
  Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between plants that exit the market and all other plants in the industry. 
 
    
 
 
 
Figure 3. 29: Exiters, Manufacturing, 
d=180km, UK 
Figure 3. 30: Exiters, Service, d=180km, UK 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between plants that exit the market and all other plants in the industry. 
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Small plants – France 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 31: Small plants, Manufacturing, 
d=30km, France 
Figure 3. 32: Small plants, Service, d=30km, 
France 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between small plants (below the 25th percentile of the employment 
distribution) and all other plants in the industry. 
 
 
     
 
Figure 3. 33: Small plants, Manufacturing, 
d=180km, France 
Figure 3. 34: Small plants, Service, d=180km, 
France 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between small plants (below the 25th percentile of the employment 
distribution) and all other plants in the industry. 
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Small plants – United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 35: Small plants, Manufacturing, 
d=30km, UK 
Figure 3. 36: Small plants, Service, d=30km, 
UK 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between small plants (below the 25th percentile of the employment 
distribution) and all other plants in the industry. 
 
 
       
 
Figure 3. 37: Small plants, Manufacturing, 
d=180km, UK 
Figure 3. 38: Small plants, Service, d=180km, 
UK 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between small plants (below the 25th percentile of the employment 
distribution) and all other plants in the industry. 
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Large plants – France 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 39: Large plants, Manufacturing, 
d=30km, France 
Figure 3. 40: Large plants, Service, d=30km, 
France 
  Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between large plants (above the 90th percentile of the employment 
distribution) and all other plants in the industry. 
 
 
    
 
Figure 3. 41: Large plants, Manufacturing, 
d=180km, France 
Figure 3. 42: Large plants, Service, d=180km, 
France 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between large plants (above the 90th percentile of the employment 
distribution) and all other plants in the industry. 
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Large plants – United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 43: Large plants, Manufacturing, 
d=180km, UK 
Figure 3. 44: Large plants, Service, d=180km, 
UK 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between large plants (above the 90th percentile of the employment 
distribution) and all other plants in the industry. 
 
 
    
 
Figure 3. 45: Large plants, Manufacturing, 
d=180km, UK 
Figure 3. 46: Large plants, Service, d=180km, 
UK 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between large plants (above the 90th percentile of the employment 
distribution) and all other plants in the industry. 
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Single-plant firms – France 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 47: Single-plant firms, 
Manufacturing, d=30km, France 
Figure 3. 48: Single-plant firms, Service, 
d=30km, France 
  Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between single-plant firms and all other plants in the industry. 
 
   
 
 
Figure 3. 49: Single-plant firms, 
Manufacturing, d=180km, France 
Figure 3. 50: Single-plant firms, Service, 
d=180km, France 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between single-plant firms and all other plants in the industry. 
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Single-plant firms – United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 51: Single-plant firms, 
Manufacturing, d=30km, UK 
Figure 3. 52: Single-plant firms, Service, 
d=30km, UK 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between single-plant firms and all other plants in the industry. 
 
    
 
 
Figure 3. 53: Single-plant firms, 
Manufacturing, d=180km, UK 
Figure 3. 54, Single-plant firms, Service, 
d=180km, UK 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between single-plant firms and all other plants in the industry. 
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Multi-plant firms – France 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 55: Multi-plant firms, 
Manufacturing, d=30km, France 
Figure 3. 56: Multi-plant firms, Service, 
d=30km, France 
  Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between plants belonging to multi-plant firms and all other plants in 
the industry. 
 
 
     
 
Figure 3. 57: Multi-plant firms, 
Manufacturing, d=180km, France 
Figure 3. 58: Multi-plant firms, Service, 
d=180km, France 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between plants belonging to multi-plant firms and all other plants in 
the industry. 
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Multi-plant firms – United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 59: Multi-plant firms, 
Manufacturing, d=30km, UK 
Figure 3. 60: Multi-plant firms, Service, 
d=30km, UK 
  Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between plants belonging to multi-plant firms and all other plants in 
the industry. 
 
 
    
 
Figure 3. 61: Multi-plant firms, 
Manufacturing, d=180km, UK 
Figure 3. 62: Multi-plant firms, Service, 
d=180km, UK 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between plants belonging to multi-plant firms and all other plants in 
the industry. 
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Headquarters – France 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 63: Headquarters, Manufacturing, 
d=30km, France 
Figure 3. 64: Headquarters, Manufacturing, 
d=30km, France 
  Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between headquarters and all other plants in the industry. 
 
    
 
 
Figure 3. 65: Headquarters, Manufacturing, 
d=180km, France 
Figure 3. 66: Headquarters, Service, 
d=180km, France 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between headquarters and all other plants in the industry. 
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High-productive firms – France 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 67: High productive firms, 
Manufacturing, d=30km, France 
Figure 3. 68: High productive firms, Service, 
d=30km, France 
  Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between high productive firms (above the 90th percentile of 
productivity distribution) and all other plants in the industry. 
 
 
    
 
Figure 3. 69: High productive firms, 
Manufacturing, d=180km, France 
Figure 3. 70: High productive firms, Service, 
d=180km, France 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between high productive firms (above the 90th percentile of 
productivity distribution) and all other plants in the industry. 
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High-productive firms – United Kingdom 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 71: High productive firms, 
Manufacturing, d=30km, UK 
Figure 3. 72: High productive firms, Service, 
d=30km, UK 
  Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between high productive firms (above the 90th percentile of 
productivity distribution) and all other plants in the industry. 
 
    
 
 
Figure 3. 73: High productive firms, 
Manufacturing, d=180km, UK 
Figure 3. 74: High productive firms, Service, 
d=30km, UK 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances between high productive firms (above the 90th percentile of 
productivity distribution) and all other plants in the industry. 
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Foreign firms – France 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 75: Foreign firms, Manufacturing, 
d=30km, France 
Figure 3. 76: Foreign firms, Service, d=30km, 
France 
  Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances plants belonging to foreign firms and all other plants in the industry. 
 
    
 
 
Figure 3. 77: Foreign firms, Manufacturing, 
d=180km, France 
Figure 3. 78: Foreign firms, Service, d=30km, 
France 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances plants belonging to foreign firms and all other plants in the industry. 
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Foreign firms – United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 79: Foreign firms, Manufacturing, 
d=30km, UK 
Figure 3. 80: Foreign firms, Service, d=30km, 
UK 
  Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances plants belonging to foreign firms and all other plants in the industry. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 81: Foreign firms, Manufacturing, 
d=180km, UK 
Figure 3. 82: Foreign firms, Service, 
d=180km, UK 
  
Notes. The graphs show the distribution of industry-specific agglomeration indices and the distribution of co-
agglomeration indices, based on bilateral distances plants belonging to foreign firms and all other plants in the industry. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A3. 1: Agglomeration by 2-digit service industry 
30km 180km 
France UK France UK 
Industry group Kd Industry group Kd Industry group Kd Industry group Kd 
75 - Veterinary activities 0.0154 55 - Accommodation 0.0268 75 - Veterinary activities 0.1454 55 - Accommodation 0.3058 
45 - Wholesale and retail trade and 
repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
0.0256 75 - Veterinary activities 0.0269 
45 - Wholesale and retail trade and 
repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
0.1667 50 - Water transport 0.3621 
47 - Retail trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 0.0408 
45 - Wholesale and retail trade and 
repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
0.0327 47 - Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.1724 75 - Veterinary activities 0.3961 
50 - Water transport 0.0414 53 - Postal and courier activities 0.0338 55 - Accommodation 0.1915 53 - Postal and courier activities 0.4117 
49 - Land transport and transport via 
pipelines 0.0679 77 - Rental and leasing activities 0.0391 50 - Water transport 0.2083 
47 - Retail trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 0.4168 
55 - Accommodation 0.0767 47 - Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.0417 
49 - Land transport and transport via 
pipelines 0.2132 77 - Rental and leasing activities 0.4286 
52 - Warehousing and support 
activities for transportation 0.0828 
72 - Scientific research and 
development 0.05 
71 - Architectural and engineering 
activities; technical testing and 
analysis 
0.224 
71 - Architectural and engineering 
activities; technical testing and 
analysis 
0.4291 
77 - Rental and leasing activities 0.0875 52 - Warehousing and support activities for transportation 0.0505 77 - Rental and leasing activities 0.2311 
49 - Land transport and transport 
via pipelines 0.4361 
46 - Wholesale trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 0.1021 
81 - Services to buildings and 
landscape activities 0.0588 68 - Real estate activities 0.2393 
81 - Services to buildings and 
landscape activities 0.4409 
68 - Real estate activities 0.1051 
82 - Office administrative, office 
support and other business support 
activities 
0.0593 72 - Scientific research and development 0.2427 
52 - Warehousing and support 
activities for transportation 0.4604 
72 - Scientific research and 
development 0.1074 
46 - Wholesale trade, except of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.0595 
46 - Wholesale trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 0.2436 
45 - Wholesale and retail trade and 
repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
0.4605 
56 - Food and beverage service 
activities 0.1104 
71 - Architectural and engineering 
activities; technical testing and 
analysis 
0.0604 52 - Warehousing and support activities for transportation 0.2538 
79 - Travel agency, tour operator 
and other reservation service and 
related activities 
0.4621 
71 - Architectural and engineering 
activities; technical testing and 
analysis 
0.1128 49 - Land transport and transport via pipelines 0.0651 
56 - Food and beverage service 
activities 0.2545 
82 - Office administrative, office 
support and other business support 
activities 
0.4724 
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81 - Services to buildings and 
landscape activities 0.1145 50 - Water transport 0.066 
81 - Services to buildings and 
landscape activities 0.2547 
46 - Wholesale trade, except of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.4776 
82 - Office administrative, office 
support and other business support 
activities 
0.1286 61 - Telecommunications 0.066 78 - Employment activities 0.2579 72 - Scientific research and development 0.481 
78 - Employment activities 0.1295 80 - Security and investigation activities 0.0724 
82 - Office administrative, office 
support and other business support 
activities 
0.2721 56 - Food and beverage service activities 0.4902 
53 - Postal and courier activities 0.1467 70 - Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities 0.0799 61 - Telecommunications 0.2824 61 - Telecommunications 0.496 
80 - Security and investigation 
activities 0.1527 
79 - Travel agency, tour operator 
and other reservation service and 
related activities 
0.08 53 - Postal and courier activities 0.2899 80 - Security and investigation activities 0.5006 
61 - Telecommunications 0.1689 58 - Publishing activities 0.0865 80 - Security and investigation activities 0.3007 68 - Real estate activities 0.5032 
74 - Other professional, scientific and 
technical activities 0.2025 
56 - Food and beverage service 
activities 0.0902 
79 - Travel agency, tour operator and 
other reservation service and related 
activities 
0.3081 51 - Air transport 0.5058 
79 - Travel agency, tour operator and 
other reservation service and related 
activities 
0.2068 51 - Air transport 0.0922 74 - Other professional, scientific and technical activities 0.3158 58 - Publishing activities 0.5087 
63 - Information service activities 0.2532 63 - Information service activities 0.0944 73 - Advertising and market research 0.3815 70 - Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities 0.5198 
73 - Advertising and market research 0.2707 68 - Real estate activities 0.109 63 - Information service activities 0.3924 63 - Information service activities 0.5306 
60 - Programming and broadcasting 
activities 0.3373 78 - Employment activities 0.1108 58 - Publishing activities 0.4348 78 - Employment activities 0.5472 
58 - Publishing activities 0.3389 74 - Other professional, scientific and technical activities 0.1422 
70 - Activities of head offices; 
management consultancy activities 0.4493 
60 - Programming and broadcasting 
activities 0.5534 
70 - Activities of head offices; 
management consultancy activities 0.3554 
73 - Advertising and market 
research 0.1449 
60 - Programming and broadcasting 
activities 0.5131 
74 - Other professional, scientific 
and technical activities 0.5535 
51 - Air transport 0.411 60 - Programming and broadcasting activities 0.1751 
59 - Motion picture, video and 
television programme production, 
sound recording and music 
publishing activities 
0.6454 73 - Advertising and market research 0.585 
59 - Motion picture, video and 
television programme production, 
sound recording and music 
publishing activities 
0.5556 
59 - Motion picture, video and 
television programme production, 
sound recording and music 
publishing activities 
0.243 51 - Air transport 0.6604 
59 - Motion picture, video and 
television programme production, 
sound recording and music 
publishing activities 
0.5879 
 
 
 145 
Table A3. 2: Agglomeration by 2-digit manufacturing industry 
30km 180km 
France UK France UK 
Industry group Kd Industry group Kd Industry group Kd Industry group Kd 
16 - Manufacture of wood and of 
products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of 
straw and plaiting materials 
0.0138 
16 - Manufacture of wood and of 
products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of 
straw and plaiting materials 
0.025 
16 - Manufacture of wood and of 
products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of 
straw and plaiting materials 
0.1605 
21 - Manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations 
0.3939 
22 - Manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products 0.0174 
26 - Manufacture of computer, 
electronic and optical products 0.032 
17 - Manufacture of paper and paper 
products 0.1708 
16 - Manufacture of wood and of 
products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of 
straw and plaiting materials 
0.4108 
25 - Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment 
0.0182 27 - Manufacture of electrical equipment 0.0344 31 - Manufacture of furniture 0.1774 
33 - Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment 0.4189 
17 - Manufacture of paper and paper 
products 0.0188 
17 - Manufacture of paper and paper 
products 0.0355 
25 - Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment 
0.1788 17 - Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.4385 
10 - Manufacture of food products 0.0203 22 - Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.0359 
33 - Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment 0.1837 10 - Manufacture of food products 0.4556 
28 - Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 0.027 
21 - Manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations 
0.0371 18 - Printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.1953 32 - Other manufacturing 0.4623 
23 - Manufacture of other non-metallic 
mineral products 0.0275 
33 - Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment 0.0415 
28 - Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 0.1973 
26 - Manufacture of computer, 
electronic and optical products 0.4675 
33 - Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment 0.033 10 - Manufacture of food products 0.0422 10 - Manufacture of food products 0.2031 
30 - Manufacture of other transport 
equipment 0.4687 
27 - Manufacture of electrical 
equipment 0.0354 
28 - Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 0.0447 
22 - Manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products 0.2061 
27 - Manufacture of electrical 
equipment 0.4709 
24 - Manufacture of basic metals 0.0359 32 - Other manufacturing 0.0452 27 - Manufacture of electrical equipment 0.2069 
20 - Manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products 0.474 
18 - Printing and reproduction of 
recorded media 0.038 31 - Manufacture of furniture 0.0466 32 - Other manufacturing 0.2075 
28 - Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. 0.4786 
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15 - Manufacture of leather and related 
products 0.0435 
30 - Manufacture of other transport 
equipment 0.0495 11 - Manufacture of beverages 0.2175 
22 - Manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products 0.4832 
32 - Other manufacturing 0.0488 
25 - Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment 
0.0525 15 - Manufacture of leather and related products 0.2242 
18 - Printing and reproduction of 
recorded media 0.4839 
13 - Manufacture of textiles 0.0567 18 - Printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.0526 
23 - Manufacture of other non-metallic 
mineral products 0.2243 31 - Manufacture of furniture 0.5029 
29 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers 0.0589 
29 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers 0.0632 24 - Manufacture of basic metals 0.2386 
25 - Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment 
0.5051 
20 - Manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products 0.065 
20 - Manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products 0.0636 13 - Manufacture of textiles 0.2444 24 - Manufacture of basic metals 0.5095 
21 - Manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations 
0.0734 24 - Manufacture of basic metals 0.0651 30 - Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.2447 11 - Manufacture of beverages 0.5162 
11 - Manufacture of beverages 0.0746 11 - Manufacture of beverages 0.0805 29 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.2469 
23 - Manufacture of other non-metallic 
mineral products 0.5227 
30 - Manufacture of other transport 
equipment 0.0829 13 - Manufacture of textiles 0.101 
26 - Manufacture of computer, 
electronic and optical products 0.2663 13 - Manufacture of textiles 0.5477 
26 - Manufacture of computer, 
electronic and optical products 0.1061 14 - Manufacture of wearing apparel 0.1161 14 - Manufacture of wearing apparel 0.269 14 - Manufacture of wearing apparel 0.5498 
14 - Manufacture of wearing apparel 0.1378 15 - Manufacture of leather and related products 0.1687 
20 - Manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products 0.2889 
29 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers 0.593 
31 - Manufacture of furniture 0.1894 23 - Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.84 
21 - Manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations 
0.2999 15 - Manufacture of leather and related products 0.6345 
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Chapter 4: Heterogeneous Agglomeration and 
Trade Shocks  
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter analyses the impact of import competition from low-income countries on the 
location decisions of plants between and within industries, interpreting agglomeration and co-
agglomeration estimates within a common framework. 
 
Over the past two decades, most advanced economies experienced a rapid increase in import 
penetration from emerging economies. The BRICS countries44 - thanks to market friendly reforms 
and lower tariffs - managed to capture a significant share of world exports in several 
manufacturing industries. This phenomenon, complementing and driving the technological 
change, is known to have further fostered the process of tertiarization of western economies. 
Trade theory identifies labour abundant countries as a likely source of disruption in high-wage 
labour markets. Many empirical studies suggest that China’s access to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) would have accelerated the decline of the manufacturing sector in high-
income countries (Bernard, Jensen, & Schott, 2006; Autor et al., 2013; Pessoa, 2016; Foliano & 
Riley, 2017). Import penetration externalities can even go beyond the affected industries. Indeed, 
other sectors are affected because they are linked to the target sectors via labour market 
reallocation (Bloom et al. 2015; Acemoglu et a., 2016), Keynesian-type aggregate demand 
spillovers (Author et al., 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2016) and upstream/downstream linkages 
(Altomonte et al., 20014; Heise et al., 2015; Acemoglu et al., 2016). On the other hand, Chinese 
import competition has been demonstrated to increase innovation within surviving firms. Bloom 
et al. (2015) find that import competition leads to an increase in the speed of technical change and 
an overall reallocation of employment towards the most technologically advanced firms. More 
generally, empirical evidence indicates that the resulting Schumpeterian process could enhance 
productivity, both through within- and between-firm reallocation effects (Bernard, Jensen, and 
Schott, 2006; Altomonte et al., 2013).  
 
 
44 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
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The distributional effects of globalisation have recently come into renewed public focus. In 
Europe and North America, the political geography - once defined to a large extent by regional 
identities and social status - was completely reshaped by a clear divide between cities and 
countryside.  
Once again, trade has been linked to the increase in disparities across space. Between 2001 and 
2011 French imports from China grew five-fold. After a five-year stagnation, mostly coinciding 
with the debt crisis, imports started to increase again in 2016. Over the 15-year period, the 
manufacturing sector experienced an overall 25% decline in employment, and even larger 
reductions in the industries more exposed to foreign competition.  
This study aims to shed new light on the distributional effect of trade shocks on the economic 
geography of manufacturing firms.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1: Imports from China and BRICS countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The chart compares the evolution of imports from China and 
BRICS countries to the evolution of France GDP 
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4.2. Literature 
 
4.2.1 Import competition  
 
A vast body of theoretical and empirical literature support the existence of a positive relationship 
betweentrade shocks and productivity.Melitz (2003), introducing product differentiation and 
inter-regional trade into the frameworkof industry dynamics proposed by Hopenhayn (1992), 
predicts a pro-competitive effect of trade liberalisation. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) extend this 
framework, incorporating variable price-cost mark-ups and demonstrate that larger markets 
attract more firms, which makes competition tougher and ultimately leads less productive firms 
to exit.While these models take only between-firm productivity changes into account, new 
studies highlight a possible within-firm productivity gain. Bernard, Redding and Scott (2011) 
further develop the main intuition of the models, reinterpreting the dynamic for multi-product 
firms. In the new framework, liberalisation fosters productivity growth within and across firms, 
by inducing firms to reallocate resources from least to most productive products and forcing least 
productive firms to exit.   
 
As far as empirical contributions are concerned, considerable evidence has been provided to 
demonstrate that significant effects of tradeon firm-level productivity (see Tybout and 
Westbrook, 1995; Krishna and Mitra, 1998; Pavcnick, 2002; Fernandes, 2003; and Topalova, 2004, 
among others).Other studies explore the ‘vertical’ channels through which a trade shock can 
enhance productivity, using measures of inter-industry integration such as imported input, input 
tariffs or import competition in the upstream sector.  Amiti and Konings (2005) study the effect 
of both input and output tariffs on productivity for a sample of Indonesian firms. The study 
demonstrates that a 10% reduction in output tariffs increases productivity by 1%, whereas a 10% 
reduction in input tariffs increases it by3% for average firms, and by 11% for input-importing 
firms. Altomonte et al. (2014) test the impact of import penetration in the same industries and in 
upstream industries on the productivity of Italian manufacturing firms between 1996 and 2003. 
They find import penetration to have a positive impact on TFP, especially for penetration in 
upstream industries and imports from European countries. Furthermore, firm openness to trade 
is positively correlated with a positive pro-competitive effect on productivity. Olper et al (2014) 
test the impact of import penetration on 25 European countries and 9 food industries between 
1995 and 2008, controlling for market size, country and sector heterogeneities, and for the 
endogeneity of import competition. Using different dynamic panel estimators, import 
penetration is found to be systematically positively related to productivity. Again, the positive 
relationship seems almost exclusively driven by penetration in final product markets coming 
from high-income countries.  
 
In addition to firm and product selection dynamics, the productivity gains associated with import 
competition can be explained by trade-induced technical change, in the form of innovations and 
the adoption of existing technologies. Bloom et al. (2016) provide a useful review of the theoretical 
literature. On the one side, the pro-competitive effects driven by foreign firms could reduce 
agency costs (Schmidt, 1997) and increase the optimal scale of production, reducing the 
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opportunity cost of innovation.  On the other hand, the same forces might reduce firm mark-ups 
and thus the quasi-rents from innovation (Aghion et al., 2005).  Technical change may also be 
driven by knowledge spillovers from foreign firms (e.g., Coe and Helpman, 1995 or Acharaya 
and Keller, 2008). However, this channel works only when the foreign competitors are closer to 
the technological frontier in the affected industries. Bloom et al. (2015) have recently proposed a 
‘trapped factor’ model of innovation that might well explain the relation between import 
penetration and innovative behaviour. The intuition is that when factors of production are 
temporarily trapped within firms due to moving frictions, an unexpected decline in demand can 
reduce the opportunity cost of their application to the innovation process. Bloom et al. (2016) test 
the model exploiting the China shock on 12 European countries. In line with traditional models, 
they find that import competition fosters factor reallocation toward the most productive and 
innovative firms. However, they also provide evidence of a within-firm increase in the absolute 
volume of patents, confirming the predictions of the trapped factor model. 
  
Import competition could also affect domestic firms via changes in the skill mix. Lu and Ng (2013) 
suggest three channels through which import penetration can be associated with skill 
composition. The first one directly follows empirical results on trade-induced technical change. 
Both within- and between-firm increase in innovation could lead to the adoption of new 
technologies and, therefore, to higher demand for skilled workers. Tougher competition could 
also encourage firms to change their input mix, creating the conditions for offshoring dynamics. 
As before, workers employed in routine tasks would pay the highest price, whereas non-routine 
interactive occupations would get a zero or even a positive effect. A final channel is a change in 
the output mix. Khandelwal (2010) suggests that in some sectors the best response to foreign 
competition from low-income countries is to switch the production process towards high-quality 
products.  Holmes and Steven (2014) develop a theoretical framework to explain the resilience of 
small US plants with respect to foreign shocks. They suggest that flexibility of production and 
customer interaction make these businesses less likely to lose market share to the benefit of large 
foreign competitors. Both these mechanisms would encourage affected domestic firms to change 
their skill mix and production processes. 
 
A third way import competition might affect firms is through changes in their internal 
organisation. Bloom et al. (2010) suggest that competition would foster firm decentralisation. The 
result can be explained theoretically with lower agency costs making decentralisation more 
convenient.  Lower costs of decentralisation can also derive from the reduced margin for 
cannibalisation between competing plants (Alonso et al., 2008).   
 
Overall, a rich theoretical and empirical literature highlights different ways in which foreign 
competition change structure and behaviour of domestic firms. Changes in productivity 
distribution, innovative behaviour, internal structure, size and skill mix are all likely to have some 
effects on dispersion and agglomeration forces that determine the spatial distribution of the 
economic activity. Surprisingly, the firm-level literature has so far provided little evidence on the 
spatial implications of these dynamics. Instead, more attention has been devoted to the spatial 
location of exporters and multinational firms. 
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4.2.2 Agglomeration and international trade  
 
Since Bernard and Jensen’s (1999) seminal empirical paper on US exporters, several studieshave 
provided evidence on the fact that trading activity is often concentrated in small spatial areas. 
Furthermore, firms engaging in international trade differ from non-trading firms in many 
respects. These firms generally employ more high-skilled workers, pay higher wages and are 
more productive than firms operating in the domestic market only.  Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) 
offer significant evidence regarding the peculiar advantages that characterise the ‘happy few’ 
involved in international trade.While new economic geography and trade models (Krugman 
1991, Krugman & Venables, 1996) have widely studied the role of trade costs and economies of 
scale in defining the uneven spatial distribution of economic activity, scant attention has been 
given to the relationship between trading behaviour and agglomeration. Most significantly of all, 
while the core-periphery model and several extensions provided in the literature have focused 
on regional agglomeration and dispersion dynamics, few models have attempted to explain the 
relation between internal agglomeration and external trade. An important contribution was made 
by Redding (2012), who extended a recent class of quantitative international trade models to 
incorporate factor mobility across regions within countries.If labour is perfectly mobile, regions 
with higher locational fundamentals and land quality experience larger increases in their 
population until real wages are again equalised in the new equilibrium following the reduction 
in trade barriers. As a result, external trade liberalisation leads to an endogenous internal 
reallocation of workers. 
 
Further theoretical and empirical evidence has been provided by Fajgelbaum and Redding (2014), 
who studied Argentina’s integration into world markets in the late-nineteenth century. Their 
study demonstrates the role of internal geography in shaping the effects of international trade 
liberalisations. Koenig (2005) argues that exporters benefits from being in the vicinity of ‘first 
geographyfactors’ such as bodies of water or national borders. French overseas traders are found 
to locate near those borders and ports that provide access to their respective partner countries. 
The empirical literature has given less attention to the so called ‘second-geography factors’: 
proximity of other firms and density of economic environment.  A relevant exception is presented 
by Bekes and Harasztosi  (2009), who argue that externalities that determine agglomeration 
premia for firms are affected by the firms’ involvement intrade. They maintain that the 
performance of internationalised firms in more densely populatedenvironments differs from 
that of firms operating within the domestic market only. Using a large panel of Hungarian 
manufacturing firms, they demonstrate that international traders benefit twice as much as non-
traders from agglomeration in productivity. Sun et al. (2012) demonstrate that agglomeration has 
a final positive effect on firms’ export possibilities and sales. Higher natural-productivity firms 
gain a higher productivity premium from agglomeration. Empirical results based ondata from 
Chinese industrial enterprises confirm the theoretical results.  
 
This study takes a different perspective, investigating to what extent import competition changes 
the geography of domestic economic activity. Exploiting geocoded plant-level data, covering the 
whole population of manufacturing firms, and international trade data retrieved from Comtrade 
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dataset, I study the effect of import penetration from China on the spatial location patterns of 
industries and specific types of plants. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.  Data  
 
Data are retrieved from two administrative sources made available by the INSEE (the French 
national statistical agency) to researchers with access to CASD secure lab. The first source is the 
Declarations Annuelles de Donnes sociales (DADS). Every year all French workers are expected 
to submit to the tax authority information about all incomes earned over the previous 12 months. 
The INSEE receives these data from the tax authority, merges them with other information on 
workers and households provided by various sources, and uses them to produce statistics about 
employment and wages. 
The data used in this process are recorded in an exhaustive dataset, where each observation 
corresponds to every job contract linking a worker to a firm in a given year. For every worker, 
the dataset provides job-spell level information on gross and net wage, employment periods, age, 
sex and skills, number of hours worked, type of contract and occupational category (Professions 
et categories socio-professionnelles, PCS 2003) at the 4-digit level. 
 
The dataset FICUS/FARE, produced by INSEE/DGFiP, provides balance sheet information 
(output, capital, inputs, exports, number of employees, sector, etc.) for each firm registered in 
France from 1993 to 2016 (approximately 47 million observations). Data are retrieved from the 
compulsory reporting of firms and income statements to fiscal authorities in France, with no 
limiting threshold in terms of firm size or sales. By merging the dataset with the information 
provided by the Sirene (Système Informatique pour le Répertoire des Entreprises de leurs 
Etablissements) dataset, it is possible to assign address and precise spatial coordinates to 27 
million establishments (the entire population of establishments that ever operated in France over 
the past 20 years). In this analysis, I drop from the sample firms subject to the micro-bin/micro-
bic regimes, namely firms: 
 
• whose principal activities are services relating to the category of business profits (BIC) 
or non-commercial profits (BNC)  
• whose turnover does not exceed €32,600 (for 2011), excluding taxes  
• which operate VAT free and do not perform an excluded activity (for example, the 
rental of equipment and durable consumer goods);  
• which do not opt for the régime du réel simplifié tax system   
 
The Liaison Financiére dataset (LIFI) provides data on all relevant financial linkages involving at 
least one firm located in France. For each observation, I can determine the country of residence 
of all foreign subsidiary/parent firms and the capital share. The median voting share owned 
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upon acquisition is 99%, with the result that the acquisition event represents a near complete 
takeover of assets and control for the overwhelming majority of the sample.  
 
Geocoded plant level data are retrieved from the Sirene database. Each plant is assigned to 
specific coordinates, corresponding to the address reported for fiscal purposes. 
 This information is missing for a small number of plants (<5%), located primarily in rural areas. 
In these cases, I assign the coordinate of the applicable IRIS. IRIS are the smallest French 
administrative unit (the French territory consists of over 49,000 IRIS areas) and plants with 
missing coordinates are expected to be located, on average, 400 m from their estimated location.  
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4.4 Empirical Strategy  
   
My goal is to test the effect of trade shocks on the spatial agglomeration of industries and different 
plant-types. To this end, I first compute an index for spatial agglomeration. Following Behrens at 
al. (2017), I extend the continuous agglomeration measures developed by Duranton and Overman 
(2003) [DO] and compute agglomeration and co-agglomeration measures for a set of industries 
and plant-types within industries. The functions are then linked to a simple index, obtained 
integrating the DO function. In contrast to the previous chapter, I also replicate the analysis using 
an alternative measure, considering only the intervals in which the DO function lies above or 
below its confidence interval. 
An import penetration measure is computed exploiting industry-product data retrieved from 
Comtrade and instrumenting the endogenous variable with world import supply for each 
product-country combination. 
 
 
4.4.1. Main Specification 
 
In the main estimation equation, I model local agglomeration as a function of time-invariant 
industry-specific characteristics, !", common shocks, #$, and the import penetration from China, %&"$'(. 
 )**+ = - + /0%&"$'((2) + !" + #$ + 4"$                                                                                                (1) 
 
The same regression is estimated multiple times for different levels of d, ranging between 30 km, 
considered a good proxy for local clustering, and 180 km, which can be associated with global 
agglomeration. 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Continuous agglomeration indices 
 
The weighted K-density proposed by Duranton and Overman describes the distribution of 
bilateral distances between workers in a given industry (see Section 3.3.1 in Chapter 3). In order 
to obtain an index providing information on the degree of agglomeration/dispersion, I follow 
two different strategies. 
First, consistently with the previous chapter, I integrate the distribution function, obtaining its 
cumulative (CDF) up to a distance d. The values obtained represent the weighted share of plant-
pairs located less than distance d from each other. Alternatively, we can view this as the 
probability that two randomly drawn plants in an industry will be at most d km away. 
 5678888(2̅) =: 5"7(2);<;8  
 
This procedure was used by Behrens (2017) to study the agglomeration of Canadian 
manufacturing industries. Although it represents a useful index to synthetize the information 
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content provided by the DO function, it fails to account for the overall pattern of concentration 
in the manufacturing sector as a whole. Therefore, I develop a different index, consisting in the 
difference between the 5"7(2) lying above (below) the upper (lower) confidence band. In this way 
I am able to compute two new indices: 
 
 Γ"7 = :>"7(2̅);<;8  
 
Where >"7 = maxB5"7(2) −	578888(2), 0G 
 Ψ"7 = :I"7(2̅);<;8  
 
Where I"7 = max	(57(2) − 5"7(2), 0) 
 
The adjusted CDF, based on the index proposed by Behrens and Bougna (2014),  is computed 
as: 
 
567JJJJ(2̅) = K Γ"7B2̅G									 if g  is significantly aggregated                            0												LM	*	LN	O4LPℎ4R	S**R4*SP42, OTR	2LNU4RN42−I"7(2̅)										if g is significantly dispersed                                    		 
 
To understand the behaviour of the index, we can consider the industry 5"7(2) (blue line) in 
Figure 4. 3. Its DO function continuously lies above the upper confidence interval up to roughly 
50 km. As a result, the 567JJJJ(2)	will be greater than 0 for every distance level and increasing up to 
d=50. The 567JJJJ(2) at 60 km distance will be equal to the blue area, between the agglomeration 
function and the upper confidence interval. 
 
 
Figure 4. 2: Behrens (2017) agglomeration 
index 
Figure 4. 3: Adjusted agglomeration index 
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4.4.3 Localisation and co-localisation patterns 
 
In Section 3.3.2, I showed that between- and within-industry agglomeration patterns can be 
analysed using three different indices: 
 
I. The agglomeration of all plants in the industry: 5678888 
II. The agglomeration of plants belonging to a certain type (group agglomeration): 5V678888 
III. The co-agglomeration between i-type plants and all plants in the industry (joint 
agglomeration): 5V6,6788888 
 
Within each industry, we can identify various types of firms and plants on the basis of 
demographic characteristics, size, productivity level, foreign status, etc… All this factor might 
determine a different spatial configuration with respect to the other plants located in the industry.  
The three indices make it possible to assign each industry-group type to a specific spatial 
pattern: 
 
a. 5V6,6788888 > 5678888	; 						5V678888 > 5678888 
In this case, group i is on average more agglomerated than its reference industry. This is 
the case when i-type plants are overrepresented in industry j local clusters and, at the 
same time, they tend to locate close to each-other. This second feature can be obtained 
with a lower representation outside local clusters or through the concentration of i-type 
plants in some, but not all clusters. This pattern could describe some manufacturing 
industries characterised by clusters of SMEs, that located close to each other in order to 
share some common functions. 
 
b. 5V6,6788888 > 5678888	; 						5V678888 < 5678888 
A group of plants might exhibit high degrees of co-agglomeration with respect to the 
whole industry but low group-level spatial agglomeration. This spatial distribution 
could describe plants characterised by high complementarity with other establishments 
in the sector. Establishments with e central position in cluster networks and 
characterised by high internal economies of scale show a similar pattern.  
 
c. 5V6,6788888 < 5678888	; 						5V678888 > 5678888 
A specific plant-type can exhibit low degree of co-agglomeration and high levels of 
group-level spatial concentration. This spatial configuration could characterise, for 
instance, manufacturing headquarters located close to each other in a large city, far 
from productive establishments, accounting for most industry j plants. 
 
d. 5V6,6788888 < 5678888	; 						5V678888 < 5678888 
Finally, i establishments could be more dispersed than other plants in industry j both in 
terms of group agglomeration and group-industry co-agglomeration. This pattern 
could describe exiters and new entries in a sector where dispersed plants are 
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characterised by higher turnout. 
 
The examples illustrated above are not meant to be exhaustive and indicative of all possible 
drivers of each scenario. By contrast, they serve as examples to understand the centrifugal and 
centripetal forces that together shape the geography of different industries.  
 
 
 
 
4.4.4 Import Penetration 
 
Import penetration analysis is performed using data retrieved from the UN Comtrade database. 
The import penetration proxy, defined as in Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2011), is givenby:  
 %&"$'( =: %Z&["\$'(%Z&["$ + &]^_["\$ − `a&["\$[  
 
where %Z&["\$'(  and %Z&["$ represent respectively the value of product p (industry j) imports from 
China and all countries, &]^_[$  is product p domestic production and `a&[$  represents  the 
exports. The index, aggregated at the 4-digit industry level, is a ratio between the imports from 
China and the estimated local demand.  
 
 
 
4.4.5 Instrumental Strategy 
 
A potential concern in my empirical strategy is that unobserved factors, such as technology 
shocks or institutional reforms might be correlated with both changes in product-level Chinese 
imports and labour demand. To address this issue, I use the interaction between initial share of 
products imported from China to each French industry j with the world export supply of product 
p from China (excluding exports to France). The instrument is subsequently normalised using 
world export supply of the same product. 
 %"$ =:b`c["$'(b`c["$d %eU[",$fg'(%eU",$fg'([  
 
Where b`c["$'(  is the world export supply of product p in year t form China, b`c["$hii is the overall 
value of the same product traded worldwide, %eU",$fg'(  is the overall value imported from industry 
j in pre-sample period and %eU[",$fg'(  is the value of product p only imported in the same period. 
World export supply data are based on Comtrade data at the HS6 product level. Similar strategies 
have been used in the literature (Altomonte et al., 2006; Bloom et al., 2012, Hummels et al., 2014, 
among others) to isolate the exogenous supply-driven components of import shocks. First stage 
results are reported in Table A4. 1. 
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4.5 Results 
 
Import penetration and manufacturing employment 
Table 4. 1 presents regression results describing some general effects of import penetration that 
have been studied in depth by the trade literature. In columns (1), foreign competition from China 
is found to have a large negative effect on industrial employment. The result is consistent with 
the recent literature (Autor et al., 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2016), suggesting that trade with 
developing economies is correlated with a more rapid decline in manufacturing employment, 
especially in labour-intensive industries. Results are consistent when considering the IV 
specification (column 2). According to the trade literature, trade liberalisation fosters pro-
competitive effects in the domestic market, leading to an increase in domestic market 
concentration (Melitz, 2003; Melitz & Ottaviano, 2007). The results in column (3) confirm the 
predictions. The effect is found to be even greater when the explanatory variable is instrumented 
(column 4).  
 
Import penetration and between-industry spatial agglomeration patterns 
Import penetration from emerging economies accelerates the employment disruption in 
manufacturing sectors, leading to an input reallocation towards the largest firms, which are more 
resilient to foreign competition. I now investigate how this dynamic affects the spatial 
distribution of economic activities. To do so, in Table 4. 2 I regress the continuous agglomeration 
index computed up to distance d on the import penetration from China.  In other words, I test 
whether the import penetration is correlated with the probability of finding two plants within a 
certain distance d.   
Overall, foreign competition is found to foster spatial agglomeration in the manufacturing sector. 
However, I find heterogeneous results with respect to the scale considered. Column (1) presents 
the impact of import penetration on the spatial agglomeration up to a 30 km distance, measured 
as the simple CDF of the 5"7(2) function. I can interpret this lower threshold of the bilateral 
distance distributions as an index for the share of economic activities localised in industrial 
clusters. One standard deviation increase in the share of local demand covered by Chinese 
suppliers is associated with a 0.05% increase in the share of establishments located within 30km 
from each other. 
The results suggest that clusters increase their relative share of employment in France. On the 
opposite side of the spatial distribution, column (6) presents the impact on the ‘global 
agglomeration’, up to 180 km. This index measures the tendency of firms to localise their plants 
in certain macro-areas (such as NUTS2 regions). One standard deviation increase in Chinese 
import penetration determines a 0.056% increase in the share of plant pair bilateral distances 
lower or equal to 180km. 
This result suggest that import penetration leads to a rise in global agglomeration, largely driven 
by variations at shorter distances. Considering the intermediate thresholds of the bilateral 
distance distribution, I notice that coefficients rise up to a distance of 90 km and then 
progressively decline. This suggests that centripetal and centrifugal forces are affected up to 90 
km distance. In the same Table, I test the effect of foreign competition on a different proxy of 
spatial agglomeration, namely the adjusted CDF proposed in Section 4.1. Results are consistent, 
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although the magnitude of the coefficient is constant above 60km, suggesting the main change 
happens below that threshold.  
  
Table 4. 3  presents the results of the IV specification. Instrumenting the explanatory variable with 
product-country specific world input supply, the pattern described above becomes even more 
evident. Import penetration is found to have a positive and significant effect on spatial 
agglomeration at any distance between 30 km and 180km. One standard deviation increase in the 
share of domestic demand covered by Chinese suppliers leads to a 0.2% increase in the share of 
plant pairs located within 30km from each other over the total bilateral distribution in the 
industry. The effect seems particularly relevant at intermediate distances, with the coefficient 
peaking at 90km and then slowly declining. In particular, the magnitude doubles between 30 and 
60km, suggesting a relevant effect up to that distance threshold, and then remains constant.  
A similar pattern is found when I consider spatial agglomeration/dispersion outside the sector 
confidence interval, with coefficients reduced by approximately 25%.  
 
In Table 4. 4 and Table 4. 5 I replicate the same analysis focussing on all the BRICS countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). Again, the results confirm a positive effect of foreign 
competition from emerging countries on the spatial agglomeration of manufacturing plants. The 
results are consistent when I adopt the adjusted agglomeration index and when I instrument the 
endogenous variable.  
 
Overall, foreign competition from China is found to have a non-negligible effect on the spatial 
distribution of economic activity. One standard deviation change in import penetration is 
associated to a 0.05%-0.2% increase in the share of firms clustered within 30km from each other 
and to a 0.05%-0.4% increase in the number of firms agglomerated within 180 km from each other. 
In chapter 3, I showed that in the period 2008-2015 the overall French manufacturing sector 
experienced a decline by 0.2% in local agglomeration and a 0.8% decline in global agglomeration. 
The results suggest import competition could have significantly slowed down the process of 
spatial dispersion characterising the manufacturing sector. 
 
 
Import penetration and within-industry spatial agglomeration patterns 
I now proceed to analyse the relation between import penetration from emerging countries and 
the spatial agglomeration of specific industrial firm types. To this end, I refer to the four possible 
patterns described in Section 4.4. Exogenous trade shocks can impact agglomeration forces, 
changing the degree to which plants co-locate with other establishment of the same type and/or 
with all plants belonging to the same industry. 
 
In Section B1.1 I focus on plant demographics. Figure 4. 4 and Figure 4. 5 report regression 
coefficients and confidence intervals for, respectively, the effect of import penetration from China 
on the degree of co-agglomeration between entrants and the incumbent plant and the group-
specific agglomeration of this category. Firms entering the market are not affected by the higher 
competition in their location decision with respect to the existing economic geography. However, 
a small, although insignificant, negative effect is found for the spatial co-location of new entrants. 
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The estimates for firms leaving the market exhibit a positive and increasing pattern (Figure 4. 6 
and Figure 4. 7). Above 120km, the p-value is below 0.1. In this case, the result for group co-
agglomeration is perfectly symmetrical. 
 
In Section B1.2 I report the same estimates for the alternative specification in which the adjusted 
CDF is used as a dependent variable (567JJJJ(2)). Results are confirmed for new entries, but the 
positive and significant effect on agglomeration of exiters disappears. Overall, foreign 
competition does not seem to have any effects on the spatial distribution of demographic events. 
 
In Section B2.1 I focus on plant size. Import penetration from China is found to have a positive 
and significant effect on both joint co-location with the rest of the sector and the group 
agglomeration of large plants (Figure 4. 12 and Figure 4. 13), especially up to 60k distance. By 
contrast, small plants show an inverted U-shaped pattern. The only significant result is the 
negative effect on group-specific agglomeration at very short distance (Figure 4. 15). 
  
 
In section B2.2 I analyse the 567JJJJ(2) estimates. The pattern discussed above with respect to large 
plants is confirmed and so is the null-effect on the co-agglomeration of small plants with the rest 
of industry (Figure 4. 16 and Figure 4. 17) The coefficient for small plant agglomeration becomes 
largely negative, although still non-significant (Figure 4. 18 and Figure 4. 19).  
In summary, the positive effect of import penetration on spatial agglomeration is driven 
primarily by the largest plants, with employment equal to or greater than the 10th percentile, 
whereas little or no effect is found for the small firms, with employment equal to or lower than 
the 25th percentile. These results seem consistent with the predictions of Holmes and Steven 
(2011). Large plants are more affected by import competition and consequently engage in a 
process of spatial agglomeration to benefit from external economies of scale. 
 
In Section B3.1 I analyse the relation between foreign competition and the spatial agglomeration 
of firms with different internal spatial organisation. 
In order to understand the way in which industries respond to foreign competition, it is 
important to study the behaviour of multi-plant firms. If it is true that market concentration 
should naturally foster spatial agglomeration, the rapid rise of multi-plant firms could be 
associated with a higher dispersion of plants belonging to the same firm. It is possible that larger 
companies expanding through M&As maintain the spatial distributions of plants previously 
operating as autonomous firms. In addition, as suggested by Bloom et al. (2010), larger 
competition could reduce agency costs and allow large firms to decentralise different functions 
and locate each establishment in the region that best fits its skill/input mix. 
 
In Figure 4. 20 and Figure 4. 21 I report coefficients and confidence intervals of the IV 
specification, analysing the relation between import penetration and the agglomeration of single-
plant firms. The charts suggest that foreign competition has a zero effect on the agglomeration of 
this type of firm, with some evidence of a positive effect only at very large distances. By contrast, 
multi-plant firms are found to exhibit higher agglomeration in response to foreign shocks. This 
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is true for the joint agglomeration with the rest of the industry and the agglomeration of multi-
plant firms only, up to 120 km (Figure 4. 22 and Figure 4. 23). 
An even clearer pattern is found for headquarters, which react to import penetration with higher 
agglomeration at any distance threshold (Figure 4. 24 and Figure 4. 25 ). 
In Section B3.2, I report regression coefficients and confidence intervals for the 567JJJJ(2) 
specification, which generally confirm previous results. Overall, competition from China seems 
to affect only multi-plant firms. This might be consistent with an important role of the internal 
organisation of firms in explaining the overall dynamic patterns that characterise the affected 
industries. 
 
In Section B4.1, I consider how import penetration affects the spatial agglomeration of the most 
productive firms. In this case, the pattern is relatively clear. An increase in foreign competition 
does not affect the group agglomeration and co-agglomeration for the most productive firms 
(Figure 4. 32 and Figure 4. 33). By contrast, we find an extremely positive and significant 
coefficient for low productive firms (below the 25th percentile of the productivity distribution). 
However, these results hold only for co-agglomeration patterns, whereas no such a result is found 
for group agglomeration. Once again, results are largely confirmed by 567JJJJ(2) estimates. 
The results could be explained in three ways. First, the positive effect on firm productivity 
highlighted by the international trade literature (Altomonte et al. 2008; Bloom et al., 2012) could 
reduce the overall dispersion of the productivity distribution, helping more dispersed and less 
productive firms to catch-up with the clustered frontier.  
Second, an increase in industrial concentration obtained by means of a reallocation of resources 
towards the most productive firms could lead the productivity frontier to assume a spatial 
pattern more consistent with the overall distribution. In other words, factor reallocation of 
dispersed low-productive plants towards high-productive plants could foster spatial 
agglomeration at the lower tale of the productivity distribution. Finally, the tougher competition 
could decrease the benefits arising from knowledge spillovers for the firms at the productivity 
frontier, leading some firms to relocate their establishment far from their competitors.  
 
 
In Sections B5.1 and B5.2 I finally consider multinational firms. I find some evidence of a positive 
relation between supply shocks and multinational co-agglomeration with domestic firms, but 
results are not significant (Figure 4. 40  and Figure 4. 42). By contrast, import penetration has no 
effect on group agglomeration of multinational firms (Figure 4. 41 and Figure 4. 43). This result 
could depend on the higher resilience of multinational firms that already compete in international 
markets and are less affected than domestic firms by new competitors accessing in the market. 
The rise in co-agglomeration would be then primarily driven by domestic firms. 
 
In the Appendix I replicate all the analyses, using import penetration from all BRICS countries. 
Results generally confirm the main findings relative to import penetration from China only. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
 
In this study, I proposed a composite strategy to analyse the way industries and some specific 
establishment types respond to import competition from low-income countries. 
Extending the continuous agglomeration measures proposed by Duranton and Overman (2006) 
and developed by Behrens (2017), I investigate a large micro dataset covering the whole 
population of French establishments from 2008 to 2015. Foreign competition from China is found 
to increase spatial agglomeration in affected industries. Instrumenting the main explanatory 
variable with the world market share of exporting countries leads to similar results. The outcome 
is not clearly explained by the location of new entries and firms quitting the market. It follows, 
therefore, that the main trend is probably driven by reallocation of resources across plants rather 
than by plant demographic events. Pro-competitive shocks are also found to affect plant location 
patterns within industries. Large, multi-plant and low productive firms respond to pro-
competitive shock increasing spatial agglomeration, whereas no effect is found for small plants 
and single-plant, multinational and low productive firms. Similar results are found when I 
consider import penetration from all BRICS countries. These findings highlight the fact that, 
behind the negative effect on aggregate employment and the positive effects on productivity and 
innovative behaviour documented by the literature, foreign competition is likely to change the 
internal geography of firms.  
 
The results have a number of policy implications. First, foreign competition is found to partially 
offset the spatial dispersion trend that characterise the manufacturing sector, with relevant 
implications on sector productivity and spatial inequalities. Second, import penetration does not 
have a homogenous effect on industries, but has instead a particularly significant effect on certain 
plant types. As a result, limited modifications in the spatial locations of entire industries could 
mask deeper changes in the nature of economic activities across regions. 
 
Further research is needed to shed new light on these mechanisms. A possible extension would 
be to adapt to this framework the approach proposed by Faggio et al. (2018) to study to what 
extent import penetration affects the co-agglomeration patterns between plant-types belonging 
to different industries. A second line of research could focus instead on functional agglomeration 
patterns, studying relation between foreign competition and the spatial distribution of individual 
workers on the basis of location, industry and occupational category. 
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Tables 
 
 
 
Table 4. 1: Employment and market concentration 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln Employment ln Employment ln Herfindal Index ln Herfindal Index 
     
China IP -0.115*** -0.118** 0.133*** 0.243*** 
 -0.0137 -0.0148 -0.0388 -0.0461 
     
Observations 1305 1305 1305 1305 
R-squared 0.799 0.799 0.804 0.816 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
IV NO YES NO YES 
Notes. The table reports the regression results for a simple linear model testing the relation between 
industrial employment, concentration and import penetration from China. The analysis is conducted over 
124 4-digit manufacturing industries over the period 2008-2015. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis.  ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.   
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Table 4. 2: Import penetration from China and spatial agglomeration, FE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES CDF (d=30) CDF (d=60) CDF (d=90) CDF (d=120) CDF (d=150) CDF (d=180) 
              5678888(d) 
       
China IP 0.0498*** 0.0686*** 0.0694*** 0.0614*** 0.0574*** 0.0559*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0180) (0.0167) (0.0164) 
       
Observations 791 791 791 791 791 791 
R-squared 0.963 0.963 0.967 0.972 0.977 0.977 
       567JJJJ(2) 
       
China IP 0.0448*** 0.0551*** 0.0556*** 0.0554*** 0.0554*** 0.0538*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0174) (0.0175) (0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0168) 
       
Observations 791 791 791 791 791 791 
R-squared 0.942 0.929 0.885 0.871 0.856 0.809 
              
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 IV NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes. The table reports the estimation results for the model presented in section 4.4.1, testing the effect of import 
penetration form China on spatial agglomeration. The dependent variables are the simple CDF of the DO function, 5678888(d) 
and the adjusted CDF,567JJJJ(2), presented in section 4.4.2. The import penetration variable is standardised to have zero 
mean and unit standard deviation. The model is estimated at different distance thresholds, between 30km and 180km. 
The analysis is conducted over 124 4-digit manufacturing industries over the period 2008-2015. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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Table 4. 3: Import penetration from China and spatial agglomeration, FE-IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES CDF (d=30) CDF (d=60) CDF (d=90) 
CDF 
(d=120) 
CDF 
(d=150) 
CDF 
(d=180) 
              5678888(d) 
       
China IP 0.207*** 0.402*** 0.483*** 0.467*** 0.429*** 0.434*** 
 (0.0715) (0.113) (0.140) (0.153) (0.157) (0.168) 
       
Observations 791 791 791 791 791 791 
R-squared 0.798 0.768 0.757 0.752 0.770 0.728 
       567JJJJ(2) 
       
China IP 0.152*** 0.294*** 0.298*** 0.293*** 0.287*** 0.290*** 
 (0.0586) (0.0793) (0.0796) (0.0785) (0.0767) (0.0765) 
       
Observations 791 791 791 791 791 791 
R-squared 0.942 0.928 0.885 0.87 0.856 0.809 
              
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 IV YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes. The table reports the estimation results for the model presented in section 4.4.1, testing the effect of import 
penetration form China on spatial agglomeration. The dependent variables are the simple CDF of the DO function, 5678888(d) 
and the adjusted CDF,567JJJJ(2), presented in section 4.4.2. Import penetration from China, standardised to have have zero 
mean and unit standard deviation, is instrumented using world export supply. The model is estimated at different 
distance thresholds, between 30km and 180km. The analysis is conducted over 124 4-digit manufacturing industries over 
the period 2008-2015. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.1 levels of significance. 
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Table 4. 4: Import penetration from BRICS countries and spatial agglomeration, FE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES CDF (d=30) CDF (d=60) CDF (d=90) 
CDF 
(d=120) 
CDF 
(d=150) 
CDF 
(d=180) 
              5678888(d) 
       
BRICS IP 0.0326*** 0.0423*** 0.0417*** 0.0370*** 0.0360*** 0.0359*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0131) (0.0126) (0.0114) (0.0108) (0.0109) 
       
Observations 791 791 791 791 791 791 
R-squared 0.963 0.962 0.966 0.972 0.977 0.977 
       567JJJJ(2) 
       
BRICS IP 0.0300*** 0.0345*** 0.0346*** 0.0345*** 0.0345*** 0.0332*** 
 (0.00999) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0106) 
       
Observations 791 791 791 791 791 791 
R-squared 0.942 0.929 0.885 0.871 0.856 0.809 
              
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 IV NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes. The table reports the estimation results for the model presented in section 4.4.1, testing the effect of import 
penetration form BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) on spatial agglomeration. The dependent 
variables are the simple CDF of the DO function, 5678888(d) and the adjusted CDF,567JJJJ(2), presented in section 4.4.2. The 
import penetration variable is standardised to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. The model is estimated at 
different distance thresholds, between 30km and 180km. The analysis is conducted over 124 4-digit manufacturing 
industries over the period 2008-2015. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * respectively indicate 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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Table 4. 5: Import penetration from BRICS countries and spatial agglomeration, FE-IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
CDF 
(d=30) 
CDF 
(d=60) 
CDF 
(d=90) 
CDF 
(d=120) 
CDF 
(d=150) 
CDF 
(d=180) 
              5678888(d) 
       
BRICS IP 0.177*** 0.340*** 0.405*** 0.387*** 0.352*** 0.356** 
 (0.0624) (0.0995) (0.120) (0.129) (0.132) (0.140) 
       
Observations 791 791 791 791 791 791 
R-squared 0.798 0.768 0.757 0.752 0.770 0.728 
       567JJJJ(2) 
       
BRICS IP 0.133** 0.254*** 0.255*** 0.251*** 0.245*** 0.247*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0746) (0.0751) (0.0739) (0.0727) (0.0725) 
       
Observations 791 791 791 791 791 791 
R-squared 0.942 0.928 0.885 0.87 0.856 0.809 
              
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 IV YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes. The table reports the estimation results for the model presented in section 4.4.1, testing the effect of import 
penetration form BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) on spatial agglomeration. The 
dependent variables are the simple CDF of the DO function, 5678888(d) and the adjusted CDF,567JJJJ(2), presented in 
section 4.4.2. Import penetration from BRICS countries, standardised to have zero mean and unit standard 
deviation, is instrumented using world export supply. The model is estimated at different distance thresholds, 
between 30km and 180km. The analysis is conducted over 124 4-digit manufacturing industries over the period 
2008-2015. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
levels of significance. 
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B. Graphical Analysis – Import penetration from China 
 
 
 
B.1.1 Entrants and exiters 
 
  
Figure 4. 4: Entrants (group-population) Figure 4. 5: Entrants (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888, estimated for new 
entrants in the market. The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, instrumented by world supply 
(sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
Figure 4. 6: Exiters (group-population) Figure 4. 7: Exiters (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888, estimated for plants that 
left the market. The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, instrumented by world supply (sections 
4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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B.1.2 Entrants and exiters 
 
 
Figure 4. 8: Entrants (group-population) Figure 4. 9: Entrants (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2),  estimated for plants 
that enter the market. The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, instrumented by world supply (sections 
4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
Figure 4. 10: Exiters (group-population) Figure 4. 11: Exiters (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2),  estimated for plants 
that left the market. The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, instrumented by world supply (sections 
4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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B.2.1  Small and large plants 
 
 
Figure 4. 12: Large plants (group-population) Figure 4. 13: Large Plants (group-group)   
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888,  estimated for large plants 
(above the 90th percentile of the size distribution). The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, 
instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 14: Small plants (group-population) Figure 4. 15: Small Plants (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888, estimated for small plants 
(below the 25th percentile of the size distribution). The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, 
instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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B.2.2 Small and large plants 
 
 
Figure 4. 16: Large plants (group-population) Figure 4. 17: Large Plants (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2),  estimated for large 
plants (above the 90th percentile of the size distribution). The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, 
instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 18: Small plants (group-population) Figure 4. 19: Small Plants (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2),  estimated for small 
plants (below the 25th percentile of the size distribution). The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, 
instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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B.3.1 Single-plant, Multiplant Firms and Heqdquarters 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 20: Single-plant (group-population) Figure 4. 21: Single-plant (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888,  estimated for single-plant 
firms. The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 22: Multiplant  (group-population) Figure 4. 23: Multiplant (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888, estimated for multiplant 
firms. The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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Figure 4. 24: Headquarters   (group-
population) 
Figure 4. 25: Headquarters  (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888, estimated for headquarter 
plants. The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 
4.4.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
B3.2 Single-plant, Multiplant Firms and Heqdquarters 
 
 
Figure 4. 26: Single-plant (group-
population) 
Figure 4. 27: Single-plant (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2),  estimated for single-
plant firms. The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 
4.4.5) 
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Figure 4. 28: Multiplant  (group-
population) 
Figure 4. 29: Multiplant (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2),  estimated for 
multiplant firms. The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, instrumented by world supply (sections 
4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 30: Headquarters (group-
population) 
Figure 4. 31: Headquarters  (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2), estimated for 
headquarter plants. The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, instrumented by world supply (sections 
4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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B.4.1  High/low LP 
 
 
Figure 4. 32: High LP  (group-population) Figure 4. 33: High LP (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888, estimated for high-
productive firms (above the 90th percentile of the labour productivity distribution). The explanatory variable is import 
penetration from China, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 34: Low LP (group-population) Figure 4. 35: Low LP (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888, estimated for high-
productive firms (below the 25th percentile of the labour productivity distribution). The explanatory variable is import 
penetration from China, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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B.4.2  High/low LP 
 
 
Figure 4. 36: High LP  (group-population) Figure 4. 37: High LP (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2),  estimated for high-
productive firms (above the 90th percentile of the labour productivity distribution). The explanatory variable is import 
penetration from China, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 38: Low LP (group-population) Figure 4. 39: Low LP (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2), estimated for low-
productive firms (below the 25th percentile of the labour productivity distribution). The explanatory variable is import 
penetration from China, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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B.5.1 MNEs 
 
Figure 4. 40: MNEs (group-population) Figure 4. 41: MNEs (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888,  estimated for multinational 
enterprises. The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 
4.4.5) 
 
 
B.5.2 MNEs 
 
Figure 4. 42: MNEs (group-population) Figure 4. 43: MNEs (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2), estimated for 
multinational enterprises. The explanatory variable is import penetration from China, instrumented by world supply 
(sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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C. Appendix  
 
 
C.1 Tables 
 
 
Table A4. 1: First stage 
 
 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) 
China IP BRICS IP 
   
WES 0.219*** 0.194*** 
 0.0259 0.0272 
      
Observations 1305 1305 
R-squared 0.68 0.57 
Industry FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
F 23.44 18.72 
This table reports the first stage of the instrumental 
strategy presented in Section 4.4.5. Import penetration 
from China and BRICS countries is analysed in relation 
to the overall supply from these countries to the world 
(excluding France). Robust standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis.  ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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C.1  Import penetration from BRICS 
 
 
C.1.1 Entrants and exiters 
 
Figure A4. 1: Entrants (group-population) Figure A4. 2 Entrants (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888, estimated for new entrants 
in the market. The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world supply 
(sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
Figure A4. 3: Exiters (group-population) Figure A4. 4: Exiters (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  56,678888 and 5V678888, estimated for plants that left 
the market. The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world supply (sections 
4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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C.1.2 Entrants and exiters 
 
Figure A4. 5: Entrants (group-population) Figure A4. 6: Entrants (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2), estimated for plants 
that enter the market. The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world 
supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
Figure A4. 7: Exiters (group-population) Figure A4. 8: Exiters (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2), estimated for plants 
that left the market. The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world supply 
(sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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C.2.1 Small and large plants 
 
Figure A4. 9: Large plants (group-
population) 
Figure A4. 10: Large Plants (group-group) 
 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888, estimated for large plants 
(above the 90th percentile of the size distribution). The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS countries, 
instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
Figure A4. 11: Small plants (group-
population) 
Figure A4. 12: Small Plants (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888, estimated for small plants 
(below the 25th percentile of the size distribution). The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS countries, 
instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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C.2.2 Small and large plants 
 
Figure A4. 13: Large plants (group-
population) 
Figure A4. 14: Large Plants (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2), estimated for large 
plants (above the 90th percentile of the size distribution). The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS 
countries, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
 
Figure A4. 15: Small plants (group-
population) 
Figure A4. 16: Small Plants (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2),  estimated for small 
plants (below the 25th percentile of the size distribution). The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS 
countries, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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C.3.1 Single-plant, Multiplant Firms and Heqdquarters 
 
Figure A4. 17: Single-plant (group-
population) 
Figure A4. 18: Single-plant (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888,  estimated for single-plant 
firms. The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 
and 4.4.5) 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4. 19: Multi-plant (group-
population) 
Figure A4. 20: Multi-plant (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888, estimated for multiplant 
firms. The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 
and 4.4.5) 
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Figure A4. 21: Headquarters (group-
population) 
Figure A4. 22: Headquarters (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2), estimated for 
headquarter plants. The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world supply 
(sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
 
C.3.2 Single-plant, Multiplant Firms and Heqdquarters 
 
Figure A4. 23: Single-plant (group-
population) 
Figure A4. 24: Single-plant (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	 V67JJJJJ(2),  estimated for single-
plant firms. The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world supply 
(sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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Figure A4. 25: Multi-plant (group-
population) 
Figure A4. 26: Multi-plant (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2), estimated for 
multiplant firms. The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world supply 
(sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
 
Figure A4. 27: Headquarters (group-
population) 
Figure A4. 28: Headquarters (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ( )	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2), estimated for 
headquarter plants. The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world supply 
(sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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C.4.1 High/low LP 
 
Figure A4. 29: High LP  (group-population) Figure A4. 30: High LP (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888,  estimated for high-
productive firms (above the 90th percentile of the labour productivity distribution). The explanatory variable is import 
penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
Figure A4. 31: Low LP (group-population) Figure A4. 32: Low LP (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888,  estimated for high-
productive firms (below the 25th percentile of the labour productivity distribution). The explanatory variable is import 
penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 190 
 
C.4.2  High/low LP 
 
Figure A4. 33: High LP  (group-population) Figure A4. 34: High LP (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2), estimated for high-
productive firms (above the 90th percentile of the labour productivity distribution). The explanatory variable is import 
penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
 
Figure A4. 35: Low LP (group-population) Figure A4. 36: Low LP (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	SO2	5V67JJJJ(2), estimated for low-
productive firms (below the 25th percentile of the labour productivity distribution). The explanatory variable is import 
penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
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C.5.1 MNEs 
 
Figure A4. 37: MNEs (group-population) Figure A4. 38: MNEs (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively,  5V6,6788888 and 5V678888, estimated for multinational 
enterprises. The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world supply 
(sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
C.5.2 MNEs 
 
Figure A4. 39: MNEs (group-population) Figure A4. 40: MNEs (group-group) 
  
The charts report coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for the specification 1 (Section 4.4.1), estimated for 
different distance thresholds (x axis). The dependent variables are, respectively, 5V6,67JJJJJ(2)	O2	5V67JJJJ(2), estimated for 
multinational enterprises. The explanatory variable is import penetration from BRICS countries, instrumented by world 
supply (sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
